This article is from the source 'nytimes' and was first published or seen on . It last changed over 40 days ago and won't be checked again for changes.

You can find the current article at its original source at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/04/opinion/campaign-stops/the-great-trump-reshuffle.html

The article has changed 2 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.

Version 0 Version 1
The Great Trump Reshuffle The Great Trump Reshuffle
(about 9 hours later)
A general election that pits Hillary Clinton against Donald Trump will produce a decisively more affluent and better educated Democratic presidential electorate and a decidedly less affluent and less educated Republican one than in any previous election going back as far as 1976.A general election that pits Hillary Clinton against Donald Trump will produce a decisively more affluent and better educated Democratic presidential electorate and a decidedly less affluent and less educated Republican one than in any previous election going back as far as 1976.
It is no secret that Trump is the driving force behind this year’s reconfigured coalition on the right. He has successfully appealed to middle- and lower-income white voters motivated by opposition to liberalized attitudes and social norms on matters of race, immigration and women’s rights.It is no secret that Trump is the driving force behind this year’s reconfigured coalition on the right. He has successfully appealed to middle- and lower-income white voters motivated by opposition to liberalized attitudes and social norms on matters of race, immigration and women’s rights.
Public Opinion Strategies, a Republican polling firm, analyzed a survey conducted in April by NBC and The Wall Street Journal. Respondents were asked to choose between Clinton and Trump, and the results demonstrate that there will be substantial shifts in the income and education levels of Democratic and Republican voters, at least as far as this presidential election is concerned.Public Opinion Strategies, a Republican polling firm, analyzed a survey conducted in April by NBC and The Wall Street Journal. Respondents were asked to choose between Clinton and Trump, and the results demonstrate that there will be substantial shifts in the income and education levels of Democratic and Republican voters, at least as far as this presidential election is concerned.
One of the largest shifts is among college-educated voters, who are predicted to defect from the Republican Party by the millions if Trump is the nominee. In 2012, President Obama lost college-educated voters by 4 points; this year, according to Public Opinion Strategies’ analysis, Clinton will win them by 29 points. One of the largest shifts is among college-educated voters, who are expected to defect from the Republican Party by the millions if Trump is the nominee. In 2012, President Obama lost college-educated voters by four points; this year, according to Public Opinion Strategies’ analysis, Clinton will win them by 29 points.
In addition, the NBC/WSJ poll reveals that Clinton should make substantial gains among voters from households earning in excess of $100,000. While Obama lost these affluent voters in 2012 by 10 points, the NBC/WSJ survey shows Clinton carrying them by 12 points.In addition, the NBC/WSJ poll reveals that Clinton should make substantial gains among voters from households earning in excess of $100,000. While Obama lost these affluent voters in 2012 by 10 points, the NBC/WSJ survey shows Clinton carrying them by 12 points.
There are two groups among whom Trump will gain and Clinton will lose: voters making less than $30,000 and voters with high school degrees. Both less affluent groups are expected to increase their level of support for the Republican nominee over their 2012 margins, by 13 and by 17 points.There are two groups among whom Trump will gain and Clinton will lose: voters making less than $30,000 and voters with high school degrees. Both less affluent groups are expected to increase their level of support for the Republican nominee over their 2012 margins, by 13 and by 17 points.
For the Democratic presidential coalition in 2016, the net effect of this shift will be to further reverse the working class tilt of the party, which has been trending upscale since 1992. The Republican coalition of 2016, in fact, will look increasingly like the Democratic Party of the 1930s.For the Democratic presidential coalition in 2016, the net effect of this shift will be to further reverse the working class tilt of the party, which has been trending upscale since 1992. The Republican coalition of 2016, in fact, will look increasingly like the Democratic Party of the 1930s.
A Trump versus Clinton contest will deepen the partisan divisions that for the past five decades have set those who support the social and cultural revolutions of the past five decades on race, immigration, women’s rights, gender equality and gay rights — as well as the broader right to sexual privacy — against those who remain in opposition. A Trump versus Clinton contest will deepen the partisan divisions that have set those who support the social and cultural revolutions of the past five decades on race, immigration, women’s rights, gender equality and gay rights — as well as the broader right to sexual privacy — against those who remain in opposition.
First, let’s take race.First, let’s take race.
Michael Tesler, a political scientist at the University of California, Irvine, examined answers to “racial resentment” questions in a Presidential Election Panel Survey conduced by the RAND Corporation in December and January to see how the responses correlated with presidential voting intentions.Michael Tesler, a political scientist at the University of California, Irvine, examined answers to “racial resentment” questions in a Presidential Election Panel Survey conduced by the RAND Corporation in December and January to see how the responses correlated with presidential voting intentions.
