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Grenfell Tower should not have been lived in, fire chief tells inquiry Grenfell Tower should not have been lived in, fire chief tells inquiry
(35 minutes later)
The “horrendous” spread of the fire around and inside Grenfell Tower meant nobody should ever have been allowed to live in the high-rise, according to a senior fire commander. Grenfell Tower was not fit for people to live in, a senior London fire brigade officer has told the public inquiry into the disaster that claimed 72 lives.
Deputy assistant commissioner Andrew O’Loughlin said fire crews could never have predicted the way that flames engulfed the outside of the cladded block and tore through its internal compartments. Its deputy assistant commissioner, Andrew O’Loughlin, the most senior officer present when the advice for residents to stay put was changed to evacuate, said the building should have protected people who were staying where they were and he could not understand why the advice had been changed.
He said people who were in flats that had not yet been reached by smoke or fire should have been protected by staying where they were until escape routes were made safe. Speaking during the final week of evidence from firefighters who attended the blaze on 14 June 2017 he said: “The building was so horrendous several hours later that I think no one should have lived in the building.”
O’Loughlin was in overall charge at the incident as the most senior London fire brigade (LFB) officer present when the advice for residents to “stay-put” in their flats was changed. He continued: “So to say we should have changed the ‘stay-put’ advice, I don’t think would have been reasonable based on something that happened several hours later that none of us could ever have expected.”
From around 2.47am, residents were encouraged to escape if they could, rather than await rescue. His evidence cast fresh light on the confusion among firefighters as the 24-storey tower was engulfed in flames fuelled by combustible cladding and a litany of faults including failed fire doors, broken smoke ventilation systems and a fire lift that could not be properly commandeered. The inquiry has already heard that the stay-put policy had effectively failed at 1.24am and was only changed at 2.47am.
Asked whether he felt this should have happened sooner, O’Loughlin replied: “I think the stay-put advice for the conditions we were dealing with... stay-put should have stayed, people should have been safe in their flats. Some 25 minutes passed before O’Loughlin was informed of the change, the inquiry heard. He also received no updates from the unit coordinating calls from trapped residents during this time who were being given fire survival guidance by phone operators.
“You wouldn’t expect fire to spread around the building like it did on the outside, and for it to fail so catastrophically, we’d never expected or anticipated that would do that in the way it did, and then similarly... we would not expect the internal protection to fail so badly as well. O’Loughlin told the inquiry he was “confused” by the change in policy and did not think it would necessarily make a material difference to the rescue plan.
“So my expectation was people who were safe in their flats should stay safe in their flats.” “You wouldn’t expect fire to spread around the building like it did on the outside, and for it to fail so catastrophically, we’d never expected or anticipated that would do that in the way it did, and then similarly … we would not expect the internal protection to fail so badly as well,” he said. “So my expectation was people who were safe in their flats should stay safe in their flats.”
Counsel to the inquiry Richard Millett asked the officer: “On what you later discovered during the course of the night, do you accept that the revocation of the stay-put advice should have happened at an earlier stage than it did?” The counsel to the inquiry, Richard Millett, pressed him, asking: “On what you later discovered during the course of the night, do you accept that the revocation of the ‘stay-put’ advice should have happened at an earlier stage than it did?”
He answered: “I don’t think you could say that a decision could be taken earlier based on what I saw several hours later. O’Loughlin answered: “I don’t think you could say that a decision could be taken earlier based on what I saw several hours later.”
“I mean, the building was so horrendous several hours later that I think no-one should have lived in the building, so to say we should have changed the stay-put advice, I don’t think would have been reasonable based on something that happened several hours later that none of us could ever have expected.” The inquiry is currently in its first phase of evidence at Holborn Bars, central London, focusing on the events of the night of the fire. A second phase, not expected to start until next spring, will examine the decisions involved in the refurbishment of the council block which was owned by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.
About 25 minutes passed before O’Loughlin was informed of the change, the inquiry heard. On Thursday, the LFB commissioner, Dany Cotton, is expected to give evidence. The bereaved, survivors and residents are scheduled to begin their evidence next week amid continuing concern about the location of the inquiry, seven miles from Grenfell.
He also received no updates from those in charge of the fire sector and the unit coordinating fire survival guidance (FSG) calls from trapped residents during this time. The inquiry is intending to release an interim report in the new year which is likely to make recommendations about the safety of cladding systems similar to those used on Grenfell which contributed to the spread of the flames.
O’Loughlin told the inquiry he was confused by the change in policy and did not think it would necessarily make a difference to the rescue plan.
He said that communicating this change to residents was “not easily done” as there was no mechanism for contacting every individual flat in the north Kensington high-rise.
But he also said he did not expect it to make much difference to people who were trapped inside their flats as they already could not leave.
He explained: “Stay-put applies to people who are unaffected, FSG is for people who say they cannot leave their flats.
“When the two were put together, I was unclear exactly what we were talking about at that point.”
He later clarified what he understood the new advice to mean: “The change to stay-put is if people feel they can escape then they should try to, but I don’t think it’s trying to tell people they should go into a smoke-filled environment. It’s saying if you feel you can escape then you should.
“But I wasn’t then sending firefighters or planning to send firefighters to unaffected flats over sending them to flats that were directly affected and in immediate danger.”
O’Loughlin, who handed over to a superior minutes later, concluded that control room staff must have had information he did not in order for them to change the advice.
Based on the information he had at the time, he said: “The people who were staying in their flats, because they are unaffected, I would have kept them in their flats at that point in time until we could ensure the staircase was clear enough for them to come down safely.”
Seventy-one people died in the 14 June fire, with a 72nd resident dying months later.
The inquiry is n its first phase hearing evidence from firefighters at Holborn Bars, central London. On Thursday, LFB commissioner Dany Cotton is expected to give evidence.
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