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| Tony Blair excluded MoD head from Iraq invasion talks, biography claims | Tony Blair excluded MoD head from Iraq invasion talks, biography claims |
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| Senior figures in the British ministry of defence were largely cut out of discussions in the run-up to the invasion in Iraq by then prime minister Tony Blair, according to a new biography by Tom Bower published on Thursday. | Senior figures in the British ministry of defence were largely cut out of discussions in the run-up to the invasion in Iraq by then prime minister Tony Blair, according to a new biography by Tom Bower published on Thursday. |
| The scenario – that the department responsible for sending British troops into action would not be directly involved in such discussions at the top – is laid out by the top civil servant in the MoD at the time, Sir Kevin Tebbit. | The scenario – that the department responsible for sending British troops into action would not be directly involved in such discussions at the top – is laid out by the top civil servant in the MoD at the time, Sir Kevin Tebbit. |
| Tebbit was surprised to discover that he was apparently to be excluded from the small ad hoc meetings held by the prime minister. According to the book ‘Broken Vows: Tony Blair – The Tragedy of Power’, Tebbit called Blair’s foreign affairs adviser Sir David Manning to ask: ‘How can you plan a war without the head of the ministry of defence?’ | Tebbit was surprised to discover that he was apparently to be excluded from the small ad hoc meetings held by the prime minister. According to the book ‘Broken Vows: Tony Blair – The Tragedy of Power’, Tebbit called Blair’s foreign affairs adviser Sir David Manning to ask: ‘How can you plan a war without the head of the ministry of defence?’ |
| Related: Tom Bower on Tony Blair: 50 shades of mostly black – no grey | |
| The book comes ahead of publication of the long-delayed inquiry into the Iraq war conducted by Sir John Chilcot. The report of the inquiry, first announced in 2009, is scheduled to be sent to the government in April, with publication expected in June or July. | The book comes ahead of publication of the long-delayed inquiry into the Iraq war conducted by Sir John Chilcot. The report of the inquiry, first announced in 2009, is scheduled to be sent to the government in April, with publication expected in June or July. |
| In his evidence to the Chilcot inquiry, Tebbit was asked about the budgetary constraints during the run-up to the war and other planning issues. But the account in the Bower book is much more personal, offering insights into how Blair conducted government business with a tiny band in Downing Street and the personal slight felt by Tebbit on finding himself excluded. | In his evidence to the Chilcot inquiry, Tebbit was asked about the budgetary constraints during the run-up to the war and other planning issues. But the account in the Bower book is much more personal, offering insights into how Blair conducted government business with a tiny band in Downing Street and the personal slight felt by Tebbit on finding himself excluded. |
| Tebbit said: “I felt rebuffed. I was embarrassed, humiliated that they would not have people like me.” | Tebbit said: “I felt rebuffed. I was embarrassed, humiliated that they would not have people like me.” |
| Bower quotes Manning as telling Tebbit: “We can’t have you because we would then have to include the permanent secretaries of the Foreign Office and DFID [the department for international development] and we don’t want Michael Jay [then permanent secretary at the Foreign Office] and Clare Short [the development secretary] involved.” | Bower quotes Manning as telling Tebbit: “We can’t have you because we would then have to include the permanent secretaries of the Foreign Office and DFID [the department for international development] and we don’t want Michael Jay [then permanent secretary at the Foreign Office] and Clare Short [the development secretary] involved.” |
| According to Bower, by excluding the MoD, Blair denied himself direct advice about the movement of manpower and the supply of equipment before and after the invasion. The prime minister, he writes, did not want to hear about problems and details from Tebbit, who, the prime minister apparently complained, spoke too much – “in other words, the MoD man would challenge him”. | According to Bower, by excluding the MoD, Blair denied himself direct advice about the movement of manpower and the supply of equipment before and after the invasion. The prime minister, he writes, did not want to hear about problems and details from Tebbit, who, the prime minister apparently complained, spoke too much – “in other words, the MoD man would challenge him”. |
| “Blair also preferred speaking to [the then defence secretary Geoff] Hoon about the war or the pitfalls set by officials in the MoD. ‘Blair didn’t care who the minister was’, Hoon had realised. ‘Everything was run from the centre, Number Ten’,” Bower writes. | “Blair also preferred speaking to [the then defence secretary Geoff] Hoon about the war or the pitfalls set by officials in the MoD. ‘Blair didn’t care who the minister was’, Hoon had realised. ‘Everything was run from the centre, Number Ten’,” Bower writes. |
| He added: “Unlike education or the NHS, Blair cared little about defence and, as Hoon discovered, ‘never discussed detail’.” Blair’s detachment “meant he resisted providing the services with sufficient money to fulfil their task, thus scuttling the military’s inviolability,” Bower writes. | He added: “Unlike education or the NHS, Blair cared little about defence and, as Hoon discovered, ‘never discussed detail’.” Blair’s detachment “meant he resisted providing the services with sufficient money to fulfil their task, thus scuttling the military’s inviolability,” Bower writes. |