The racial resentment scale is based on favorable or unfavorable responses to survey questions like this:The racial resentment scale is based on favorable or unfavorable responses to survey questions like this:
In addition, the RAND survey sought to measure “ethnocentrism” by asking respondents to rank their own racial or ethnic group on a seven point scale for “lazy or hardworking,” “intelligent or unintelligent” and “trustworthy or untrustworthy.” The respondents were then asked to rate other groups by the same measures. Those ranking their own race or ethnic group higher than others ranked high on ethnocentrism. In addition, the RAND survey sought to measure “ethnocentrism” by asking respondents to rank their own racial or ethnic group on a seven-point scale for “lazy or hardworking,” “intelligent or unintelligent” and “trustworthy or untrustworthy.” The respondents were then asked to rate other groups by the same measures. Those ranking their own race or ethnic group higher than others ranked high on ethnocentrism.
Tesler’s findings are illustrated in the accompanying chart. There was a dose effect: the higher you scored on racial resentment, the more likely you were to support Trump; the more you resented immigrants or professed your white ethnocentrism, the likelier you were to plan to vote for Trump. Tesler’s findings are illustrated in the accompanying chart. There was a dose effect: The higher you scored on racial resentment, the more likely you were to support Trump; the more you resented immigrants or professed your white ethnocentrism, the likelier you were to plan to vote for Trump.
On March 3, Tesler and John Sides, a political scientist at George Washington University, published an article in the Washington Post: “How political science helps explain the rise of Trump: the role of white identity and grievances.” Using data collected by American National Election Studies, Tesler and Sides ranked white respondents by their level of “white racial identity” — determined by asking white respondents questions like “How Important is being white to your identity?”; “How important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites?”; and “How likely is it that many whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities instead?” On March 3, Tesler and John Sides, a political scientist at George Washington University, published an article in the Washington Post: “How political science helps explain the rise of Trump: the role of white identity and grievances.” Using data collected by American National Election Studies, Tesler and Sides ranked white respondents by their level of “white racial identity” — determined by asking white respondents questions like “How important is being white to your identity?”; “How important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites?”; and “How likely is it that many whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities instead?”
In each case, Trump’s level of support in the survey rose in direct proportion to your level of agreement with each of these statements.In each case, Trump’s level of support in the survey rose in direct proportion to your level of agreement with each of these statements.
Trump has also recruited strong support from those who have not come to terms with the women’s rights, reproductive rights and gay rights movements.Trump has also recruited strong support from those who have not come to terms with the women’s rights, reproductive rights and gay rights movements.
Ron Lesthaeghe and Lisa Neidert of the University of Michigan’s Population Studies Center have done pioneering work that sheds more light on Trump’s success so far. They have ranked all 3140 counties in the United States by their level of entry into what researchers call the “second demographic transition.” Ron Lesthaeghe and Lisa Neidert of the University of Michigan’s Population Studies Center have done pioneering work that sheds more light on Trump’s success so far. They have ranked all 3,140 counties in the United States by their level of entry into what researchers call the “second demographic transition.”
“The Second Demographic Transition: A concise overview of its development,” by Lesthaeghe, summarizes this concept: “The Second Demographic Transition: A Concise Overview of Its Development,” by Lesthaeghe, summarizes this concept:
These revolutions have reordered much of society. Lesthaeghe continues:These revolutions have reordered much of society. Lesthaeghe continues:
The second accompanying chart summarizes the key cultural and social transformations put into effect by this demographic transition.The second accompanying chart summarizes the key cultural and social transformations put into effect by this demographic transition.
Measured by these criteria, the top-ranked counties were cosmopolitan centers, with a larger percentage of affluent, highly educated residents: New York City, the District of Columbia, Pitkin County, Colo. (where Aspen is), San Francisco and Marin County, Calif. The counties at the bottom tended to be small, white, rural, poor and less educated and they were located in the South and the mountain West: Millard County, Utah (population 12,662), Loup County, Neb. (pop. 576), Perry County, Miss. (pop. 12,131) and Roberts County, Tex. (pop. 831). Measured by these criteria, the top-ranked counties were cosmopolitan centers, with a larger percentage of affluent, highly educated residents: New York City, the District of Columbia, Pitkin County, Colo. (where Aspen is), San Francisco and Marin County, Calif. The counties at the bottom tended to be small, white, rural, poor and less educated and they were located in the South and the Mountain West: Millard County, Utah (population 12,662), Loup County, Neb. (pop. 576), Perry County, Miss. (pop. 12,131), and Roberts County, Tex. (pop. 831).
To see where Trump has been getting his strongest support in terms of the Lesthaeghe-Neidert measures, it is useful to look at county level results from the Republican presidential primaries in four states: Ohio, Michigan, Florida and Tennessee. With rare exceptions, the same pattern emerged in all four states: the lower the S.D.T. ranking, the higher Trump’s votes compared to his statewide average; the higher the S.D.T. level, the lower Trump’s vote. In many cases, the spread was 10 percentage points or more. To see where Trump has been getting his strongest support in terms of the Lesthaeghe-Neidert measures, it is useful to look at county level results from the Republican presidential primaries in four states: Ohio, Michigan, Florida and Tennessee. With rare exceptions, the same pattern emerged in all four states: the lower the S.D.T. ranking, the higher Trump’s votes compared with his statewide average; the higher the S.D.T. level, the lower Trump’s vote. In many cases, the spread was 10 percentage points or more.
