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Donald Trump’s Identity Politics | Donald Trump’s Identity Politics |
(about 11 hours later) | |
In the wake of the presidential election, we’ve all been asking simplistic questions about how Donald Trump won. Was it economics? Was it racism? Was it misogyny? Did it come down to identity? We know that it can’t have been just one thing, and that President Trump’s triumph was a concoction of many things. Nonetheless, several factors came together in a peculiar way, with serious electoral consequences. Millions of white voters began to see themselves more openly not as white supremacists but as white identified. | In the wake of the presidential election, we’ve all been asking simplistic questions about how Donald Trump won. Was it economics? Was it racism? Was it misogyny? Did it come down to identity? We know that it can’t have been just one thing, and that President Trump’s triumph was a concoction of many things. Nonetheless, several factors came together in a peculiar way, with serious electoral consequences. Millions of white voters began to see themselves more openly not as white supremacists but as white identified. |
It is no secret that the president has capitalized on the increasing salience of race and ethnicity in recent years. The furious reaction to many different historical and cultural developments — mass immigration; the success of the civil rights and women’s rights movements; the election and re-election of a black president; and the approaching end of white majority status in the United States — has created a political environment ripe for the growth of white identity politics. | It is no secret that the president has capitalized on the increasing salience of race and ethnicity in recent years. The furious reaction to many different historical and cultural developments — mass immigration; the success of the civil rights and women’s rights movements; the election and re-election of a black president; and the approaching end of white majority status in the United States — has created a political environment ripe for the growth of white identity politics. |
Ashley Jardina, a political scientist at Duke, puts it this way: | Ashley Jardina, a political scientist at Duke, puts it this way: |
White voters for whom racial identity is important include a minority faction of white supremacists, but as a whole they constitute a much broader and encompassing group. In an Aug. 16 essay for The Washington Post’s Monkey Cage, Jardina wrote: | White voters for whom racial identity is important include a minority faction of white supremacists, but as a whole they constitute a much broader and encompassing group. In an Aug. 16 essay for The Washington Post’s Monkey Cage, Jardina wrote: |
A total of 36 percent of whites described their racial identity as either “very important” (16 percent) or “extremely important” (20 percent), according to an American National Election Studies survey in January 2016. Another 25 percent said it was “moderately important.” | A total of 36 percent of whites described their racial identity as either “very important” (16 percent) or “extremely important” (20 percent), according to an American National Election Studies survey in January 2016. Another 25 percent said it was “moderately important.” |
Careful examination of Trump’s initial support shows the key role of white identity voters in Trump’s ascendance. | Careful examination of Trump’s initial support shows the key role of white identity voters in Trump’s ascendance. |
Between Jan. 22 and Jan. 28, 2016, as Trump consolidated his early support on the eve of the Republican caucuses and primaries, ANES conducted a special pre-election survey. To explore the role of white voters for whom racial identity was especially important, three political scientists — John Sides, Michael Tesler and Lynn Vavreck — analyze the ANES data in their forthcoming book, “Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America.” | Between Jan. 22 and Jan. 28, 2016, as Trump consolidated his early support on the eve of the Republican caucuses and primaries, ANES conducted a special pre-election survey. To explore the role of white voters for whom racial identity was especially important, three political scientists — John Sides, Michael Tesler and Lynn Vavreck — analyze the ANES data in their forthcoming book, “Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America.” |
The survey, they write, | The survey, they write, |
On the basis of that scale, the authors assembled the data illustrated by the accompanying chart, which shows that fewer than five percent of white Republicans who indicated that their racial identity was of little importance supported Trump. Among those who said their identity as whites was extremely important to them, Trump’s support reached 81 percent. | On the basis of that scale, the authors assembled the data illustrated by the accompanying chart, which shows that fewer than five percent of white Republicans who indicated that their racial identity was of little importance supported Trump. Among those who said their identity as whites was extremely important to them, Trump’s support reached 81 percent. |
In a separate essay on the Post’s Monkey Cage site in March 2016, Tesler and Sides explained that | In a separate essay on the Post’s Monkey Cage site in March 2016, Tesler and Sides explained that |
