'Europeans watch our referendum debate with fascination and fear' diff viewer (0/1)

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Europeans watch our referendum debate with fascination and fear	Europeans watch our referendum debate with fascination and fear
2016-04-23 23:10:08 UTC	2016-08-29 12:20:37 UTC (4 months later)
View from Germany	View from Germany
When David Cameron first promised a referendum on British membership of the EU if he were re-elected as prime minister, the idea baffled most Germans. They could not believe that the British could be contemplating leaving the EU. What future could they possibly think they might have outside Europe?	When David Cameron first promised a referendum on British membership of the EU if he were re-elected as prime minister, the idea baffled most Germans. They could not believe that the British could be contemplating leaving the EU. What future could they possibly think they might have outside Europe?
Gradually, however, Germans have begun to take seriously the possibility that the UK might actually leave the EU – and they are worried. They still can’t imagine a future for Britain outside Europe, but most Germans also think that Brexit would be bad for them, too.	Gradually, however, Germans have begun to take seriously the possibility that the UK might actually leave the EU – and they are worried. They still can’t imagine a future for Britain outside Europe, but most Germans also think that Brexit would be bad for them, too.
Chancellor Angela Merkel supported Cameron in his renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with the EU while at the same time seeking to uphold the principles of freedom of movement and non-discrimination. Ahead of the crucial European council meeting in February, she told the Bundestag that keeping Britain in the EU was “not just in Britain’s but also in Germany’s interest”.	Chancellor Angela Merkel supported Cameron in his renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with the EU while at the same time seeking to uphold the principles of freedom of movement and non-discrimination. Ahead of the crucial European council meeting in February, she told the Bundestag that keeping Britain in the EU was “not just in Britain’s but also in Germany’s interest”.
What Germans fear most is that Brexit might lead to an unravelling of the European project. They worry that a British vote to leave on 23 June would strengthen the “centrifugal forces” within the EU and prompt other member states to hold referendums of their own – or least seek to use the threat of one to renegotiate their relationship with the EU, as Cameron did.	What Germans fear most is that Brexit might lead to an unravelling of the European project. They worry that a British vote to leave on 23 June would strengthen the “centrifugal forces” within the EU and prompt other member states to hold referendums of their own – or least seek to use the threat of one to renegotiate their relationship with the EU, as Cameron did.
Germans also worry about the message sent to the rest of the world if one of the EU’s biggest and most important members opted out even as the rest of the continent struggled to solve the euro crisis and the refugee crisis. There would be an even greater sense than now that the EU is doomed.	Germans also worry about the message sent to the rest of the world if one of the EU’s biggest and most important members opted out even as the rest of the continent struggled to solve the euro crisis and the refugee crisis. There would be an even greater sense than now that the EU is doomed.
There are some Germans who see a possible upside. In particular, they hope that, without the EU’s most difficult member state blocking them or demanding endless “opt-outs”, France and Germany would be able to move ahead with further integration. Brexit might actually force such steps immediately in order to reassure the world about the future of the European project.	There are some Germans who see a possible upside. In particular, they hope that, without the EU’s most difficult member state blocking them or demanding endless “opt-outs”, France and Germany would be able to move ahead with further integration. Brexit might actually force such steps immediately in order to reassure the world about the future of the European project.
Brexit could also simplify the EU in some ways. Some Germans think the increasing institutional complexity of the EU contributes to its lack of legitimacy. In particular, they would like all EU states to join the single currency. Brexit would leave Denmark as the only remaining country with a permanent “opt-out” from the euro.	Brexit could also simplify the EU in some ways. Some Germans think the increasing institutional complexity of the EU contributes to its lack of legitimacy. In particular, they would like all EU states to join the single currency. Brexit would leave Denmark as the only remaining country with a permanent “opt-out” from the euro.