Take Manhattan. In these rankings, it is the highest of the 3140 counties in the United States. Trump won the entire state of New York with 60.4 percent of the primary vote. In Manhattan, however, Trump lost to John Kasich, the more moderate candidate, 41.8 percent to 45.2 percent. Take Manhattan. In these rankings, it is the highest of the 3,140 counties in the United States. Trump won the entire state of New York with 60.4 percent of the primary vote. In Manhattan, however, Trump lost to John Kasich, the more moderate candidate, 41.8 percent to 45.2 percent.
Or take two Virginia counties, Arlington and Alexandria, which rank high on the S.D.T. list at 7 and 8. Trump carried all of Virginia with 41.8 percent of the vote, but in Alexandria and Arlington he won by 18.8 percent and by 16.8 percent. Or take two Virginia counties, Arlington and Alexandria, which rank high on the S.D.T. list at seven and eight. Trump carried all of Virginia with about 35 percent of the vote (Marco Rubio came in second, with about 32 percent), but in Alexandria and Arlington, Trump won only 18.8 percent and 16.8 percent.
Compare that to two Texas counties, Tyler and St. Augustine, that rank near the bottom in the S.D.T. ratings. Trump lost Texas to his former opponent, Ted Cruz, 43.8 percent to 26.7 percent. In St. Augustine, Trump outperformed his statewide results, winning 39.6 of the county’s votes, a 12.9 point improvement. In Tyler, Trump received 35.9 percent, 9.2 points better than his statewide average. Compare that with two Texas counties, Tyler and St. Augustine, which rank near the bottom in the S.D.T. ratings. Trump lost Texas to his former opponent, Ted Cruz, 43.8 percent to 26.7 percent. In St. Augustine, Trump outperformed his statewide results, winning 39.6 of the county’s votes, a 12.9 point improvement. In Tyler, Trump received 35.9 percent, 9.2 points better than his statewide average.
Similarly, in Ohio, Trump exceeded his statewide average in 15 out of 18 counties ranked near the bottom on the Lesthaeghe-Neidert scale, while falling well below his statewide percentage in four metropolitan counties — Franklin, Delaware, Cuyahoga and Hamilton — near the top of the rankings.Similarly, in Ohio, Trump exceeded his statewide average in 15 out of 18 counties ranked near the bottom on the Lesthaeghe-Neidert scale, while falling well below his statewide percentage in four metropolitan counties — Franklin, Delaware, Cuyahoga and Hamilton — near the top of the rankings.
The nomination of Donald Trump will sharpen and deepen the Republican Party’s core problems. Trump gains the party ground among declining segments of the population — less well educated, less well off whites — and loses ground with the growing constituencies: single women, well-educated men and women, minorities, the affluent and professionals.The nomination of Donald Trump will sharpen and deepen the Republican Party’s core problems. Trump gains the party ground among declining segments of the population — less well educated, less well off whites — and loses ground with the growing constituencies: single women, well-educated men and women, minorities, the affluent and professionals.
This is especially true in the case of Trump’s dependence on support from communities at the bottom of the Lesthaeghe-Neidert S.D.T. scale. Not only are more and more Americans adopting the practices and values described by Lesthaeghe and Neidert — self-expressiveness, gender equality, cohabitation, same-sex couples, postponed marriage and childbearing — but so too is much of the developed world.This is especially true in the case of Trump’s dependence on support from communities at the bottom of the Lesthaeghe-Neidert S.D.T. scale. Not only are more and more Americans adopting the practices and values described by Lesthaeghe and Neidert — self-expressiveness, gender equality, cohabitation, same-sex couples, postponed marriage and childbearing — but so too is much of the developed world.
This transition has effectively become the norm in much of Europe, and, as Lesthaeghe points out, it is gaining ground in regions as diverse as East Asia and Latin America. This transition has effectively become the norm in much of Europe, and as Lesthaeghe points out, it is gaining ground in regions as diverse as East Asia and Latin America.
In this country, the transition has led to partisan schism. For decades now, the Republican Party has been conducting a racial and cultural counterrevolution. It proved a successful strategy from 1966 to 1992. Since then, as the percentage of Americans on the liberal side of the culture wars has grown steadily, the counterrevolutionary approach has become more and more divisive.In this country, the transition has led to partisan schism. For decades now, the Republican Party has been conducting a racial and cultural counterrevolution. It proved a successful strategy from 1966 to 1992. Since then, as the percentage of Americans on the liberal side of the culture wars has grown steadily, the counterrevolutionary approach has become more and more divisive.
In this respect, Trump is not, as many charge, violating core Republican tenets. Instead, he represents the culmination of the rear-guard action that has characterized the party for decades. There is a chance that Trump will bring new blood into a revitalized Republican coalition. It’s also possible that he will accelerate the Republican Party’s downward spiral into irrelevance.In this respect, Trump is not, as many charge, violating core Republican tenets. Instead, he represents the culmination of the rear-guard action that has characterized the party for decades. There is a chance that Trump will bring new blood into a revitalized Republican coalition. It’s also possible that he will accelerate the Republican Party’s downward spiral into irrelevance.