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Turkey and the Aftermath of the Ankara Bombing Turkey and the Aftermath of the Ankara Bombing
(about 2 hours later)
Last weekend, the deadliest terrorism attack in modern Turkey’s history killed nearly 100 people who had gathered for a peace rally in Ankara, the capital. Tim Arango, a Times correspondent based in Istanbul, answers readers’ questions about the attack, the response by Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the political situation in the country just weeks before snap parliamentary elections.Last weekend, the deadliest terrorism attack in modern Turkey’s history killed nearly 100 people who had gathered for a peace rally in Ankara, the capital. Tim Arango, a Times correspondent based in Istanbul, answers readers’ questions about the attack, the response by Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the political situation in the country just weeks before snap parliamentary elections.
EFFECT ON ELECTIONSEFFECT ON ELECTIONS
Q. I would be very interested to read your take on how these bombings are likely to affect the results of the Nov. 1 election. Are the Turkish media suppressed by the government to such a point that most people are flocking to Erdogan and the A.K.P., or is there growing discontent? If the results of the November election are similar to those of the June election, will Erdogan accept them? Is there any way Erdogan’s power can be checked at this point, given that neither the laws nor public opinion seem to mean anything to him, and given that his party still appears happy to follow his orders? In other words, what are the prospects for true democracy and freedom of speech in Turkey in the next decade or two?Q. I would be very interested to read your take on how these bombings are likely to affect the results of the Nov. 1 election. Are the Turkish media suppressed by the government to such a point that most people are flocking to Erdogan and the A.K.P., or is there growing discontent? If the results of the November election are similar to those of the June election, will Erdogan accept them? Is there any way Erdogan’s power can be checked at this point, given that neither the laws nor public opinion seem to mean anything to him, and given that his party still appears happy to follow his orders? In other words, what are the prospects for true democracy and freedom of speech in Turkey in the next decade or two?
— H.G. in New Jersey— H.G. in New Jersey
A. There is certainly growing discontent, and that is clear by the trajectory of events in Turkey over the last few years — from the Gezi Park protests in 2013 to the election in June in which the Islamist Justice and Development Party, or the A.K.P., lost its majority in Parliament for the first time in more than a decade. A. There is certainly growing discontent, and that is clear by the trajectory of events in Turkey over the last few years — from the Gezi Park protests in 2013 to the election in June in which the Justice and Development Party, or the A.K.P., lost its majority in Parliament for the first time in more than a decade.
As we approach the Nov. 1 election, which will be a rerun of the previous vote because the country’s major political parties could not form a coalition, most polls predict that the result will be largely the same. That leaves the million-dollar question: How will Mr. Erdogan react? Will he allow a coalition to be formed? Will he push for yet another election?As we approach the Nov. 1 election, which will be a rerun of the previous vote because the country’s major political parties could not form a coalition, most polls predict that the result will be largely the same. That leaves the million-dollar question: How will Mr. Erdogan react? Will he allow a coalition to be formed? Will he push for yet another election?
Of course, we do not know, and what happens after this election could largely determine the future of Turkish democracy.Of course, we do not know, and what happens after this election could largely determine the future of Turkish democracy.
Many analysts believe that the only way for Turkey to revert to a democratic path is for Mr. Erdogan to confine his role within the constitutional limits of the presidency, which is mostly a ceremonial job. That would probably require those within the party to stand up to him, but there is no sign that will happen anytime soon.Many analysts believe that the only way for Turkey to revert to a democratic path is for Mr. Erdogan to confine his role within the constitutional limits of the presidency, which is mostly a ceremonial job. That would probably require those within the party to stand up to him, but there is no sign that will happen anytime soon.
EVIDENCE OF ISISEVIDENCE OF ISIS
Q. What evidence exists that this was an attack by ISIS? Erdogan has more to gain from introducing an attack upon this specific group of people — why rule him out so quickly?Q. What evidence exists that this was an attack by ISIS? Erdogan has more to gain from introducing an attack upon this specific group of people — why rule him out so quickly?