However, most Germans think Brexit would have much more important downsides. The argument you often hear is that, if the UK left the EU, Germany would lose a liberal ally on economic policy and be stuck with countries such as France that are perceived as more protectionist. It is sometimes also said that Germany benefits from the UK’s aggressive attempts to reform the EU on liberal lines, for example Cameron’s “competitiveness” agenda.	However, most Germans think Brexit would have much more important downsides. The argument you often hear is that, if the UK left the EU, Germany would lose a liberal ally on economic policy and be stuck with countries such as France that are perceived as more protectionist. It is sometimes also said that Germany benefits from the UK’s aggressive attempts to reform the EU on liberal lines, for example Cameron’s “competitiveness” agenda.
This argument that Germany and the UK are like-minded countries is a little disingenuous, because Germany is not quite as liberal as is sometimes suggested. While it is a strong supporter of trade liberalisation beyond the EU, from which its export-driven economy benefits, it is also one of the countries that has blocked internal steps, such as the completion of the single market in services.	This argument that Germany and the UK are like-minded countries is a little disingenuous, because Germany is not quite as liberal as is sometimes suggested. While it is a strong supporter of trade liberalisation beyond the EU, from which its export-driven economy benefits, it is also one of the countries that has blocked internal steps, such as the completion of the single market in services.
Germany is not always aligned with the UK on other economic issues either. For example, even on the right, for example, there is support for a financial transactions tax, something that is anathema to the Tories. Meanwhile, some Social Democrats see the UK as a corrosive neoliberal influence on the EU and like to think that, without it, France and Germany could together create a more “social” Europe, even though the UK has had nothing to do with the austerity Germany has imposed on the eurozone during the past six years.	Germany is not always aligned with the UK on other economic issues either. For example, even on the right, for example, there is support for a financial transactions tax, something that is anathema to the Tories. Meanwhile, some Social Democrats see the UK as a corrosive neoliberal influence on the EU and like to think that, without it, France and Germany could together create a more “social” Europe, even though the UK has had nothing to do with the austerity Germany has imposed on the eurozone during the past six years.
Perhaps the most interesting question is whether Germany would be more or less able to get what it wants were the UK to leave. At first glance, it would be more powerful simply because its relative weight – expressed, for example, in its voting weight in the European council or the number of seats in the European parliament it has – would increase.	Perhaps the most interesting question is whether Germany would be more or less able to get what it wants were the UK to leave. At first glance, it would be more powerful simply because its relative weight – expressed, for example, in its voting weight in the European council or the number of seats in the European parliament it has – would increase.
In fact, this is the reason that some officials from other EU member states say in private that this is precisely why they do not think it would be in their interests for the UK to leave. Part of the reason France softened its opposition to British membership of the EEC in the late 1960s was that it thought it might help balance West Germany’s increasing economic strength. But if Britain now left, none of the other four large member states – France, Italy, Poland and Spain – would be able to counterbalance German power. Without Britain, Germany would be Europe’s hegemon.	In fact, this is the reason that some officials from other EU member states say in private that this is precisely why they do not think it would be in their interests for the UK to leave. Part of the reason France softened its opposition to British membership of the EEC in the late 1960s was that it thought it might help balance West Germany’s increasing economic strength. But if Britain now left, none of the other four large member states – France, Italy, Poland and Spain – would be able to counterbalance German power. Without Britain, Germany would be Europe’s hegemon.
Actually, this exaggerates the extent of German power. After all, Germany makes up only 28% of the eurozone’s total GDP – between them France (21%) and Italy (16%) make up a bigger share. This illustrates that Germany is not a hegemon at all – with or without the UK – but rather a “semi-hegemon”. In that sense, Germany has returned to the position it occupied in Europe between 1871 and 1945, except in geoeconomic rather than geopolitical form.	Actually, this exaggerates the extent of German power. After all, Germany makes up only 28% of the eurozone’s total GDP – between them France (21%) and Italy (16%) make up a bigger share. This illustrates that Germany is not a hegemon at all – with or without the UK – but rather a “semi-hegemon”. In that sense, Germany has returned to the position it occupied in Europe between 1871 and 1945, except in geoeconomic rather than geopolitical form.
