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Excessive force not a problem in the D.C. police force, but issues remain | Excessive force not a problem in the D.C. police force, but issues remain |
(about 5 hours later) | |
Nearly a decade after the Justice Department ended its oversight of D.C. police, the use of excessive force and shootings by officers have remained low and have “not reemerged as a problem,” according to an independent report made public Thursday. | |
The police force, according to the review commissioned by D.C. Auditor Kathleen Patterson, “is plainly a very different, and much better, law enforcement agency” than it was when federal authorities began investigating fatal shootings by officers in 1999, when the department had the highest rate among large cities in the nation. | The police force, according to the review commissioned by D.C. Auditor Kathleen Patterson, “is plainly a very different, and much better, law enforcement agency” than it was when federal authorities began investigating fatal shootings by officers in 1999, when the department had the highest rate among large cities in the nation. |
But investigators also found what they called “significant shortcomings” that were procedural and substantive, including concerns about the way some internal investigations were conducted. The reviewers also questioned the decision to merge an elite squad that handled probes of shootings by officers into a larger unit, saying that the quality of inquiries has suffered. | |
The report cites numerous instances in which investigations were incomplete, including cases where detectives failed to follow up on discrepancies between accounts of officers and questionable tactics that went unexamined. | The report cites numerous instances in which investigations were incomplete, including cases where detectives failed to follow up on discrepancies between accounts of officers and questionable tactics that went unexamined. |
Police disputed or sought to correct many parts of the report and said their investigations have not declined in quality. The department said the agency “remains a leader in the field of use-of-force investigations. The investigations conducted by [internal affairs] from 2008 to the present have investigative substance and are based on sound investigative principles.” Police also noted a new program designed to identify and root out problem officers and the implementation of body-worn cameras to increase accountability. | Police disputed or sought to correct many parts of the report and said their investigations have not declined in quality. The department said the agency “remains a leader in the field of use-of-force investigations. The investigations conducted by [internal affairs] from 2008 to the present have investigative substance and are based on sound investigative principles.” Police also noted a new program designed to identify and root out problem officers and the implementation of body-worn cameras to increase accountability. |
The review was conducted by the Bromwich Group, headed by Michael R. Bromwich, who served as the monitor overseeing D.C. police reforms for the Justice Department from 2001 to 2008. The oversight came after The Washington Post published a series called “Deadly Force,” which won the Pulitzer Prize for public service in 1999. In addition to the Justice Department review, the police chief ordered new firearms training for all 3,500 officers. | The review was conducted by the Bromwich Group, headed by Michael R. Bromwich, who served as the monitor overseeing D.C. police reforms for the Justice Department from 2001 to 2008. The oversight came after The Washington Post published a series called “Deadly Force,” which won the Pulitzer Prize for public service in 1999. In addition to the Justice Department review, the police chief ordered new firearms training for all 3,500 officers. |
[Read the Post’s 1998 investigation into police shootings in the District] | [Read the Post’s 1998 investigation into police shootings in the District] |
The report, titled “The durability of police reform,” comes at a time when law enforcement is under increased scrutiny across the country for tactics and use of deadly force. Many departments are implementing reforms that mirror those the District was forced to undertake years ago, and prosecutors are increasingly charging officers for deadly shootings. | |
Bromwich’s team met with D.C. Police Chief Cathy L. Lanier and her staff, which issued a 42-page response to the report. The police department agreed to implement 15 suggestions, agreed in part to 13 and opposed 10. Four of the suggestions Lanier rejected related to new programs, and the department felt the analysis of those was premature. | Bromwich’s team met with D.C. Police Chief Cathy L. Lanier and her staff, which issued a 42-page response to the report. The police department agreed to implement 15 suggestions, agreed in part to 13 and opposed 10. Four of the suggestions Lanier rejected related to new programs, and the department felt the analysis of those was premature. |