— Don Herman in Denver— Don Herman in Denver
A. The manner in which the attack was carried out — suicide bombings at a gathering that was, in part, an expression of Kurdish identity — resembled the bombing of a cultural center in Suruc, in southeast Turkey, in July. That attack killed more than 30 Kurdish activists, and the government blamed the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, although the group did not claim responsibility. The government has also said that the Islamic State is the prime suspect in Saturday’s attack.A. The manner in which the attack was carried out — suicide bombings at a gathering that was, in part, an expression of Kurdish identity — resembled the bombing of a cultural center in Suruc, in southeast Turkey, in July. That attack killed more than 30 Kurdish activists, and the government blamed the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, although the group did not claim responsibility. The government has also said that the Islamic State is the prime suspect in Saturday’s attack.
Another reason that many assumed the attack to be the work of ISIS is that the group has been fighting the Kurds in Syria and Iraq. So it would be logical that the Islamic State would seek to attack Kurds within Turkey.Another reason that many assumed the attack to be the work of ISIS is that the group has been fighting the Kurds in Syria and Iraq. So it would be logical that the Islamic State would seek to attack Kurds within Turkey.
Kurdish leaders in Turkey, however, have long accused the government of enabling ISIS — Turkey has, of course, supported rebel groups inside Syria — and so in the aftermath of Saturday’s attack, the Kurds immediately accused the government, saying that at the very least the authorities had failed to prevent the attack.Kurdish leaders in Turkey, however, have long accused the government of enabling ISIS — Turkey has, of course, supported rebel groups inside Syria — and so in the aftermath of Saturday’s attack, the Kurds immediately accused the government, saying that at the very least the authorities had failed to prevent the attack.
SECURITY CONCERNSSECURITY CONCERNS
Q. Did the Turkish government answer this question asked by surviving participants in the tragic peace demonstration: Why were there no security officers body-checking participants — apparently a standard practice during Turkish demonstrations?Q. Did the Turkish government answer this question asked by surviving participants in the tragic peace demonstration: Why were there no security officers body-checking participants — apparently a standard practice during Turkish demonstrations?
— SA in Canada— SA in Canada
A. This is a question a number of people, including security experts, have raised. And we do not have adequate answers yet. But on Saturday, during a news conference, the interior minister said there had been no security lapses, a comment that only added to the anger of the survivors.A. This is a question a number of people, including security experts, have raised. And we do not have adequate answers yet. But on Saturday, during a news conference, the interior minister said there had been no security lapses, a comment that only added to the anger of the survivors.
BREAKUP OF TURKEYBREAKUP OF TURKEY
Q. Do you think an actual breakup of Turkey would be a good idea? My (possibly wrong) sense is that the eastern part of Turkey is essentially a mideastern area while the western part is European.Q. Do you think an actual breakup of Turkey would be a good idea? My (possibly wrong) sense is that the eastern part of Turkey is essentially a mideastern area while the western part is European.
— Marcus Sinthrough in Princeton, N.J.— Marcus Sinthrough in Princeton, N.J.
A. No one would seriously discuss a breakup of Turkey. The problem at the heart of so much of the violence in Turkey now is an old one: national identity. In other words, can Turkey redefine a national identity that includes space for minorities, specifically the Kurds? For more than three decades, Kurdish rebels have fought against the Turkish state in the southeast, which is the Kurdish-dominated region of the country. The Kurdish militants, though, gave up the notion of a separate state, and in recent years Turkey and the Kurds have been discussing a peace plan, which would include cultural and language rights and a degree of autonomy.A. No one would seriously discuss a breakup of Turkey. The problem at the heart of so much of the violence in Turkey now is an old one: national identity. In other words, can Turkey redefine a national identity that includes space for minorities, specifically the Kurds? For more than three decades, Kurdish rebels have fought against the Turkish state in the southeast, which is the Kurdish-dominated region of the country. The Kurdish militants, though, gave up the notion of a separate state, and in recent years Turkey and the Kurds have been discussing a peace plan, which would include cultural and language rights and a degree of autonomy.
