The Observer view on Britain and Europe
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Version 0 of 1. There is a view, current in some circles here and abroad, that the referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU is an unnecessary and damaging distraction. Issues such as the war in Syria, global terrorism, the impact of climate change and widening social and economic inequality at home are deemed more deserving of attention. Did not Margaret Thatcher, while insisting on proper limitations to EU power, ultimately answer the European question, both for Eurosceptic Tories and the country, when she declared in Bruges in 1988: “Our destiny is in Europe”? Unveiling his referendum plan in January 2013, David Cameron recycled some of Thatcher’s ambivalence. He warned that deepening integration among the 19 eurozone countries and the demands of global competition posed important questions for the UK-EU relationship. Yet, like Thatcher, he did not say Britain should leave. Quite the opposite. “I do not want that to happen. I want the EU to be a success. And I want a relationship between Britain and the EU that keeps us in it,” Cameron said. In calling the referendum, it was clear he was responding primarily to party pressures, not continental power shifts or any fundamental change of heart. In the same speech, he argued that public disillusionment with the EU “is at an all-time high”. In fact, according to a contemporary Ipsos Mori survey, only 2% of voters included Europe among the most pressing issues facing Britain. A more alarming figure for Cameron, at that decisive moment three years ago, was Labour’s 10% poll lead – and growing panic among Tory backbenchers about the rapid rise of Ukip. As the 2015 election showed, these fears were unfounded. But he was stuck with his referendum. Having put party before country and himself before party, and called a vote for the wrong reasons, Cameron compounded his error by squandering the opportunity for renegotiation. This is not surprising. He has rarely demonstrated a firm grasp of, or a sustained personal interest in, foreign affairs. His neglect of Europe during his first term was illustrated by the Tories’ withdrawal from the main centre-right group in the European parliament, unwisely snubbing powerful allies such as Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats. Looked at from the outside, Cameron is one of the most parochial prime ministers Britain has produced. His subsequent negotiations have been characterised by haste, muddle and lack of ambition. It seems he can hardly wait to get the whole business over with, hence the prospect of an early June vote. His evident weakness has undermined his already limited leverage with irritated EU leaders wary of being sucked into what seems an essentially British problem. In the tradition of the Major-era “bastards”, Cameron has not been helped by some semi-loyal Eurosceptic ministers and MPs whose lack of vision reflects their limited abilities. How very gracious of Theresa May to let it be known, in her grandly elevated view, that the prime minister may have secured the basis for a deal! How jolly for Boris Johnson to keep flashing his ankle at Downing Street. When considered calmly, the package of changes assembled by Cameron and Donald Tusk, the EU council president, has merit. The threat of British withdrawal has contributed to a shift in a European mindset that placed a premium on integration, enlargement and bringing more countries into the euro. The driver of the EU project was always the historical and constitutional obligation on the commission to push for integration, to open with the highest bid and move in one direction. Now, there is more questioning and a recognition that perhaps the bid might need to be in the other direction – a sense that unless the EU and commission question its approach, it could be done for. The fear grew that Britain could be just the first to go. And Cameron has garnered backing for some of his specific measures. Several east and central European leaders support his proposed additional protections for non-eurozone members. Many agree there is too much red tape. Many parliaments would welcome a moderate restoration of sovereign powers. The once emblematic concept of ever-closer union has palled in these more complex times, without Cameron having to push his case. Even on the question of in-work benefits, at a time when uncontrolled migration is affecting all, there is sympathy, if not agreement, for Cameron’s stance. All of which underscores the substantive point: that in changing times, many, perhaps a majority of EU states, overshadowed for too long by an inflexible Franco-German axis, accept there is need for reform. The British renegotiation, if it had been handled more consensually, could have achieved so much more. As the last European elections showed, there is deep dissatisfaction in all 28 EU countries. Post-crash austerity imposed on southern Europe continues to cause immense damage. The proliferation of xenophobic, racist and nationalist parties of left and right is one direct result. The failure of the Brussels elites to respond to, or even demonstrate understanding of, this crisis is more injurious to the idea of Europe than anything Bill Cash and John Redwood might do. The EU suffers from a chronic democratic deficit. But the answer is not to walk away. The answer lies in challenging how Europe works, in rendering its opaque institutions more open and accountable and exercising more control over how it evolves. A good start would be a total re-evaluation of the EU’s proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the US, which might be good for multinationals, but threatens jobs, incomes, workplace and environmental standards and the way public sector organisations are run. The public, by and large, understands this broader point, even if a complacent Downing Street does not. Cameron’s referendum will be decided, to a large degree, not by mixed perceptions of his much-mocked renegotiation but far bigger issues. Now you ask us, voters might say, one such issue is this lack of a connected, fit-for-purpose EU. Another is how Europe will deal with accelerating migration. If Germany closes the door, and pressure on Merkel is growing, chaos could ensue. And then there is the risk of another eurozone meltdown or Crimea-style humiliation by Russia. Any of these or other wild-card factors could tip a vote in favour of leaving, whatever the government says. This is the risk to which Cameron has exposed Britain. He has created conditions in which the opposite of what he said he wanted in 2013 may now occur: Brexit, with all the deeply negative and harmful consequences. |