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| Ukraine Upheaval Highlights E.U.’s Past Miscalculations and Future Dangers | Ukraine Upheaval Highlights E.U.’s Past Miscalculations and Future Dangers |
| (6 months later) | |
| BRUSSELS — When antigovernment protesters first took to the streets of the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, late last year, José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Union’s executive arm, applauded the demonstrators for “writing the new narrative” for a 28-nation bloc weighed down by economic gloom and growing public skepticism about its purpose. | |
| Three months on, with those same pro-European protesters now victorious but their country at risk of being dismembered by Russia, Ukraine’s political tumult has instead brought back an old story line — a confrontation redolent of the Cold War that has only underscored Europe’s divisions and exposed the chasm between the bloc’s high-minded aspirations and the rough reality of geopolitics as practiced by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. | Three months on, with those same pro-European protesters now victorious but their country at risk of being dismembered by Russia, Ukraine’s political tumult has instead brought back an old story line — a confrontation redolent of the Cold War that has only underscored Europe’s divisions and exposed the chasm between the bloc’s high-minded aspirations and the rough reality of geopolitics as practiced by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. |
| European Union leaders gathered Thursday in Brussels to consider further responses to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and steps to discourage Mr. Putin from additional encroachments into Ukraine. | European Union leaders gathered Thursday in Brussels to consider further responses to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and steps to discourage Mr. Putin from additional encroachments into Ukraine. |
| Divided by the economic and political interests of individual countries, they added 12 new names to a list of Russians and pro-Moscow Ukrainians hit by an asset freeze and travel ban announced in Brussels on Monday. Officials said the new names on the expanded blacklist included “really high-ranking” Russians and would be made public Friday. It was not known whether some or all of the people to be named are the same individuals signaled out by the United States for sanctions earlier on Thursday. | Divided by the economic and political interests of individual countries, they added 12 new names to a list of Russians and pro-Moscow Ukrainians hit by an asset freeze and travel ban announced in Brussels on Monday. Officials said the new names on the expanded blacklist included “really high-ranking” Russians and would be made public Friday. It was not known whether some or all of the people to be named are the same individuals signaled out by the United States for sanctions earlier on Thursday. |
| But, despite moves by Russia in recent days to formally seize Crimea, European leaders backed away from acting on their March 6 threat to impose broad economic sanctions if Moscow took “further steps to destabilize the situation in Ukraine.” They kept the threat alive by ordering preparations for a raft of possible restrictions on trade, economic and financial ties with Russia. | But, despite moves by Russia in recent days to formally seize Crimea, European leaders backed away from acting on their March 6 threat to impose broad economic sanctions if Moscow took “further steps to destabilize the situation in Ukraine.” They kept the threat alive by ordering preparations for a raft of possible restrictions on trade, economic and financial ties with Russia. |
| For years before Ukraine fractured, European leaders went out of their way to reassure Moscow that their approach to Ukraine would pose no threat — that it was not the zero-sum game that Mr. Putin ultimately saw it to be. That approach clearly failed, and the question now is not just how, but whether they can draw a firmer line. “The European Union definitely miscalculated about Russia’s reaction,” said Linus Linkevicius, the foreign minister of Lithuania, a Baltic state with a long and painful history of living in Moscow’s shadow. “When you play soccer there are rules of the game, but the other side turned out to be playing rugby with a bit of wrestling.” | For years before Ukraine fractured, European leaders went out of their way to reassure Moscow that their approach to Ukraine would pose no threat — that it was not the zero-sum game that Mr. Putin ultimately saw it to be. That approach clearly failed, and the question now is not just how, but whether they can draw a firmer line. “The European Union definitely miscalculated about Russia’s reaction,” said Linus Linkevicius, the foreign minister of Lithuania, a Baltic state with a long and painful history of living in Moscow’s shadow. “When you play soccer there are rules of the game, but the other side turned out to be playing rugby with a bit of wrestling.” |
| Anchored in elaborate rules and regulations, the European Union has repeatedly been caught off guard not only by Russia’s blunt methods and its disdain for established borders but also by the pace of unforeseen events in Ukraine. | Anchored in elaborate rules and regulations, the European Union has repeatedly been caught off guard not only by Russia’s blunt methods and its disdain for established borders but also by the pace of unforeseen events in Ukraine. |
| These started last November when the president then, Viktor F. Yanukovych, abruptly spurned a sweeping trade and political accord with Europe. | These started last November when the president then, Viktor F. Yanukovych, abruptly spurned a sweeping trade and political accord with Europe. |
| But his decision was not entirely unforeseeable. The European Union’s own intelligence analysis unit, Intcen, predicted in a secret report weeks before that Mr. Yanukovych would not sign the deal. | But his decision was not entirely unforeseeable. The European Union’s own intelligence analysis unit, Intcen, predicted in a secret report weeks before that Mr. Yanukovych would not sign the deal. |
