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| How to stop worrying and embrace a nuclear North Korea | How to stop worrying and embrace a nuclear North Korea |
| (about 4 hours later) | |
| North Korea’s announcement that it has restarted its atomic bomb fuel production has sparked a now-familiar chorus of outrage and concern around the world. | North Korea’s announcement that it has restarted its atomic bomb fuel production has sparked a now-familiar chorus of outrage and concern around the world. |
| It seems that the west, governments and civilians alike, is more concerned with a possible military threat than with the myriad human rights violations taking place inside the country. | It seems that the west, governments and civilians alike, is more concerned with a possible military threat than with the myriad human rights violations taking place inside the country. |
| North Korea is a country which denies basic rights to its people and has as economy teetering on the edge of collapse. Instead of settling for maintaining the status quo, ignoring the suffering of millions and simply hoping the crisis doesn’t spill over the border, here’s what the west should do about North Korea: | North Korea is a country which denies basic rights to its people and has as economy teetering on the edge of collapse. Instead of settling for maintaining the status quo, ignoring the suffering of millions and simply hoping the crisis doesn’t spill over the border, here’s what the west should do about North Korea: |
| Related: North Korea says it has restarted all its nuclear bomb fuel plants | Related: North Korea says it has restarted all its nuclear bomb fuel plants |
| 1. Stop worrying about a nuclear North | 1. Stop worrying about a nuclear North |
| The DPRK isn’t interested in getting rid of its nuclear capacity; the west has tried sanctions, the threat of military force, and (unfulfilled) promises of alternative energy assistance for 20 years with no significant effect. Given that North Korea watched as Libya denuclearised in 2003 and was invaded in 2011, this should come as no surprise. | The DPRK isn’t interested in getting rid of its nuclear capacity; the west has tried sanctions, the threat of military force, and (unfulfilled) promises of alternative energy assistance for 20 years with no significant effect. Given that North Korea watched as Libya denuclearised in 2003 and was invaded in 2011, this should come as no surprise. |
| It’s time to accept North Korea as a nuclear power and shift the focus from deterrence politics to human security. If anything, diplomatic efforts should go towards encouraging North Korea to sign up to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and submit to regular IAEA inspections rather than stubbornly insisting that disarmament is a hard prerequisite for engagement. | It’s time to accept North Korea as a nuclear power and shift the focus from deterrence politics to human security. If anything, diplomatic efforts should go towards encouraging North Korea to sign up to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and submit to regular IAEA inspections rather than stubbornly insisting that disarmament is a hard prerequisite for engagement. |
| Related: North Korea's renewed nuclear threat keeps experts guessing | |
| 2. Continue joint military exercises with South Korea | 2. Continue joint military exercises with South Korea |
| The diplomatic utility of the annual exercises is two-fold: to remind the North (and China) of the US presence on the peninsula and to reassure western allies in the region (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines). At the most basic level, military exercises maintain operational readiness and ensure effective integration between participating forces. Yet the war games are disproportionate and overly theatrical when compared to the potential threat posed by North Korea – and offer all stick but no carrot. | The diplomatic utility of the annual exercises is two-fold: to remind the North (and China) of the US presence on the peninsula and to reassure western allies in the region (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines). At the most basic level, military exercises maintain operational readiness and ensure effective integration between participating forces. Yet the war games are disproportionate and overly theatrical when compared to the potential threat posed by North Korea – and offer all stick but no carrot. |
| 3. Engage in state-level diplomacy | 3. Engage in state-level diplomacy |
| Here’s the carrot: economic aid in exchange for human rights improvements. Avoiding the DPRK’s economic collapse is ultimately in the interests of western governments – not only to avoid a human rights crisis but also to prevent an influx of refugees to China and South Korea. The aid should be targeted at meeting civilians’ basic needs, for example food and healthcare. Economic aid is the other side of diplomacy, inverse to the use of military force, and would increase western influence over the North. North Korean diplomats are actually quite sane and reasonable. They have personal and national interests like any other diplomats; engaging with them would be mutually beneficial. | Here’s the carrot: economic aid in exchange for human rights improvements. Avoiding the DPRK’s economic collapse is ultimately in the interests of western governments – not only to avoid a human rights crisis but also to prevent an influx of refugees to China and South Korea. The aid should be targeted at meeting civilians’ basic needs, for example food and healthcare. Economic aid is the other side of diplomacy, inverse to the use of military force, and would increase western influence over the North. North Korean diplomats are actually quite sane and reasonable. They have personal and national interests like any other diplomats; engaging with them would be mutually beneficial. |
