This article is from the source 'nytimes' and was first published or seen on . It last changed over 40 days ago and won't be checked again for changes.
You can find the current article at its original source at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/opinion/new-orleans-new-flood-maps-an-outline-for-disaster.html
The article has changed 3 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.
| Version 0 | Version 1 |
|---|---|
| New Orleans’ New Flood Maps: An Outline for Disaster | New Orleans’ New Flood Maps: An Outline for Disaster |
| (about 2 hours later) | |
| NEW ORLEANS — TODAY, June 1, is the first day of hurricane season — an understandably anxious time for New Orleans. That’s why I was briefly elated — and then, horrified — when, earlier this year, the federal government declared most of New Orleans safe from flooding. | |
| According to new maps issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, even vast areas of the city that are below sea level — including parts of the Lower Ninth Ward, Lakeview and New Orleans East that sat under 10 feet of water after Hurricane Katrina — need not worry about the next storm. | According to new maps issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, even vast areas of the city that are below sea level — including parts of the Lower Ninth Ward, Lakeview and New Orleans East that sat under 10 feet of water after Hurricane Katrina — need not worry about the next storm. |
| But as a historian of disasters, I know that FEMA’s maps offer a myopic view of New Orleans’s vulnerability. They threaten to put thousands of people at greater risk, and offer more ominous evidence of our country’s stumbling efforts to reckon with climate change. | But as a historian of disasters, I know that FEMA’s maps offer a myopic view of New Orleans’s vulnerability. They threaten to put thousands of people at greater risk, and offer more ominous evidence of our country’s stumbling efforts to reckon with climate change. |
| The maps in question, called digital flood insurance rate maps, are a crucial component of the National Flood Insurance Program, which Congress created in 1968 to subsidize flood insurance (which private insurers would otherwise not offer), in exchange for communities’ regulating land use in flood-prone areas. The maps designate “special flood hazard areas” where FEMA estimates there is a 1 percent or greater chance of flooding in any given year; for anyone seeking a mortgage in these areas, flood insurance is mandatory. | The maps in question, called digital flood insurance rate maps, are a crucial component of the National Flood Insurance Program, which Congress created in 1968 to subsidize flood insurance (which private insurers would otherwise not offer), in exchange for communities’ regulating land use in flood-prone areas. The maps designate “special flood hazard areas” where FEMA estimates there is a 1 percent or greater chance of flooding in any given year; for anyone seeking a mortgage in these areas, flood insurance is mandatory. |
| The flood insurance rate maps for New Orleans that were in force in 2005, when the federal levee system failed during Hurricane Katrina, dated from the 1980s. They offered a relatively accurate prediction of the city’s vulnerability: About 80 percent of New Orleans flooded. | The flood insurance rate maps for New Orleans that were in force in 2005, when the federal levee system failed during Hurricane Katrina, dated from the 1980s. They offered a relatively accurate prediction of the city’s vulnerability: About 80 percent of New Orleans flooded. |
| Nonetheless, New Orleans officials protested in 2009 when FEMA released drafts of new maps suggesting most of the city was still vulnerable. Knowing the flood maps would shape the city’s future — dictating property values, insurance premiums and perceptions of the city’s viability — the officials claimed that FEMA had not adequately taken into account the protection offered by the $14.5 billion post-Katrina levee system. | Nonetheless, New Orleans officials protested in 2009 when FEMA released drafts of new maps suggesting most of the city was still vulnerable. Knowing the flood maps would shape the city’s future — dictating property values, insurance premiums and perceptions of the city’s viability — the officials claimed that FEMA had not adequately taken into account the protection offered by the $14.5 billion post-Katrina levee system. |
| Now, after more than six years of waiting and wrangling, the finalized maps FEMA released this spring reflect the most optimistic possible assessment. FEMA’s maps mean homeowners who have rebuilt in many neighborhoods flooded in 2005 — including, to give just one example, the area around a new memorial exhibition at the site of a catastrophic levee failure — will no longer be required to buy flood insurance. Insurance rates will fall, and despite the city’s cautions to the contrary, many will forgo coverage altogether. Property values will rise. Cash-strapped New Orleanians will celebrate. | Now, after more than six years of waiting and wrangling, the finalized maps FEMA released this spring reflect the most optimistic possible assessment. FEMA’s maps mean homeowners who have rebuilt in many neighborhoods flooded in 2005 — including, to give just one example, the area around a new memorial exhibition at the site of a catastrophic levee failure — will no longer be required to buy flood insurance. Insurance rates will fall, and despite the city’s cautions to the contrary, many will forgo coverage altogether. Property values will rise. Cash-strapped New Orleanians will celebrate. |