| According to diplomats involved in Europe’s policy toward Ukraine, so much bureaucratic energy had been invested in bringing Ukraine into the bloc’s so-called Eastern Partnership program that wishful thinking prevailed over hardheaded calculation, especially since Mr. Yanukovych and his allies repeatedly restated their commitment to embrace Europe in the months ahead of his about-face. | According to diplomats involved in Europe’s policy toward Ukraine, so much bureaucratic energy had been invested in bringing Ukraine into the bloc’s so-called Eastern Partnership program that wishful thinking prevailed over hardheaded calculation, especially since Mr. Yanukovych and his allies repeatedly restated their commitment to embrace Europe in the months ahead of his about-face. |
| Brussels seemed to become locked inside its own minutely calibrated bureaucratic mechanism and shut out events that threatened to throw grit in the works. | Brussels seemed to become locked inside its own minutely calibrated bureaucratic mechanism and shut out events that threatened to throw grit in the works. |
| When Stefan Fule, the union’s enlargement commissioner and one of its main interlocutors with Ukraine, visited Kiev in mid-November, Mr. Yanukovych told him clearly, according to officials in Kiev and Brussels, that he was having serious second thoughts about signing the long-planned association agreement with Europe at a summit meeting scheduled for the end of that month in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania. | When Stefan Fule, the union’s enlargement commissioner and one of its main interlocutors with Ukraine, visited Kiev in mid-November, Mr. Yanukovych told him clearly, according to officials in Kiev and Brussels, that he was having serious second thoughts about signing the long-planned association agreement with Europe at a summit meeting scheduled for the end of that month in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania. |
| Mr. Fule, upon his return to Brussels, informed ambassadors privately of the possible setback but in a public statement issued Nov. 20 made no mention of any potential trouble and instead hailed the “determination” of Mr. Yanukovych and his allies. | Mr. Fule, upon his return to Brussels, informed ambassadors privately of the possible setback but in a public statement issued Nov. 20 made no mention of any potential trouble and instead hailed the “determination” of Mr. Yanukovych and his allies. |
| Mr. Linkevicius, the Lithuanian foreign minister, said that Mr. Yanukovych had sent so many mixed signals about his intentions that it was impossible to know what he intended to do. From 2008, when the European Union began its Eastern Partnership scheme, Europe’s efforts to extend democratic values and free trade to Ukraine and five other countries in the former Soviet Union were based on calculations that turned out to be wrong. | Mr. Linkevicius, the Lithuanian foreign minister, said that Mr. Yanukovych had sent so many mixed signals about his intentions that it was impossible to know what he intended to do. From 2008, when the European Union began its Eastern Partnership scheme, Europe’s efforts to extend democratic values and free trade to Ukraine and five other countries in the former Soviet Union were based on calculations that turned out to be wrong. |
| “We knew that we were heading for some issues with the Russians,” said Carl Bildt, Sweden’s foreign minister and an architect of the eastward push, along with the Polish foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski. “But we have seen a different Russia emerging, during the last year in particular, than many anticipated.” | “We knew that we were heading for some issues with the Russians,” said Carl Bildt, Sweden’s foreign minister and an architect of the eastward push, along with the Polish foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski. “But we have seen a different Russia emerging, during the last year in particular, than many anticipated.” |
| In its dealings with Russia, Mr. Bildt added, “We did two things wrong in retrospect.” The first, he said, was not to take issue with Moscow’s increasingly assertive claims since 2009 in its military doctrine that it had a right to protect Russians living outside the country, particularly in former Soviet lands. The second was Europe’s muted reaction when Russia started last year to block the import of Ukrainian goods and threatened severe hardship if Kiev signed the trade and political pact with Brussels. | In its dealings with Russia, Mr. Bildt added, “We did two things wrong in retrospect.” The first, he said, was not to take issue with Moscow’s increasingly assertive claims since 2009 in its military doctrine that it had a right to protect Russians living outside the country, particularly in former Soviet lands. The second was Europe’s muted reaction when Russia started last year to block the import of Ukrainian goods and threatened severe hardship if Kiev signed the trade and political pact with Brussels. |
| A senior diplomat in Brussels, speaking on condition of anonymity following diplomatic protocol, said that Europe had stumbled badly by reducing its outreach to Ukraine to a “technocratic and bloodless” exercise that ignored political realities. | A senior diplomat in Brussels, speaking on condition of anonymity following diplomatic protocol, said that Europe had stumbled badly by reducing its outreach to Ukraine to a “technocratic and bloodless” exercise that ignored political realities. |
| Britain and France, he added, “are the only member states that still understand hard power as opposed to the E.U. technocratic approach of ignoring the political dimension.” | Britain and France, he added, “are the only member states that still understand hard power as opposed to the E.U. technocratic approach of ignoring the political dimension.” |
