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| British stabilisation plan for post-Gaddafi Libya was 'fanciful rot' | British stabilisation plan for post-Gaddafi Libya was 'fanciful rot' |
| (35 minutes later) | |
| A senior government minister wrote the phrase “fanciful rot” on a British stabilisation plan for Libya drawn up for implementation after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, the foreign affairs select committee has been told during a day-long session on the causes of Libya’s near collapse. | |
| Former international development minister Alan Duncan said the paper, drawn up by a cross-governmental body of officials, was “an unrealistic desktop exercise” that took no account of the tribal forces that would be unleashed if Gaddafi’s government fell. | |
| Duncan said: “[The paper was based on the] whopping assumption that anything that follows Gaddafi will be better. It did not foresee the real historic and tribal tensions [that would] be unleashed and act as a source for conflict and not unity.” His remarks reflect a growing acceptance within Whitehall that Britain’s intervention in Libya misjudged the political forces in the country. | |
| Speaking to the committee, the former foreign secretary William Hague conceded Libya has been left in a “terrible state” because the west failed to take “forceful” action in the aftermath of Gaddafi’s fall in 2011. Accepting Libya was in a terrible state, he reflected: “In Libya we had plenty of plans but no power to implement them.” | |
| Only 13 MPs voted against the Libyan intervention. Lord Hague said he would take the same decision to defend civilians in Benghazi from an attack by Gaddafi, but said there should have been a more prescriptive approach by the coalition following the military intervention. | |
| The former defence secretary Liam Fox also admitted Britain knew that weapons were being transported in convoys out of the collapsing Libyan state into Niger and Mali but was unable to act because it did not have ground troops to interdict the flow of weaponry. He said such leakage was “an unavoidable consequence of the lack of ground troops”. | The former defence secretary Liam Fox also admitted Britain knew that weapons were being transported in convoys out of the collapsing Libyan state into Niger and Mali but was unable to act because it did not have ground troops to interdict the flow of weaponry. He said such leakage was “an unavoidable consequence of the lack of ground troops”. |
| David Richards, chief of the defence staff at the time, also conceded that he was “very sorry about the outcome” to the campaign, saying it was “a strategic failure”. He claimed respectable Libyans had assured the Foreign Office that they would have a grasp over the militias once the conflict was over. Lord Richards said with the benefit of hindsight this was wrong, adding that the diplomats “somehow hoped that it would work out on the night when self-evidently it did not”. | |
| Richards revealed he had built a military break point into the UK plan for Libya, to take place after protecting the civilians of Benghazi from Gaddafi, but the pause, designed to give a chance to reopen negotiations with Gaddafi, was rejected by the UK’s French allies and gained little traction in the UK. “We did not own the process,” Richards said. | Richards revealed he had built a military break point into the UK plan for Libya, to take place after protecting the civilians of Benghazi from Gaddafi, but the pause, designed to give a chance to reopen negotiations with Gaddafi, was rejected by the UK’s French allies and gained little traction in the UK. “We did not own the process,” Richards said. |
| Richards also admitted that British military intelligence had little knowledge of the anti-Gaddafi forces in Libya. Libyan officials had assured him that there were no tribal forces inside Libya. He justified Britain’s intervention pointing out it was necessary to act swiftly to save tens of thousands of lives in Benghazi. | Richards also admitted that British military intelligence had little knowledge of the anti-Gaddafi forces in Libya. Libyan officials had assured him that there were no tribal forces inside Libya. He justified Britain’s intervention pointing out it was necessary to act swiftly to save tens of thousands of lives in Benghazi. |
| Related: Libya unveils UN-backed government but divisions remain | |
| He added: “If you don’t do it properly or you don’t have the resources, do not do it all. If you want to win wars, mass matters, you need troops on the ground.” | He added: “If you don’t do it properly or you don’t have the resources, do not do it all. If you want to win wars, mass matters, you need troops on the ground.” |
| The all-party committee is looking into the justification for the Libyan military intervention, and the subsequent collapse of authority inside Libya. Since Gaddafi’s departure, Islamic State has gained a foothold in the country. | The all-party committee is looking into the justification for the Libyan military intervention, and the subsequent collapse of authority inside Libya. Since Gaddafi’s departure, Islamic State has gained a foothold in the country. |
| Fox said: “It is always true that where a power vacuum is created, forces of insurgency are drawn into it.” He could not say if there had been sufficient international planning for post-war reconstruction. | Fox said: “It is always true that where a power vacuum is created, forces of insurgency are drawn into it.” He could not say if there had been sufficient international planning for post-war reconstruction. |
| Fox said the aim had never been regime change in Libya, but admitted he did not see any paper warning him that the disparate anti-Gaddafi rebel groups included Islamist forces. | Fox said the aim had never been regime change in Libya, but admitted he did not see any paper warning him that the disparate anti-Gaddafi rebel groups included Islamist forces. |
| In October 2011, Fox said, he was made “acutely aware” by Mustafa Jalil, the chairman of the Libyan National Transitional Council, of how disunited the militias had become. | In October 2011, Fox said, he was made “acutely aware” by Mustafa Jalil, the chairman of the Libyan National Transitional Council, of how disunited the militias had become. |
| Fox said France was the chief source of the momentum for military intervention in February 2011, with the former president Nicolas Sarkozy “very determined” from the outset to launch airstrikes within minutes of an agreement to do so. | Fox said France was the chief source of the momentum for military intervention in February 2011, with the former president Nicolas Sarkozy “very determined” from the outset to launch airstrikes within minutes of an agreement to do so. |
| Asked if France had “jumped the gun and didn’t tell us”, Fox said he was notaware of anyone in government who knew about the impending airstrikes. | Asked if France had “jumped the gun and didn’t tell us”, Fox said he was notaware of anyone in government who knew about the impending airstrikes. |
| Hague told MPs that transition had been too quick and excessively rapid elections meant senior experienced figures in the transitional government “disappeared” too quickly. He conceded “certainly there was a success for radical Islamist candidates” in the poll. | Hague told MPs that transition had been too quick and excessively rapid elections meant senior experienced figures in the transitional government “disappeared” too quickly. He conceded “certainly there was a success for radical Islamist candidates” in the poll. |
| The former foreign secretary said United Nations assistance was “not prescriptive enough” and the organisation had failed to be “forceful” in implementing plans for crucial areas such as policing. | The former foreign secretary said United Nations assistance was “not prescriptive enough” and the organisation had failed to be “forceful” in implementing plans for crucial areas such as policing. |
| “One of the lessons of this is not that there was a lack of planning, but that transition takes a lot longer,” Hague added. “It is in a terrible state.” |