Once Trump secured this “white identifier” base — making him competitive in a multicandidate field — he was positioned to expand his traction among traditional Republicans, including a decisive majority of those who backed Mitt Romney, John McCain and George W. Bush. | Once Trump secured this “white identifier” base — making him competitive in a multicandidate field — he was positioned to expand his traction among traditional Republicans, including a decisive majority of those who backed Mitt Romney, John McCain and George W. Bush. |
What are the views of “white identifiers”? | What are the views of “white identifiers”? |
According to Jardina, these voters | According to Jardina, these voters |
And they are | And they are |
Perhaps most important, Jardina found that white identifiers are | Perhaps most important, Jardina found that white identifiers are |
In other words, most — though by no means all — white identifiers appear to be driven as much by anger at their sense of lost status as by their animosity toward other groups, although these two feelings are clearly linked. | In other words, most — though by no means all — white identifiers appear to be driven as much by anger at their sense of lost status as by their animosity toward other groups, although these two feelings are clearly linked. |
Tesler argued last November, after the election, that the | Tesler argued last November, after the election, that the |
Just over a decade ago, political scientists were discounting the significance of white identity in elections. | Just over a decade ago, political scientists were discounting the significance of white identity in elections. |
David O. Sears, a professor of political science and psychology at U.C.L.A., wrote in 2006 that | David O. Sears, a professor of political science and psychology at U.C.L.A., wrote in 2006 that |
In a 2005 paper, Cara Wong, a political scientist at the University of Illinois, and Grace E. Cho, who was a graduate student in politial science at the University of Michigan at the time, found that many whites identified with their race, but “white racial identity is not politically salient.” | |
Wong and Cho went on, however, to make what turned out to be a crucially important point: that since | Wong and Cho went on, however, to make what turned out to be a crucially important point: that since |
John Podhoretz, in an article on the Commentary website, referred to Trump’s failure to condemn white supremacy — and anti-Semitism — on display in Charlottesville: | John Podhoretz, in an article on the Commentary website, referred to Trump’s failure to condemn white supremacy — and anti-Semitism — on display in Charlottesville: |
Podhoretz recognizes Trump’s adamant refusal to alienate his most dogged backers: | Podhoretz recognizes Trump’s adamant refusal to alienate his most dogged backers: |
and, even more important, | and, even more important, |
For years, Podhoretz writes, Trump operated below the radar, cultivating a constituency of “disaffected Americans entirely on the margins of American life, politically and culturally and organizationally.” | For years, Podhoretz writes, Trump operated below the radar, cultivating a constituency of “disaffected Americans entirely on the margins of American life, politically and culturally and organizationally.” |
He did so, Podhoretz argues, by capitalizing on media and organizational tools disdained by the establishment: Alex Jones’s Infowars; the American Media supermarket tabloids, including The National Enquirer, Star and the Globe; the WWE professional wrestling network where “Trump intermittently served as a kind of Special Guest Villain.” | He did so, Podhoretz argues, by capitalizing on media and organizational tools disdained by the establishment: Alex Jones’s Infowars; the American Media supermarket tabloids, including The National Enquirer, Star and the Globe; the WWE professional wrestling network where “Trump intermittently served as a kind of Special Guest Villain.” |
While Trump’s initial base included many on the margins of society, the larger population of white identifiers has been a growing constituency within the Republican electorate, starting in the white South after the passage under President Lyndon Johnson of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Trump, Vavreck noted in an email, was the first successful presidential candidate willing to explicitly direct his campaign toward this disaffected white electorate. | While Trump’s initial base included many on the margins of society, the larger population of white identifiers has been a growing constituency within the Republican electorate, starting in the white South after the passage under President Lyndon Johnson of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Trump, Vavreck noted in an email, was the first successful presidential candidate willing to explicitly direct his campaign toward this disaffected white electorate. |
“This has been happening for a while, which is why Trump was able to leverage white identity in 2016,” she wrote. “Trump went where no other GOP primary candidate would go even though they all knew those voters were there.” | “This has been happening for a while, which is why Trump was able to leverage white identity in 2016,” she wrote. “Trump went where no other GOP primary candidate would go even though they all knew those voters were there.” |