But in recent months that conflict has resumed, partly because of the domestic politics and partly because of the war in Syria, where Kurds, affiliated with the rebels in Turkey, are establishing their own area of autonomy near the Turkish border. So the challenge for Turkey is to return to the peace process, continuing the positive work of recent years.But in recent months that conflict has resumed, partly because of the domestic politics and partly because of the war in Syria, where Kurds, affiliated with the rebels in Turkey, are establishing their own area of autonomy near the Turkish border. So the challenge for Turkey is to return to the peace process, continuing the positive work of recent years.
One thing that is important to remember is that it was Mr. Erdogan’s government, in its earlier years, that did more than any previous Turkish government in advancing the rights of Kurds and acknowledging a Kurdish identity. And many Kurds, at one time, voted for Mr. Erdogan and his party. So there is a basis there for cooperation, even though the two sides today are enemies once again.One thing that is important to remember is that it was Mr. Erdogan’s government, in its earlier years, that did more than any previous Turkish government in advancing the rights of Kurds and acknowledging a Kurdish identity. And many Kurds, at one time, voted for Mr. Erdogan and his party. So there is a basis there for cooperation, even though the two sides today are enemies once again.
MEDIA RESTRICTIONS
Q. Shortly after the blasts attacking the peace rally, the Turkish government placed bans and restrictions on reporting and covering the loss. Although the restrictions were largely disregarded, can you share your experience, if any, reporting while under these restrictions, or were you exempt as a New York Times correspondent? And is this recent trend indicative of larger malaise and restrictions on freedom of the press, especially given the government’s clampdown on social networks like Twitter?
— Village in Lower Manhattan
A. I have never had an issue doing my job while one of these bans was in place. Sometimes the government does this to block the dissemination of certain images, as we saw earlier this year during a hostage crisis at an Istanbul courthouse. Often, during an event, these bans are widely ignored. But my understanding is that sometimes, after the fact, there is blowback such as fines for local organizations that have violated them.
And, yes, absolutely: The environment for the press and freedom of expression in Turkey, never great, has been deteriorating. Many of the most accomplished and respected Turkish journalists have lost their jobs in recent years, and we are seeing a particularly toxic environment ahead of the Nov. 1 election.
A well-known columnist, Ahmet Hakan, was recently beaten up outside his house. The offices of his newspaper were attacked by an angry mob. In each case, it was later determined that members of the governing party were involved.
TURKISH MILITARY
Q. Where is the Turkish military in all this? Does the A.K.P. trust the military to fight the Kurds—if it benefits Islamists? And vice versa? If Turkey continues coming apart at the seams, and the Islamists further prove themselves simultaneously divisive, authoritarian and incompetent, will secular Turkey call for a coup?
— Nate in New York City
A. Great question, because historically the military has played such a prominent role in Turkish politics. There have been three coups, and another instance in 1997 in which the military intervened, largely behind the scenes, to oust the first Islamist prime minister in an event that later became known as a “post modern coup.”
But under Mr. Erdogan’s government, the military was tamed – put back in its barracks, as it is commonly said – by a series of controversial trials. But then, and this gets complicated, many of the prosecutors and others who were responsible for the trials against the generals turned on Mr. Erdogan and initiated a widespread corruption investigation that reached the highest levels of the government. The result was that many of the same prosecutors were purged, and the generals were released from prison.
So the result has been that the military has been somewhat rehabilitated over the last year or so. No one believes the military is powerful like it once was, and no one is worried about a coup. But it is widely assumed that the military has been eager to wage this war against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or P.K.K., with Mr. Erdogan and the government.
POLARIZATION
Q. My question is whether there’s any sort of consensus amongst people as to whether there was a tipping point when the polarization started to become so strong?
— SWM in Providence
A. I’m not sure there’s a consensus as to the tipping point; it’s more like a continuum of a number of events. The highly controversial trials of the military and other groups in recent years, on supposed coup plots, did a lot to alienate secular society. The Gezi Park protests were another important event that highlighted the growing dissatisfaction toward the government, as was the corruption investigation, and the sense afterward that no one really faced justice. And now we just have a tangled web of factors – political instability, rising violence, deepening polarization, spillover from Syria – that suggest that Turkey is, as I wrote and many analysts have written recently, essentially at war with itself.