| 4. Recognise the limits of unofficial diplomacy | 4. Recognise the limits of unofficial diplomacy |
| The last high-profile attempt at so-called track two diplomacy was in 2013, when Dennis Rodman went to the North to try to secure the release of Korean-American Kenneth Bae who was in prison on charges amounting to propagating Christianity. He failed (although Bae has since been released). The lesson is that celebrity athletes are not reliable sources of diplomacy and future track two efforts should be coordinated with government-level engagement. | The last high-profile attempt at so-called track two diplomacy was in 2013, when Dennis Rodman went to the North to try to secure the release of Korean-American Kenneth Bae who was in prison on charges amounting to propagating Christianity. He failed (although Bae has since been released). The lesson is that celebrity athletes are not reliable sources of diplomacy and future track two efforts should be coordinated with government-level engagement. |
| 5. Listen to defectors (critically) | 5. Listen to defectors (critically) |
| Related: Why have North Korean defections dropped? | Related: Why have North Korean defections dropped? |
| Refugees offer the most reliable insight into life beyond the DMZ, the conditions within prisons, and the activities of the regime. Unfortunately the western media rewards sensationalist stories and some defectors have taken to fabricating elaborate tales of espionage and involvement with secret organs of the North’s government. This contributes to an already severe information deficit, silencing defectors who are telling the truth and hindering efforts at understanding the North. | Refugees offer the most reliable insight into life beyond the DMZ, the conditions within prisons, and the activities of the regime. Unfortunately the western media rewards sensationalist stories and some defectors have taken to fabricating elaborate tales of espionage and involvement with secret organs of the North’s government. This contributes to an already severe information deficit, silencing defectors who are telling the truth and hindering efforts at understanding the North. |
| 6. Read North Korean propaganda | 6. Read North Korean propaganda |
| The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) is the DPRK’s state news outlet and one of only two printed news sources in the country, the other being Rodong Sinmun. KCNA offers unique insight into the official party line within North Korea. Many “North Korea watchers” read the English version online and scoff at how ridiculous the government makes itself sound with its petty and combative insults – but these readers fail to realise that they aren’t the KCNA’s target audience. The state news is directed toward citizens who have no access to outside news sources. It is not indicative of what the government thinks, rather it’s a daily dose of Kimist propaganda and should be read accordingly. Interpreting the KCNA superficially would be to underestimate the sophistication of the government. | The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) is the DPRK’s state news outlet and one of only two printed news sources in the country, the other being Rodong Sinmun. KCNA offers unique insight into the official party line within North Korea. Many “North Korea watchers” read the English version online and scoff at how ridiculous the government makes itself sound with its petty and combative insults – but these readers fail to realise that they aren’t the KCNA’s target audience. The state news is directed toward citizens who have no access to outside news sources. It is not indicative of what the government thinks, rather it’s a daily dose of Kimist propaganda and should be read accordingly. Interpreting the KCNA superficially would be to underestimate the sophistication of the government. |
| 7. Support efforts by (some) human rights groups | 7. Support efforts by (some) human rights groups |
| International governments are not the only relevant players in international security. NGOs are potentially able to access and assist vulnerable people where states are not. Support groups which facilitate the agency of North Koreans, help amplify their voices and give them access to resources; avoid those who claim to speak on their behalf. | International governments are not the only relevant players in international security. NGOs are potentially able to access and assist vulnerable people where states are not. Support groups which facilitate the agency of North Koreans, help amplify their voices and give them access to resources; avoid those who claim to speak on their behalf. |
| Morgan Potts is a North Korean scholar and production editor for the British Association For Korean Studies academic journal, BAKS Papers | Morgan Potts is a North Korean scholar and production editor for the British Association For Korean Studies academic journal, BAKS Papers |
| Related: North Korea hints at long-range rocket launch to mark party anniversary | Related: North Korea hints at long-range rocket launch to mark party anniversary |