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Bamako attack shows Mali fight goes on two years after French intervention Bamako attack shows Mali fight goes on, two years after French intervention
(35 minutes later)
On 2 February 2013, five days after French forces had driven out the occupying jihadists, a victorious François Hollande arrived in Timbuktu, the emblematic desert city in north Mali.On 2 February 2013, five days after French forces had driven out the occupying jihadists, a victorious François Hollande arrived in Timbuktu, the emblematic desert city in north Mali.
It had taken just 23 days for the French to retake most of a swath of territory that for nine months had been proclaimed the Islamic Republic of Azawad, occupied by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (Aqim) and its allies. Few French presidents – indeed, few world leaders – can have enjoyed such an emphatic victory or received such a welcome from a grateful people.It had taken just 23 days for the French to retake most of a swath of territory that for nine months had been proclaimed the Islamic Republic of Azawad, occupied by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (Aqim) and its allies. Few French presidents – indeed, few world leaders – can have enjoyed such an emphatic victory or received such a welcome from a grateful people.
France’s decision to drive the jihadists out of northern Mali appeared then to be a rare and successful example of a risky boots-on-the-ground intervention of the sort that had fallen out of favour in the Obama years. But the jihadist attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako is evidence that the fight goes on. France’s decision to drive the jihadis out of northern Mali appeared then to be a rare and successful example of a risky boots-on-the-ground intervention of the sort that had fallen out of favour in the Obama years. But the jihadi attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako is evidence that the fight goes on.
In 2012, Mali’s jihadist problems were largely confined to the north. The Sahara had long been a rough neighbourhood, with its toxic mix of people traffickers, jihadists and drug smugglers – people the governor of Timbuktu labelled Islamonarcotrafiquants. In 2012, Mali’s jihadi problems were largely confined to the north. The Sahara had long been a rough neighbourhood, with its toxic mix of people traffickers, jihadis and drug smugglers – people the governor of Timbuktu labelled Islamonarcotrafiquants.
After the fall of the LIbyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and the flight of his Tuareg soldiers to their home across the desert, the pressure of policing this great northern region was too much for the Malian military, which had few bullets and poor equipment, and was so demoralised that many of its soldiers deserted or simply went home. The result was a military coup, and a power vacuum into which the Tuareg separatist MNLA and their jihadist allies drove. After the fall of the LIbyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and the flight of his Tuareg soldiers to their home across the desert, the pressure of policing this great northern region was too much for the Malian military, which had few bullets and poor equipment, and was so demoralised that many of its soldiers deserted or simply went home. The result was a military coup and a power vacuum into which the Tuareg separatist MNLA and their jihadi allies drove.
In the two and a half years since France’s intervention, Mali and its international partners have been working to rebuild. Elections in 2013 returned the charismatic elder statesman Ibrahim Boubacar Keita as president. By the following year, it was possible at ambassadors’ receptions in the capital to find European soldiers who were cautiously confident about turning the Malian military into a fighting force.In the two and a half years since France’s intervention, Mali and its international partners have been working to rebuild. Elections in 2013 returned the charismatic elder statesman Ibrahim Boubacar Keita as president. By the following year, it was possible at ambassadors’ receptions in the capital to find European soldiers who were cautiously confident about turning the Malian military into a fighting force.
In summer of 2015, long-running peace talks in Algiers concluded in agreement between the rebel coalition, the CMA, and in recent months some progress has been made among towards implementing it. France has not cut and run: while drawing down its military personnel in Mali, it is committed to a wider operation, codenamed Barkhane, with a long-term remit to keep the jihadists at bay across the Sahelian countries. In summer of 2015, long-running peace talks in Algiers concluded in agreement between the rebel coalition, the CMA, and in recent months some progress has been made towards implementing it. France has not cut and run: while drawing down its military personnel in Mali, it is committed to a wider operation, codenamed Barkhane, with a long-term remit to keep the jihadisat bay across the Sahelian countries.
But, as with Afghanistan or Iraq, the conflict has never fully gone away. The north is still populated by an alphabet soup of armed groups: apart from AQIM, jihadist offshoots include al-Mourabitoun (which has claimed responsibility for the Bamako attack) and Ansar Dine, while the separatists, including the HCUA and the MNLA, operate under the umbrella of the CMA. There are many more, including pro-government militias such as the Ganda Koy and Gatia. The result is that parts of the country are no-go areas even for its leaders, and the job of the UN protection force Minusma has become one of the most dangerous in world peacekeeping. But, as with Afghanistan or Iraq, the conflict has never fully gone away. The north is still populated by an alphabet soup of armed groups: apart from AQIM, jihadi offshoots include al-Mourabitoun (which has claimed responsibility for the Bamako attack) and Ansar Dine, while the separatists, including the HCUA and the MNLA, operate under the umbrella of the CMA. There are many more, including pro-government militias such as the Ganda Koy and Gatia. The result is that parts of the country are no-go areas even for its leaders and the job of the UN protection force Minusma has become one of the most dangerous in world peacekeeping.
Recently, the jihadist problem that originated in the desert has shown alarming signs of creeping south across the Niger river into central and southern Mali. In March there was a gun and bomb attack at La Terrasse bar in Bamako, which was popular with ex-patriates. In August a Byblos hotel in central Mali, a regular haunt of UN workers, was attacked and 13 people were killed. That attack was later said to be the work of a central Malian group called the Macina Liberation Front (FLM). Recently, the jihadi problem that originated in the desert has shown alarming signs of creeping south across the Niger river into central and southern Mali. In March, there was a gun and bomb attack at La Terrasse bar in Bamako, which was popular with expatriates. In August, the Byblos hotel in central Mali, a regular haunt of UN workers, was attacked and 13 people were killed. That attack was later said to be the work of a central Malian group called the Macina Liberation Front (FLM).
It is an inevitable impact of intervention focusing on the north that groups scatter and pop up in different areas, according Andrew Lebovich, a visiting fellow at the European Council of Foreign Relations. Paul Melly, of Chatham House, described the rise of these assaults on soft targets as “pinprick attacks”, and said they were often but not always the work of jihadists with links to the AQIM franchise. Some of the fighters within these groups are committed salafists, but for many the group’s objectives are not the point. Since 2012, local residents have often observed fighters moving seamlessly from one armed group to another, from jihadist to secular separatist group and back, irrespective of each group’s aims. It is an inevitable impact of intervention focusing on the north that groups scatter and pop up in different areas, according Andrew Lebovich, a visiting fellow at the European Council of Foreign Relations. Paul Melly, of Chatham House, described the rise of these assaults on soft targets as “pinprick attacks” and said they were often but not always the work of jihadis with links to the AQIM franchise. Some of the fighters within these groups are committed salafists but, for many, the group’s objectives are not the point. Since 2012, local residents have often observed fighters moving seamlessly from one armed group to another, from jihadi to secular separatist group and back, irrespective of each group’s aims.
There is an economic as well as a political dimension to the jihadists’ recruitment: the groups are fed by poor, disenfranchised young men who have few national loyalties and economic prospects. This part of the problem is exacerbated by the rise of political violence. Mali is famous around the world for its culture, and until recently many Malians made a living from tourism. That business is long extinct in the north and threatened in the south. It will not improve after the events of Friday. There is an economic as well as a political dimension to the jihadis’ recruitment: the groups are fed by poor, disenfranchised young men who have few national loyalties and economic prospects. This part of the problem is exacerbated by the rise of political violence. Mali is famous around the world for its culture and, until recently, many Malians made a living from tourism. That business is long extinct in the north and threatened in the south. It will not improve after the events of Friday.