This article is from the source 'guardian' and was first published or seen on . It last changed over 40 days ago and won't be checked again for changes.
You can find the current article at its original source at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/01/hans-dietrich-genscher-obituary
The article has changed 6 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.
Version 0 | Version 1 |
---|---|
Hans-Dietrich Genscher obituary | Hans-Dietrich Genscher obituary |
(2 days later) | |
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who has died aged 89, was foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany for 18 years, until his surprise resignation in 1992. He had by then held ministerial office continuously for 23 years (having been appointed minister of the interior in 1969). Even when Chancellor Helmut Kohl came to dominate Germany’s political scene, the opinion polls showed that Genscher remained firmly established as his country’s favourite politician. He was among the key figures who restored Germany’s international standing and secured Russian agreement to the unification of Germany in 1990. | Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who has died aged 89, was foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany for 18 years, until his surprise resignation in 1992. He had by then held ministerial office continuously for 23 years (having been appointed minister of the interior in 1969). Even when Chancellor Helmut Kohl came to dominate Germany’s political scene, the opinion polls showed that Genscher remained firmly established as his country’s favourite politician. He was among the key figures who restored Germany’s international standing and secured Russian agreement to the unification of Germany in 1990. |
He even achieved his own trademark, “Genscherism”, a term that signified his enduring belief in European unity and the need for east-west co-operation while Europe remained divided; but it also stood for his deceptively informal style of operating, used to great effect to promote his carefully planned, often devious, strategies. | He even achieved his own trademark, “Genscherism”, a term that signified his enduring belief in European unity and the need for east-west co-operation while Europe remained divided; but it also stood for his deceptively informal style of operating, used to great effect to promote his carefully planned, often devious, strategies. |
His outlook was genuinely liberal. But he was wily, and though his colleagues appreciated his ability they took a more critical view of him than the public. Foreign ministers often questioned his actions, and even his own aides were provoked by his occasional wilful behaviour towards them. And yet there was never any doubting Genscher’s deep commitment to Germany’s reconciliation with its eastern neighbours and his efforts to win the trust of the communists as well as of western governments. | His outlook was genuinely liberal. But he was wily, and though his colleagues appreciated his ability they took a more critical view of him than the public. Foreign ministers often questioned his actions, and even his own aides were provoked by his occasional wilful behaviour towards them. And yet there was never any doubting Genscher’s deep commitment to Germany’s reconciliation with its eastern neighbours and his efforts to win the trust of the communists as well as of western governments. |
Related: Hans-Dietrich Genscher: former German foreign minister dies aged 89 | Related: Hans-Dietrich Genscher: former German foreign minister dies aged 89 |
Like Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt and Kohl, Genscher strongly believed in the need to build a close relationship with Washington, while at the same time working to strengthen the European Union and the Nato alliance. He shared the belief of successive German chancellors that European integration with a unified Germany solidly embedded in the European Union was a prerequisite for peace and stability. European unity, Genscher always argued, was both achievable and also desirable. He scarcely bothered to hide his impatience with Britain’s ambivalence towards Brussels, and he was never comfortable with Margaret Thatcher. Her great sin, as he saw it, was to rubbish the European ideal. Her mistrust of Germany and the misgivings she showed over reunification only served to reinforce Genscher’s reservations about Britain. | Like Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt and Kohl, Genscher strongly believed in the need to build a close relationship with Washington, while at the same time working to strengthen the European Union and the Nato alliance. He shared the belief of successive German chancellors that European integration with a unified Germany solidly embedded in the European Union was a prerequisite for peace and stability. European unity, Genscher always argued, was both achievable and also desirable. He scarcely bothered to hide his impatience with Britain’s ambivalence towards Brussels, and he was never comfortable with Margaret Thatcher. Her great sin, as he saw it, was to rubbish the European ideal. Her mistrust of Germany and the misgivings she showed over reunification only served to reinforce Genscher’s reservations about Britain. |
It is a moot point whether Thatcher or Genscher was first to spot Mikhail Gorbachev’s potential as an agent for far-reaching change in the Soviet Union. Certainly Genscher claimed credit for being ahead of Germany’s partners in recognising that Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika would lead to radical change in Europe’s political map and end the division of Europe. Eduard Shevardnadze, Gorbachev’s foreign minister, became his firm friend. Together, they probably did more than any of their colleagues to negotiate the “two plus four” agreement under which the former Soviet Union formally accepted German unification, and agreed to withdraw its forces from East Germany. | It is a moot point whether Thatcher or Genscher was first to spot Mikhail Gorbachev’s potential as an agent for far-reaching change in the Soviet Union. Certainly Genscher claimed credit for being ahead of Germany’s partners in recognising that Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika would lead to radical change in Europe’s political map and end the division of Europe. Eduard Shevardnadze, Gorbachev’s foreign minister, became his firm friend. Together, they probably did more than any of their colleagues to negotiate the “two plus four” agreement under which the former Soviet Union formally accepted German unification, and agreed to withdraw its forces from East Germany. |