The problem, though, is that this semi-hegemonic position leads to a perception of dominance and therefore resistance, in particular through the formation of coalitions. That has been what has happened in Europe over the past six years since the euro crisis began: southern states have opposed Germany on economic policy and eastern states have opposed it on refugee policy. In both cases, Germany has been accused of “imperialism”.	The problem, though, is that this semi-hegemonic position leads to a perception of dominance and therefore resistance, in particular through the formation of coalitions. That has been what has happened in Europe over the past six years since the euro crisis began: southern states have opposed Germany on economic policy and eastern states have opposed it on refugee policy. In both cases, Germany has been accused of “imperialism”.
Although a British withdrawal from the EU wouldn’t turn Germany into a hegemon, it could increase this perception of German dominance and with it the pressure to form coalitions to counterbalance German power. Paradoxically, therefore, Germany could actually be weaker – that is, less able to get what it wants – in an EU without the UK. Meanwhile, expectations of Germany would probably increase further.	Although a British withdrawal from the EU wouldn’t turn Germany into a hegemon, it could increase this perception of German dominance and with it the pressure to form coalitions to counterbalance German power. Paradoxically, therefore, Germany could actually be weaker – that is, less able to get what it wants – in an EU without the UK. Meanwhile, expectations of Germany would probably increase further.
Although Germany has itself become much more Eurosceptic in the past decade, few Germans are demanding a referendum of their own. Even the Eurosceptic Alternative für Deutschland wants Germany to leave the single currency rather than the EU. Moreover, referendums are not part of the German political system and many are suspicious about such elements of direct democracy.	Although Germany has itself become much more Eurosceptic in the past decade, few Germans are demanding a referendum of their own. Even the Eurosceptic Alternative für Deutschland wants Germany to leave the single currency rather than the EU. Moreover, referendums are not part of the German political system and many are suspicious about such elements of direct democracy.
In any case, leaving the EU is not in the end an option for Germany in the way it is for the UK. Germany is simply too central to the EU, which, after all, was created in part as a solution to the vexed “German question”. The EU could survive a British withdrawal, but not a German one.	In any case, leaving the EU is not in the end an option for Germany in the way it is for the UK. Germany is simply too central to the EU, which, after all, was created in part as a solution to the vexed “German question”. The EU could survive a British withdrawal, but not a German one.
Hans Kundnani is the author of The Paradox of German Power (Hurst)	Hans Kundnani is the author of The Paradox of German Power (Hurst)
View from Sweden	View from Sweden
In Sweden, you would be hard pressed to find anyone – or at least anyone in a prominent position – who would use a milder term than “disaster” when referring to a possible Brexit. You will often find statements that Brexit would have even worse consequences for our country than the UK.	In Sweden, you would be hard pressed to find anyone – or at least anyone in a prominent position – who would use a milder term than “disaster” when referring to a possible Brexit. You will often find statements that Brexit would have even worse consequences for our country than the UK.
“For Sweden it would be devastating, for the EU worrisome and for the UK really bad,” says former finance minister Anders Borg about the threat of Brexit. “It would be worse for Sweden”, according to the headline of an editorial comment in Aftonbladet, Sweden’s biggest evening paper. “A catastrophe,” says the current finance minister, Magdalena Andersson. The feeling is widely shared across the Swedish political landscape. It is echoed by the business world – never failing to cite Brexit as one of the darker clouds over the economy – and even the trade unions.	“For Sweden it would be devastating, for the EU worrisome and for the UK really bad,” says former finance minister Anders Borg about the threat of Brexit. “It would be worse for Sweden”, according to the headline of an editorial comment in Aftonbladet, Sweden’s biggest evening paper. “A catastrophe,” says the current finance minister, Magdalena Andersson. The feeling is widely shared across the Swedish political landscape. It is echoed by the business world – never failing to cite Brexit as one of the darker clouds over the economy – and even the trade unions.
Why the strong emotion? Well, of course there’s an economic case to be made. The UK is Sweden’s fourth largest trading partner. Danske Bank calculates that after Ireland, Luxembourg and Belgium, Sweden would be the EU country hardest hit if the British economy were cut off from the European economy (with a loss of up to 0.48% of Swedish GDP).	Why the strong emotion? Well, of course there’s an economic case to be made. The UK is Sweden’s fourth largest trading partner. Danske Bank calculates that after Ireland, Luxembourg and Belgium, Sweden would be the EU country hardest hit if the British economy were cut off from the European economy (with a loss of up to 0.48% of Swedish GDP).
