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The Guardian view on the Chilcot delays: undermining his own work The Guardian view on the Chilcot delays: undermining his own work
(5 days later)
Sir John Chilcot is having another long, torrid summer. The continued uncertainty about a publication date for his report into the Iraq war, now six years in preparation, is turning mounting impatience into outright anger. A fortnight ago, some of the families of soldiers who died in the conflict threatened legal action to force the report’s publication. Last week the prime minister, who had tried to get the report published before the May election, added to the pressure. Now Sir John has finally broken his silence. He did indeed set a timetable – but only for another timetable. He announced that the Maxwellisation process, by which witnesses facing criticism in his draft report are given an opportunity to respond, was nearly complete. He expected the final replies shortly; once they had been received, he would assess the outstanding work and then announce a final timetable. His statement, with its promise not only of accuracy but also completeness, has all the urgency of the age of the quill pen. Sir John Chilcot is having another long, torrid summer. The continued uncertainty about a publication date for his report into the Iraq war, now six years in preparation, is turning mounting impatience into outright anger. A fortnight ago, some of the families of soldiers who died in the conflict threatened legal action to force the report’s publication. Last week the prime minister, who had tried to get the report published before the May election, added to the pressure. Now Sir John has finally broken his silence. He did indeed set a timetable – but only for another timetable. He announced that the Maxwellisation process, by which witnesses facing criticism in his draft report are given an opportunity to respond, was nearly complete. He expected the final replies shortly; once they had been received, he would assess the outstanding work and then announce a final timetable. His statement, with its promise not only of accuracy but also completeness, has all the urgency of the age of the quill pen.
Yet it would be unfair to ignore how vast the inquiry’s remit has been – even though it is also limited in a manner that his critics who want a verdict, preferably guilty, do not necessarily appreciate. Chilcot is examining the eight years between summer 2001 and July 2009, the years that start with the runup to war, cover its conduct in March 2003, and continue through the costly aftermath. He is also required to identify the lessons to be learned. This does not make him a hanging judge, fingering the guilty men. Rather, he is a Whitehall management guru. The absence of good legal expertise on his team may be part of the reason for its lethargic rate of progress. So, too, perhaps, is his appetite for “completeness”. Sir John says witnesses’ responses to their Maxwell letters have led to further documents being uncovered, needing further examination. But the urge to leave no stone unturned is a trap that will be recognised by anyone who has ever done any research. At some point, it has to stop.Yet it would be unfair to ignore how vast the inquiry’s remit has been – even though it is also limited in a manner that his critics who want a verdict, preferably guilty, do not necessarily appreciate. Chilcot is examining the eight years between summer 2001 and July 2009, the years that start with the runup to war, cover its conduct in March 2003, and continue through the costly aftermath. He is also required to identify the lessons to be learned. This does not make him a hanging judge, fingering the guilty men. Rather, he is a Whitehall management guru. The absence of good legal expertise on his team may be part of the reason for its lethargic rate of progress. So, too, perhaps, is his appetite for “completeness”. Sir John says witnesses’ responses to their Maxwell letters have led to further documents being uncovered, needing further examination. But the urge to leave no stone unturned is a trap that will be recognised by anyone who has ever done any research. At some point, it has to stop.
As the Guardian reported, many more people than Tony Blair and his immediate colleagues are likely to face criticism in the report. They include Clare Short, the former international development secretary who eventually resigned over the failure to prepare for the reconstruction of Iraq. Having been named in the Guardian, she broke ranks with other witnesses who have remained silent and volunteered herself to the BBC’s World at One to confirm that she had indeed received a so-called Maxwell letter, which made what she considered to be unfair criticisms. She also confirmed that the deadline for an answer had passed “a long time ago”. And she warned that Chilcot appeared to be planning to criticise much of Whitehall as well as senior military and the politicians: as a result, the report might fail to hold any single person responsible. Related: Chilcot report: we need a publication date by the end of the year | Letter from Shirley Williams
This would hardly be surprising, if it proves to be true. Even in the much-publicised absence of cabinet government that characterised the Blair era, any such huge and important a policy, conducted over an extended period of time, would inevitably have involved many individuals. How the policy was conceived and executed is at the heart of what the Chilcot inquiry is intended to clarify. And while the machinery of government will never bring people out on to the streets, in the end it might be the most effective contribution that Chilcot’s report can make. As the Guardian reported, many more people than Tony Blair and his immediate colleagues are likely to face criticism in the report. They include Clare Short, the former international development secretary who eventually resigned over the failure to prepare for the reconstruction of Iraq. Having been named in the Guardian, she broke ranks with other witnesses who have remained silent and volunteered herself to the BBC’s World at One to confirm that she had indeed received a so-called Maxwell letter, which made what she considered to be unfair criticisms. She also confirmed that the deadline for an answer had passed “a long time ago”. And she warned that Chilcot appeared to be planning to criticise much of Whitehall as well as senior military and the politicians: as a result, the report might fail to hold any single person responsible.
This would hardly be surprising, if it proves to be true. Even in the much-publicised absence of cabinet government that characterised the Blair era, any such huge and important a policy, conducted over an extended period of time, would inevitably have involved many individuals. How the policy was conceived and executed is at the heart of what the Chilcot inquiry is intended to clarify. And while the machinery of government will never bring people out on to the streets, in the end it might be the most effective contribution that Chilcot’s report can make.
Sir John, himself a former senior civil servant, rightly insists on the absolute importance of being both accurate and fair. An inquiry chaired by a tough-minded judge with good counsel to conduct the evidence sessions might have been a quicker and more effective way of arriving at the same place. But any thorough inquiry with such an extensive remit would have had to wrestle with enormous volume of evidence, the reluctance of the official machine to surrender certain documents in public and their potential security implications.Sir John, himself a former senior civil servant, rightly insists on the absolute importance of being both accurate and fair. An inquiry chaired by a tough-minded judge with good counsel to conduct the evidence sessions might have been a quicker and more effective way of arriving at the same place. But any thorough inquiry with such an extensive remit would have had to wrestle with enormous volume of evidence, the reluctance of the official machine to surrender certain documents in public and their potential security implications.
This report is more than an academic exercise in how government works; it goes beyond even the psychology of leadership, although both will be part of it. In the end it has a much harder, more symbolic and weightier function. It has to provide a degree of closure – for the families, of course, but for the country too. The effects of the Iraq war in the region are still being played out. It severely damaged trust in politics. It is asking too much of any single inquiry to make good the harm. But it could play a vital role in restoring the health of democracy. Every day of delay undermines its chance of success.This report is more than an academic exercise in how government works; it goes beyond even the psychology of leadership, although both will be part of it. In the end it has a much harder, more symbolic and weightier function. It has to provide a degree of closure – for the families, of course, but for the country too. The effects of the Iraq war in the region are still being played out. It severely damaged trust in politics. It is asking too much of any single inquiry to make good the harm. But it could play a vital role in restoring the health of democracy. Every day of delay undermines its chance of success.