In “Identity Crisis,” Sides, Tesler and Vavreck write that Trump’s primary campaign | In “Identity Crisis,” Sides, Tesler and Vavreck write that Trump’s primary campaign |
The three authors describe a rapidly “growing sense of white victimhood.” They cite surveys showing that among Republicans, the perception of discrimination against whites grew from 38 percent in 2011-12 to 47 percent in January 2016. | The three authors describe a rapidly “growing sense of white victimhood.” They cite surveys showing that among Republicans, the perception of discrimination against whites grew from 38 percent in 2011-12 to 47 percent in January 2016. |
A February 2017 survey by the Public Religion Research Institute separately asked voters whether “there is a lot of discrimination” against various groups. 43 percent of Republicans said there is a lot of discrimination against whites, compared to 27 percent of Republicans who said that there is a lot of discrimination against blacks. | A February 2017 survey by the Public Religion Research Institute separately asked voters whether “there is a lot of discrimination” against various groups. 43 percent of Republicans said there is a lot of discrimination against whites, compared to 27 percent of Republicans who said that there is a lot of discrimination against blacks. |
Trump, according to Sides, Tesler and Vavreck, was | Trump, according to Sides, Tesler and Vavreck, was |
Direct and indirect references to threats to white identity continue to shape Trump’s rhetoric. In his ongoing drive to demonize the media, Trump declared during his rally in Phoenix on Tuesday that “they are trying to take away our history and our heritage.” | Direct and indirect references to threats to white identity continue to shape Trump’s rhetoric. In his ongoing drive to demonize the media, Trump declared during his rally in Phoenix on Tuesday that “they are trying to take away our history and our heritage.” |
Shedding light on Trump’s sustained backing among his supporters, a Public Policy Polling survey conducted from Aug. 18 to Aug. 21 found that Trump’s approval rating did not diminish in the aftermath of the Charlottesville protests on Aug. 11 and 12, during which white nationalists marched wearing Nazi insignia and chanting anti-Semitic slogans. The poll reported that support for Trump held firm | Shedding light on Trump’s sustained backing among his supporters, a Public Policy Polling survey conducted from Aug. 18 to Aug. 21 found that Trump’s approval rating did not diminish in the aftermath of the Charlottesville protests on Aug. 11 and 12, during which white nationalists marched wearing Nazi insignia and chanting anti-Semitic slogans. The poll reported that support for Trump held firm |
Trump has mobilized the white identity electorate, and in doing so has put the tenuous American commitment to racial and ethnic egalitarianism on the line. And Trump has been captured by the success of his own demagoguery. He surged ahead of his Republican competitors for the nomination when he threw matches on the kindling and now, under siege, his only strategy for survival is to pour gasoline on the flames. | Trump has mobilized the white identity electorate, and in doing so has put the tenuous American commitment to racial and ethnic egalitarianism on the line. And Trump has been captured by the success of his own demagoguery. He surged ahead of his Republican competitors for the nomination when he threw matches on the kindling and now, under siege, his only strategy for survival is to pour gasoline on the flames. |
No one doubts that it has been unsettling for many Americans to adapt to an increasingly interconnected world. Still, history has not been kind to those who have unequivocally yielded to racial grievance — to our local agitators, the David Dukes and the Father Coughlins, as well as to the even more poisonous propagators of racial hatred overseas. As Trump abandons his campaign promises to end endless war, to provide “beautiful” health care, to protect Medicaid, to restore American industry, jobs and mines, to make Mexico pay for a border wall, he has kept his partially veiled promise to focus on white racial essentialism, to make race divisive again. He has gone where other politicians dared not venture and he has taken the Republican Party with him. | No one doubts that it has been unsettling for many Americans to adapt to an increasingly interconnected world. Still, history has not been kind to those who have unequivocally yielded to racial grievance — to our local agitators, the David Dukes and the Father Coughlins, as well as to the even more poisonous propagators of racial hatred overseas. As Trump abandons his campaign promises to end endless war, to provide “beautiful” health care, to protect Medicaid, to restore American industry, jobs and mines, to make Mexico pay for a border wall, he has kept his partially veiled promise to focus on white racial essentialism, to make race divisive again. He has gone where other politicians dared not venture and he has taken the Republican Party with him. |
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