As foreign minister, Genscher made himself a firm advocate of the case for halting the east-west arms race and the promotion of arms control. This did not stop him, in the early 1980s, from defending the Nato decision to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles in Germany in spite of Soviet threats of retaliation as well as determined domestic German hostility. However, in 1989 Genscher broke ranks with the Nato allies when he urged the alliance to remove short-range nuclear weapons from Germany as a confidence-building measure to help Gorbachev with his reform programme. | As foreign minister, Genscher made himself a firm advocate of the case for halting the east-west arms race and the promotion of arms control. This did not stop him, in the early 1980s, from defending the Nato decision to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles in Germany in spite of Soviet threats of retaliation as well as determined domestic German hostility. However, in 1989 Genscher broke ranks with the Nato allies when he urged the alliance to remove short-range nuclear weapons from Germany as a confidence-building measure to help Gorbachev with his reform programme. |
Not long before his resignation, Genscher insisted on European Union recognition of the independence of Bosnia and of Croatia. Most of Germany’s partners, especially Britain, had deep misgivings, fearing that the move at the close of 1991 was premature and was certain to trigger military conflict between Serbia and the two republics. Genscher afterwards denied that a secret deal was struck involving German concessions on British opt-outs from the Maastricht treaty in return for joint recognition of the two former Yugoslav republics. In any event, Genscher will for ever be associated with a move that put an end to western hopes for a negotiated solution to the break-up of the Yugoslav federation. | Not long before his resignation, Genscher insisted on European Union recognition of the independence of Bosnia and of Croatia. Most of Germany’s partners, especially Britain, had deep misgivings, fearing that the move at the close of 1991 was premature and was certain to trigger military conflict between Serbia and the two republics. Genscher afterwards denied that a secret deal was struck involving German concessions on British opt-outs from the Maastricht treaty in return for joint recognition of the two former Yugoslav republics. In any event, Genscher will for ever be associated with a move that put an end to western hopes for a negotiated solution to the break-up of the Yugoslav federation. |
Genscher’s role in Germany’s domestic politics was far more controversial than his foreign policies. As leader of the small liberal Free Democratic party (FDP), he became the arbiter of successive coalition governments. Under Germany’s system of proportional representation, neither of the major parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, was able to secure an overall majority in federal elections, and the FDP was the indispensable junior coalition partner. During Genscher’s first phase in government, the FDP served under Brandt, and after 1974 under Schmidt’s SPD coalition. But in 1982 Genscher ended the pact with the SPD, bringing down Schmidt’s government, and switched to the CDU, led by Kohl. The SPD, cast out into the political wilderness, never forgave Genscher for his perfidy. | |
Kohl and Genscher needed each other; but never fully trusted each other. Even so, after the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, the two men worked closely and harmoniously to achieve the practicalities of unification. His standing rose both at home and abroad. Few suspected that Genscher intended to leave public life. | Kohl and Genscher needed each other; but never fully trusted each other. Even so, after the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, the two men worked closely and harmoniously to achieve the practicalities of unification. His standing rose both at home and abroad. Few suspected that Genscher intended to leave public life. |
In April 1992, it came as a bombshell when he announced his decision to resign from the government. He had been such a fixture on the public stage that his departure “would weaken Germany’s international status”, as a Guardian headline suggested. Another commentator noted that he was leaving behind “a Europe that his foreign policy had helped to bring together” and speculated that his resignation would “intensify European fears of a rudderless Germany”. | In April 1992, it came as a bombshell when he announced his decision to resign from the government. He had been such a fixture on the public stage that his departure “would weaken Germany’s international status”, as a Guardian headline suggested. Another commentator noted that he was leaving behind “a Europe that his foreign policy had helped to bring together” and speculated that his resignation would “intensify European fears of a rudderless Germany”. |
There were no hidden skeletons to prompt Genscher’s resignation; only perhaps a characteristically wily calculation that Kohl’s coalition government had reached the peak of its achievement with German unification and that its way now could only be downhill and therefore held no more promise for him. | There were no hidden skeletons to prompt Genscher’s resignation; only perhaps a characteristically wily calculation that Kohl’s coalition government had reached the peak of its achievement with German unification and that its way now could only be downhill and therefore held no more promise for him. |