| But officials in the Brussels headquarters of the European Commission, the union’s executive arm, say it was difficult to raise the alarm over Russian pressure last year because Ukraine itself kept mostly quiet about it until Mr. Yanukovych suddenly told Mr. Füle in November that trade restrictions imposed by Moscow had slashed key industrial sectors in Ukraine by 40 percent. | But officials in the Brussels headquarters of the European Commission, the union’s executive arm, say it was difficult to raise the alarm over Russian pressure last year because Ukraine itself kept mostly quiet about it until Mr. Yanukovych suddenly told Mr. Füle in November that trade restrictions imposed by Moscow had slashed key industrial sectors in Ukraine by 40 percent. |
| To some degree, the current clash is a result of the success of the early efforts to integrate Poland and the Baltic States into the West. “Everyone thought the Eastern Partnership was just another flabby European project,” said Fiona Hill, a Russia expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington and co-author of a political biography of Mr. Putin. | To some degree, the current clash is a result of the success of the early efforts to integrate Poland and the Baltic States into the West. “Everyone thought the Eastern Partnership was just another flabby European project,” said Fiona Hill, a Russia expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington and co-author of a political biography of Mr. Putin. |
| “But once a country signs up, it is in Weight Watchers and, if they follow the regimen, they change,” she said. “Russia realized this and did not like it.” | “But once a country signs up, it is in Weight Watchers and, if they follow the regimen, they change,” she said. “Russia realized this and did not like it.” |
| Indeed, she added, Russia had already been deeply alarmed by the transformation of countries like Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania after they entered the European Union in 2004. | Indeed, she added, Russia had already been deeply alarmed by the transformation of countries like Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania after they entered the European Union in 2004. |
| The Baltic states, formerly part of the Soviet Union, joined the European Union within a few weeks of their admission to NATO, a sequence that strengthened Moscow’s view that Brussels served as a stalking horse for the American-led military alliance. | The Baltic states, formerly part of the Soviet Union, joined the European Union within a few weeks of their admission to NATO, a sequence that strengthened Moscow’s view that Brussels served as a stalking horse for the American-led military alliance. |
| In the case of Ukraine, Europe never offered even the possibility of it one day joining the European Union, and NATO dropped Ukraine as a potential future member back in 2008. This raised hopes in Brussels that Moscow might not object too strongly, and Russia initially expressed little unease about Europe’s Eastern Partnership plans. | In the case of Ukraine, Europe never offered even the possibility of it one day joining the European Union, and NATO dropped Ukraine as a potential future member back in 2008. This raised hopes in Brussels that Moscow might not object too strongly, and Russia initially expressed little unease about Europe’s Eastern Partnership plans. |
| But after Mr. Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012, after four years as prime minister, previous talk of shared interests in free trade and close cooperation gave way to increasingly forceful calls for the establishment of a Moscow-dominated rival to the European Union called the Eurasian Union. By last summer, Moscow began a campaign of pressure to dissuade former Soviet lands, including Ukraine, from siding with Europe. | But after Mr. Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012, after four years as prime minister, previous talk of shared interests in free trade and close cooperation gave way to increasingly forceful calls for the establishment of a Moscow-dominated rival to the European Union called the Eurasian Union. By last summer, Moscow began a campaign of pressure to dissuade former Soviet lands, including Ukraine, from siding with Europe. |
| Of the six former Soviet republics that Brussels had hoped to pull into its orbit, only two, Moldova and Georgia, are still on track to sign association agreements with the European Union on schedule this summer. But that could easily change if Moscow ratchets up economic and other pressure to make them reconsider, as it did with Ukraine. | Of the six former Soviet republics that Brussels had hoped to pull into its orbit, only two, Moldova and Georgia, are still on track to sign association agreements with the European Union on schedule this summer. But that could easily change if Moscow ratchets up economic and other pressure to make them reconsider, as it did with Ukraine. |
| Ukraine now says it wants to revive the deal spurned by Mr. Yanukovych, but has been told by Europe that this will not be possible until it holds new elections in May. Instead, Europe has offered Ukraine a partial deal that will be sealed on Friday. | Ukraine now says it wants to revive the deal spurned by Mr. Yanukovych, but has been told by Europe that this will not be possible until it holds new elections in May. Instead, Europe has offered Ukraine a partial deal that will be sealed on Friday. |
| Asked how historians will judge Europe’s efforts to expand its law-abiding ways eastward, Mr. Linkevicius, Lithuania’s foreign minister, said: “At some distance, we will see how we are weak, how we are inconsistent. We are doing a lot of things too little and too late.” | Asked how historians will judge Europe’s efforts to expand its law-abiding ways eastward, Mr. Linkevicius, Lithuania’s foreign minister, said: “At some distance, we will see how we are weak, how we are inconsistent. We are doing a lot of things too little and too late.” |