| But many of us will hold our breath through hurricane season nonetheless, because we know that the new maps reflect questionable assumptions. First, they assume that this time the Army Corps of Engineers’ work can be trusted, and the levee system will not fail again. | But many of us will hold our breath through hurricane season nonetheless, because we know that the new maps reflect questionable assumptions. First, they assume that this time the Army Corps of Engineers’ work can be trusted, and the levee system will not fail again. |
| The new maps also do not adequately highlight the shifting reality wrought by climate change. It’s not just that a warming planet heralds bigger and more frequent storms. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Louisiana faces the highest rate of sea-level rise of any coastal region on the planet: As seas rise, Louisiana’s land is sinking, part of an ancient geologic process of subsidence accelerated by the levee system itself, which prevents mud from the Mississippi River from replenishing the land. Already, the Corps of Engineers has had to rebuild sections of the new levee system that had sunk six inches below their original height. | The new maps also do not adequately highlight the shifting reality wrought by climate change. It’s not just that a warming planet heralds bigger and more frequent storms. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Louisiana faces the highest rate of sea-level rise of any coastal region on the planet: As seas rise, Louisiana’s land is sinking, part of an ancient geologic process of subsidence accelerated by the levee system itself, which prevents mud from the Mississippi River from replenishing the land. Already, the Corps of Engineers has had to rebuild sections of the new levee system that had sunk six inches below their original height. |
| According to current projections, roughly 75 percent of New Orleans will be below sea level by 2050, up from 54 percent today. And all the while, canals dug by the oil industry are causing coastal wetlands — the crucial buffer against hurricane storm surges — to fall into the Gulf of Mexico at the rate of a football field every hour. And yet, according to the new map, most of the city is safe. | According to current projections, roughly 75 percent of New Orleans will be below sea level by 2050, up from 54 percent today. And all the while, canals dug by the oil industry are causing coastal wetlands — the crucial buffer against hurricane storm surges — to fall into the Gulf of Mexico at the rate of a football field every hour. And yet, according to the new map, most of the city is safe. |
| That is why a likely outcome of this new federal policy is that when — not if — New Orleans floods again, thousands of people will be worse off than they were during Hurricane Katrina: When their homes flood, they will not have flood insurance. | That is why a likely outcome of this new federal policy is that when — not if — New Orleans floods again, thousands of people will be worse off than they were during Hurricane Katrina: When their homes flood, they will not have flood insurance. |
| This is not to say that gloomier maps alone would solve the problem. By many measures the National Flood Insurance Program is a failure. The program was supposed to limit federal payouts after flood disasters, while discouraging building in risky areas. But since its inception, development in dangerous places has accelerated, while costs to federal taxpayers for both flood insurance and disaster relief have skyrocketed. As of 2014, after Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy, the program was $24 billion in debt. | This is not to say that gloomier maps alone would solve the problem. By many measures the National Flood Insurance Program is a failure. The program was supposed to limit federal payouts after flood disasters, while discouraging building in risky areas. But since its inception, development in dangerous places has accelerated, while costs to federal taxpayers for both flood insurance and disaster relief have skyrocketed. As of 2014, after Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy, the program was $24 billion in debt. |
| We face a difficult choice. The National Flood Insurance Program can charge an unsubsidized, or “actuarial,” rate for coverage (as Congress decreed in 2012, though it later severely limited how rapidly those rates could rise); doing so would impose crippling costs on homeowners. Or it can continue to subsidize development in dangerous places. But these new maps represent an unwise compromise: blinding residents to their physical vulnerability, while also inviting them to financial ruin. | We face a difficult choice. The National Flood Insurance Program can charge an unsubsidized, or “actuarial,” rate for coverage (as Congress decreed in 2012, though it later severely limited how rapidly those rates could rise); doing so would impose crippling costs on homeowners. Or it can continue to subsidize development in dangerous places. But these new maps represent an unwise compromise: blinding residents to their physical vulnerability, while also inviting them to financial ruin. |