Genscher was born in Reideburg, near Halle in eastern Germany. In common with most other German teenagers of the second world war years, he was in the Hitler Youth. He became an aircraft gunner, and was captured by the Americans, and handed over to the British. After the war he opted to return home to his mother, even though Halle was now within the Soviet occupation zone. He enrolled as a law student in Leipzig; but fled to the west after the 1953 East German uprising was quashed by Soviet tanks. | Genscher was born in Reideburg, near Halle in eastern Germany. In common with most other German teenagers of the second world war years, he was in the Hitler Youth. He became an aircraft gunner, and was captured by the Americans, and handed over to the British. After the war he opted to return home to his mother, even though Halle was now within the Soviet occupation zone. He enrolled as a law student in Leipzig; but fled to the west after the 1953 East German uprising was quashed by Soviet tanks. |
Even though Genscher completed his law studies, in Bremen, he never practised and instead settled for a career in politics. If the postwar Federal Republic had adopted Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system, his political star might never have taken him very far. But under Germany’s system of proportional representation, Genscher’s decision as a young man to join the FDP proved a well-calculated choice as a fast track to political influence and power. | Even though Genscher completed his law studies, in Bremen, he never practised and instead settled for a career in politics. If the postwar Federal Republic had adopted Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system, his political star might never have taken him very far. But under Germany’s system of proportional representation, Genscher’s decision as a young man to join the FDP proved a well-calculated choice as a fast track to political influence and power. |
Genscher reasoned that a small party like the FDP would have influence way beyond its actual size. And so it proved, for a period extending over almost the next three decades. The attack on Israel’s team at the Munich Olympics occurred while Genscher was in control of Germany’s police forces. It was a setback for which he never quite forgave himself. | Genscher reasoned that a small party like the FDP would have influence way beyond its actual size. And so it proved, for a period extending over almost the next three decades. The attack on Israel’s team at the Munich Olympics occurred while Genscher was in control of Germany’s police forces. It was a setback for which he never quite forgave himself. |
In 1974 Schmidt appointed Genscher foreign minister. He never forgot his roots, and returned to visit his mother in Halle even after the Berlin Wall appeared to have sealed the division of Germany. After unification he took many of his foreign ministerial colleagues on celebratory pilgrimages to his beloved Halle. | In 1974 Schmidt appointed Genscher foreign minister. He never forgot his roots, and returned to visit his mother in Halle even after the Berlin Wall appeared to have sealed the division of Germany. After unification he took many of his foreign ministerial colleagues on celebratory pilgrimages to his beloved Halle. |
Genscher always worked indefatigably, even though during his last decade as foreign minister he suffered from a weak heart and was often urged to rest. There was scarcely a week where he did not fly to one of two foreign capitals; or that his tall shambling figure, often dressed in a trademark yellow pullover and undistinguished grey suit, could not be seen striding down a corridor, surrounded by a bevy of officials and journalists on his way to yet another meeting or negotiation. | Genscher always worked indefatigably, even though during his last decade as foreign minister he suffered from a weak heart and was often urged to rest. There was scarcely a week where he did not fly to one of two foreign capitals; or that his tall shambling figure, often dressed in a trademark yellow pullover and undistinguished grey suit, could not be seen striding down a corridor, surrounded by a bevy of officials and journalists on his way to yet another meeting or negotiation. |
He was always readily accessible to the media. He liked journalists and they, for the most part, liked him. Of course he used them; but he also told them far more than any of the other foreign ministers on the international circuit. Wherever he went, and often late into the night, Genscher would commune with “his”, mostly German, journalists. | He was always readily accessible to the media. He liked journalists and they, for the most part, liked him. Of course he used them; but he also told them far more than any of the other foreign ministers on the international circuit. Wherever he went, and often late into the night, Genscher would commune with “his”, mostly German, journalists. |
Genscher published a volume of memoirs, Erinnerungen (1995), a huge tome, soon after his departure from office. Though it gave away few secrets, it reinforced the picture of an obscure East German refugee law student transformed into a major political force in West Germany whose handwriting was firmly imprinted as a positive and imaginative force on Europe’s troubled postwar history. | Genscher published a volume of memoirs, Erinnerungen (1995), a huge tome, soon after his departure from office. Though it gave away few secrets, it reinforced the picture of an obscure East German refugee law student transformed into a major political force in West Germany whose handwriting was firmly imprinted as a positive and imaginative force on Europe’s troubled postwar history. |
He continued to take an interest in politics and in 2013 was involved in the negotiations with Vladimir Putin for the release from prison of the Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky. | He continued to take an interest in politics and in 2013 was involved in the negotiations with Vladimir Putin for the release from prison of the Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky. |
He is survived by his wife, Barbara, and a daughter. | He is survived by his wife, Barbara, and a daughter. |
• Hans-Dietrich Genscher, politician, born 21 March 1927; died 31 March 2016 | • Hans-Dietrich Genscher, politician, born 21 March 1927; died 31 March 2016 |