The report found that even though the D.C. police force is no longer required to maintain its reforms, it has largely kept them in place since signing a memo of understanding in 2001. Intentional discharges of weapons — 28 in 2001, 30 in 2004 and 31 in 2007 — have declined to seven in 2010, nine in 2012 and 15 in 2015. Since 2009, the report says, the number of fatal shootings by police has remained relatively constant, between three and eight each year. | The report found that even though the D.C. police force is no longer required to maintain its reforms, it has largely kept them in place since signing a memo of understanding in 2001. Intentional discharges of weapons — 28 in 2001, 30 in 2004 and 31 in 2007 — have declined to seven in 2010, nine in 2012 and 15 in 2015. Since 2009, the report says, the number of fatal shootings by police has remained relatively constant, between three and eight each year. |
Other types of force used by officers — such as batons and tactical takedowns — were difficult to track because of changes in policy and reporting requirements. But the report found “no evidence of any significant or sustained increase in any category of use of force employed by MPD officers.” | Other types of force used by officers — such as batons and tactical takedowns — were difficult to track because of changes in policy and reporting requirements. But the report found “no evidence of any significant or sustained increase in any category of use of force employed by MPD officers.” |
But the report criticized police for recently removing certain categories of force, such as takedowns that do not result in injuries, from reporting and investigation requirements. The reviewers said those changes “weaken the comprehensive system for reporting, tracking and managing less serious uses of force.” | |
Police said the report mischaracterized the department’s policy, which requires reporting takedowns and use of force that result in injuries or claims of injury. “While MPD is willing to reinstate the reporting requirement for all tactical take-downs, regardless of injury, our experience has been that requiring paperwork and a full administrative investigation anytime an arrestee resists being put in handcuffs is a waste of scarce and valuable resources,” the department said in its response. | |
Another change the report found fault with was the disbanding of the Force Investigation Team, called FIT, which had exclusively reviewed police-involved shootings and serious uses of force. In 2012, Lanier merged the team with the internal affairs division, citing a diminished workload because of the fewer shootings by officers. | |
Regardless of whether the department maintained the shooting team or merged it with another squad, the report found the quality of investigations into police shootings “has deteriorated over the past seven to eight years.” The report recommends that the internal affairs division assign specialists to handle such complex cases. | |
Police also complained that the reviewers drew “broad conclusions regarding the quality” of internal investigations “based on a review of handful of cases.” It defended merging its elite force investigation squad into internal affairs, saying detectives were exceptionally trained. | |
The report authors reviewed or tried to examine three fatal police shooting cases, two in 2014 and another in 2011. | |
In the 2011 case, reviewers agreed with findings by police and prosecutors that the shooting of Ralphael Briscoe was justified because the officer reasonably believed the suspect’s pellet gun was a firearm. A federal civil jury hearing a $100 million lawsuit sided with the officers. | |
But the report said FIT detectives failed to reconcile inconsistencies in the reasons officers gave for chasing Briscoe, and criticized the “excessive use of leading questions.” The report also found that there were discrepancies between written summaries of interviews and tape recordings, and said a use-of-force review board made no “serious effort to conduct a tactical analysis” of the officers’ actions. | |
The report said the internal police investigation “included no discussion whatsoever of the tactics used by the shooting officer, and no discussion about whether or not the tactics used by the shooting officer were consistent with training provided to officers.” | |
The report authors said they had difficulty reviewing two 2014 shootings because reviews by the U.S. attorney’s office were still ongoing and they did not have access to the complete files. | |
The authors also said they were troubled at what the report called an inordinate length of time to investigate use-of-force cases. Such cases are first investigated as potential crimes and are reviewed by police and prosecutors in the U.S. attorney’s office. | |
Such inquiries can take as long as 19 months, and most often result in no charges being filed. The report says that based on information from prosecutors, “there has never been a criminal prosecution of an on-duty MPD officer arising from an officer-involved shooting.” | Such inquiries can take as long as 19 months, and most often result in no charges being filed. The report says that based on information from prosecutors, “there has never been a criminal prosecution of an on-duty MPD officer arising from an officer-involved shooting.” |
The report said authorities should find a way to speed up inquiries or overlap administrative and criminal reviews, which can be difficult given the different legal requirements of both. Officers, for example, can’t be compelled to give statements until after the criminal investigation is complete. | |
In a letter to the reviewers, prosecutors said the report oversimplifies the time for investigations, failing to take into account that many agencies have to complete tasks, such as analyzing DNA evidence, and that the pace of such investigations has sped up over the past decade. |