Goodbye to land warfare? No, says controversial new study
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Version 0 of 1. Shortly after the end of the war in Europe, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, head of the British army and Churchill’s principal military adviser during the second world war, reminded Stalin of a toast he had made at Yalta: “To those men who are always wanted in war and always forgotten in peace - the soldiers!” I was reminded of this reading a plea on behalf of armies, now - in the west, at least - treated as the poor relation of naval and air forces. Beleaguered army chiefs, including British, are getting increasingly despondent listening to the “no boots on the ground” mantra. Even as pundits say Isis and other terror groups can only be beaten by ground forces, desperate to put the bad experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan behind them, governments are placing their bets on drones and special forces, fast jets, “smart” bombs, and missiles. The Future of Land Warfare, by Michael O’Hanlon of the Washington-based Brookings thinktank, is an antidote to conventional wisdom. The author refers to “the supposed obsolescene of large-scale ground combat”, reflected in official American policy and defence reviews. He concludes that the size of the US army, which some commentators - notably senior members of other branches of the armed forces - want to slash should stay where it is now: about 500,000 active duty soldiers and 550,000 reservists. They should have the capability to wage one major “all-out regional battle” while “contributing substantially” to two multiyear, multilateral, operations. Though O’Hanlon’s arguments are directly mainly at the US, they can apply easily to other Nato members. European countries with the biggest armies are imposing significant cuts. The British army is being reduced from 102,000 to 80,000 (in the hope the number of reservists will increase from 24,000 to 30,000). Nearly three-fourths of the world’s full-time military personnel, almost 15m out of some 20m, are in their nations’ respective armies, O’Hanlon notes. Most wars today are civil wars, he adds, fought within states by ground forces. Interstate wars may be rare but when they do occur they generally involve a heavy concentration of ground combat forces. Conflicts involving Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Mexico could pose systemic and large-scale disruption to “the global order and to American interests”. Though he says he does not anticipate a war with Russia “it is important that Russia [does] not perceive itself as the undisputed preeminent land power of Central and Eastern Europe.” He adds: “Another Korea war is perhaps the only case where a large-scale encounter could credibly occur betweeen Chinese and American land armies in the future.” The bottom line is clear, insists O’Hanlon. “The case of ongoing US army engagement in a world of land-force-dominated militaries is powerful. Also, allies, for all their limits, are a clear strategic asset for the United States”. And deterrents, he adds, “ are more credible when they are quickly available as well as deployable”. He gives some scenarios where maintaining a large US army would be important: That is a long list of contingencies, and an opportunity in at least one - the last, Syria - offers itself right now. This is meat and drink to forlorn cheerleaders for armies. Britain, meanwhile, is sending a few scores of soldiers to Ukraine and the Baltic to train indigenous troops. And Nato is conducting exercises - and slowly building up a “Very High Readiness Joint Task Force”. It is expected to be made up of 5,000 troops, with lead units able to deploy at two days’ notice. |