The sheer uncertainty of whether we are heading for Brexit is one of the most commonly mentioned negative factors at any presentation of the year ahead, be it for the Swedish economy or for any major Swedish company.	The sheer uncertainty of whether we are heading for Brexit is one of the most commonly mentioned negative factors at any presentation of the year ahead, be it for the Swedish economy or for any major Swedish company.
But there is much more at play than just economic worries. The UK does not seem to be aware of it, but Sweden rather feels it has a “special relationship” with the UK. Andersson spelled it out in an opinion article in February: “The UK is simply one of our absolute closest allies in the EU,” she said. Indeed, the prime minister, Stefan Löfven (a socialist), promised to do everything in his power to help David Cameron get a good deal in his negotiations with the EU earlier this year, so that the UK would stay.	But there is much more at play than just economic worries. The UK does not seem to be aware of it, but Sweden rather feels it has a “special relationship” with the UK. Andersson spelled it out in an opinion article in February: “The UK is simply one of our absolute closest allies in the EU,” she said. Indeed, the prime minister, Stefan Löfven (a socialist), promised to do everything in his power to help David Cameron get a good deal in his negotiations with the EU earlier this year, so that the UK would stay.
That Sweden feels this strong bond with the UK has something of a mystery about it. For a start, anyone would be excused for thinking that the fellow Nordic countries must surely be mentioned as Sweden’s closest friends more often than the UK. That never happens. There is a historic rivalry here that keeps getting in the way.	That Sweden feels this strong bond with the UK has something of a mystery about it. For a start, anyone would be excused for thinking that the fellow Nordic countries must surely be mentioned as Sweden’s closest friends more often than the UK. That never happens. There is a historic rivalry here that keeps getting in the way.
Still, every attempt to enumerate the many areas where Sweden and the UK are such close allies invariably comes up with a rather short list.	Still, every attempt to enumerate the many areas where Sweden and the UK are such close allies invariably comes up with a rather short list.
Free trade is always mentioned as the top (staunch defenders, both of us). Then comes the EU budget (we both would like to pay less). Third, we have common interests as non-euro countries (we both fear losing out).	Free trade is always mentioned as the top (staunch defenders, both of us). Then comes the EU budget (we both would like to pay less). Third, we have common interests as non-euro countries (we both fear losing out).
This amounts to a surprisingly short list for your “absolute closest ally”. Especially considering that the two overriding subjects in the Swedish political debate for years have been important societal issues where we do not seem to share any common interest with the UK. These are: the labour market (Sweden will insist on strengthening workers’ rights, no matter which government is in power) and migration (Sweden will defend remaining “open” and also defend giving equal rights to newcomers).	This amounts to a surprisingly short list for your “absolute closest ally”. Especially considering that the two overriding subjects in the Swedish political debate for years have been important societal issues where we do not seem to share any common interest with the UK. These are: the labour market (Sweden will insist on strengthening workers’ rights, no matter which government is in power) and migration (Sweden will defend remaining “open” and also defend giving equal rights to newcomers).
~~Related: EU reforms would benefit other nations, says George Osborne~~
Even so, there is an obvious sincerity in the Swedish conviction that the UK is very close to Sweden. Former prime minister Fredrik Reinfeldt said he felt that Cameron was a “personal friend” and the Swedish media would often describe them as “best buddies”. Another former prime minister, Göran Persson, felt so personally close to Tony Blair that at press briefings at EU summits he would refer to him as simply Tony, as in: “Tony said to me…” Yet another exformer prime minister, Carl Bildt, described his relationship with his counterpart John Major as “outstanding”.	Even so, there is an obvious sincerity in the Swedish conviction that the UK is very close to Sweden. Former prime minister Fredrik Reinfeldt said he felt that Cameron was a “personal friend” and the Swedish media would often describe them as “best buddies”. Another former prime minister, Göran Persson, felt so personally close to Tony Blair that at press briefings at EU summits he would refer to him as simply Tony, as in: “Tony said to me…” Yet another exformer prime minister, Carl Bildt, described his relationship with his counterpart John Major as “outstanding”.
There are also linguistic and cultural factors that go a long way to explain the feeling of closeness and understanding. Swedish people tend to speak English more or less fluently but no other foreign language. For that reason they tend to read no foreign media other than British media. This is true for your everyday Swede and, of course, every Swedish politicians and most Swedish journalists.	There are also linguistic and cultural factors that go a long way to explain the feeling of closeness and understanding. Swedish people tend to speak English more or less fluently but no other foreign language. For that reason they tend to read no foreign media other than British media. This is true for your everyday Swede and, of course, every Swedish politicians and most Swedish journalists.
Thus, our window on to the world, to Europe, can often be from a British perspective. This, incidentally, has contributed to shaping the Swedish view of the EU and our ideas on whether the EU is costing too much, spending money on the wrong things or is hopelessly bureaucratic. All in all, maybe it is not illogical that we should end up thinking of the UK as our closest ally.	Thus, our window on to the world, to Europe, can often be from a British perspective. This, incidentally, has contributed to shaping the Swedish view of the EU and our ideas on whether the EU is costing too much, spending money on the wrong things or is hopelessly bureaucratic. All in all, maybe it is not illogical that we should end up thinking of the UK as our closest ally.
A recent poll indicates that Swedish public opinion may be losing faith in the EU with only 39% declaring their trust in the institution in March this year, as opposed to 59% last autumn. Also, no fewer than two political parties in the Swedish parliament currently demand that Sweden follow in Cameron’s footsteps and ask for a renegotiation of our EU membership deal.	A recent poll indicates that Swedish public opinion may be losing faith in the EU with only 39% declaring their trust in the institution in March this year, as opposed to 59% last autumn. Also, no fewer than two political parties in the Swedish parliament currently demand that Sweden follow in Cameron’s footsteps and ask for a renegotiation of our EU membership deal.
One should not, however, make the mistake of thinking that Sweden would be tempted to follow the UK if it were to leave the EU. ou will find that tThe two parties seeking a new EU deal for Sweden are at the very extremes of the Swedish political map – one, the former communist Left party and the other, the anti-immigration Sweden Democrats.	One should not, however, make the mistake of thinking that Sweden would be tempted to follow the UK if it were to leave the EU. ou will find that tThe two parties seeking a new EU deal for Sweden are at the very extremes of the Swedish political map – one, the former communist Left party and the other, the anti-immigration Sweden Democrats.
And the disappointment in the EU recently expressed by Swedes is probably influenced by the experience of seeing no solidarity from the rest of Europe when Sweden was overwhelmed by an influx of immigrants last autumn. Including, of course, from the UK.	And the disappointment in the EU recently expressed by Swedes is probably influenced by the experience of seeing no solidarity from the rest of Europe when Sweden was overwhelmed by an influx of immigrants last autumn. Including, of course, from the UK.
Also, any statement from Swedish politicians or business people about the gravity of the risk that Brexit constitutes will always be followed by the explanation for the worried: “… because it would be bad for the EU, it would endanger the European co-operation”.	Also, any statement from Swedish politicians or business people about the gravity of the risk that Brexit constitutes will always be followed by the explanation for the worried: “… because it would be bad for the EU, it would endanger the European co-operation”.
In Swedish politics, you will find much bickering about the EU but a deep conviction remains that Europe needs the EU and a small country such as Sweden, trying to make its way in a global context, needs the EU very much. It would take a political earthquake to convince Swedish politicians that Brexit would be a reason for Sweden to also leave.	In Swedish politics, you will find much bickering about the EU but a deep conviction remains that Europe needs the EU and a small country such as Sweden, trying to make its way in a global context, needs the EU very much. It would take a political earthquake to convince Swedish politicians that Brexit would be a reason for Sweden to also leave.