This article is from the source 'guardian' and was first published or seen on . It last changed over 40 days ago and won't be checked again for changes.
You can find the current article at its original source at https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/06/chilcot-iraq-war-inquiry-jack-straw
The article has changed 3 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.
| Version 0 | Version 1 |
|---|---|
| Jack Straw's role in preparing for post-crisis Iraq criticised by Chilcot | Jack Straw's role in preparing for post-crisis Iraq criticised by Chilcot |
| (35 minutes later) | |
| Jack Straw signed up to plans for an invasion in Iraq, despite fearing there could be “a long and unsuccessful war”, the Chilcot report finds. | Jack Straw signed up to plans for an invasion in Iraq, despite fearing there could be “a long and unsuccessful war”, the Chilcot report finds. |
| The report states the then foreign secretary raised the question in response to a briefing in March 2003 of what would happen in the event of a protracted conflict, but “Mr Straw’s question was not put to officials and there is no indication that it was considered further”. | The report states the then foreign secretary raised the question in response to a briefing in March 2003 of what would happen in the event of a protracted conflict, but “Mr Straw’s question was not put to officials and there is no indication that it was considered further”. |
| Related: We need your help reporting on Chilcot | Related: We need your help reporting on Chilcot |
| It also criticises Straw’s role in the deeply flawed process of preparing for post-crisis Iraq, with the UK failing to win over Washington to its preferred plan for the UN to take the lead. “It was Mr Straw’s responsibility as foreign secretary to give due consideration to the range of options available to the UK” should it fail to convince the US that the UN should take charge, it says. | |
| “These included making UK participation in military action conditional on a satisfactory post-conflict plan … Mr Straw did not do so in January 2003,” it says. | |
| Straw is also revealed to have been aware at the time of Blair’s private promise to then US president George W Bush in 2002 to be with him “all the way”, in a note that was not widely circulated. | Straw is also revealed to have been aware at the time of Blair’s private promise to then US president George W Bush in 2002 to be with him “all the way”, in a note that was not widely circulated. |
| In a message to Blair on 11 March 2003, as the pair worked hand-in-hand to build the case for the war, Straw pressed the idea of the “Kosovo route” of avoiding a vote in the UN security council on military action, to prevent it being vetoed by France, and perhaps by other members. But he also suggested a plan B in which the UK would not participate in military action if it failed to win the support of the parliamentary Labour party. In conclusion, Straw said: “When Bush graciously accepted your offer to be with him all the way, he wanted you alive, not dead.” | In a message to Blair on 11 March 2003, as the pair worked hand-in-hand to build the case for the war, Straw pressed the idea of the “Kosovo route” of avoiding a vote in the UN security council on military action, to prevent it being vetoed by France, and perhaps by other members. But he also suggested a plan B in which the UK would not participate in military action if it failed to win the support of the parliamentary Labour party. In conclusion, Straw said: “When Bush graciously accepted your offer to be with him all the way, he wanted you alive, not dead.” |
| Chilcot also vindicates the judgment of the late Robin Cook, who resigned from the cabinet in March 2003 in protest over what he saw as the rush towards military action. | Chilcot also vindicates the judgment of the late Robin Cook, who resigned from the cabinet in March 2003 in protest over what he saw as the rush towards military action. |
| While criticising the conclusions Blair and his inner circle drew from contemporary intelligence reports about the threat posed by Iraq, the executive summary of the Chilcot report says: “As Mr Cook’s resignation statement on 17 March made clear, it was possible for a minister to draw different conclusions from the same information.” | While criticising the conclusions Blair and his inner circle drew from contemporary intelligence reports about the threat posed by Iraq, the executive summary of the Chilcot report says: “As Mr Cook’s resignation statement on 17 March made clear, it was possible for a minister to draw different conclusions from the same information.” |
| It also suggests the inclusion of the sceptical Cook, or deputy prime minister John Prescott, in discussions about the buildup to the conflict could have helped improve decision-making. | |
| Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary at the time, also emerges from the report as a restraining influence on Blair in the year before the invasion of Iraq. Hoon attempted, for example, to secure greater UK involvement in planning for the conflict and its aftermath. | |
| “Mr Hoon advised that the UK should support President Bush and be ready to make a military contribution; and that UK involvement in planning would improve the US process. One of Mr Blair’s objectives at Crawford [the summit between the leaders at Bush’s Texas ranch] in 2002, should, therefore, be to secure agreement to the UK’s participation in military planning,” the report reads. | |
| Hoon also made clear in 2002 his reservations to Blair about focusing solely on Iraq as the source of potential weapons proliferation: “Mr Hoon sent a minute to Mr Blair on 22 March, which included Mr Hoon’s assessment that Saddam Hussein was ’only one unpleasant dimension’ of the ’key strategic problem’ of the spread of WMD, and that a more active counter‑proliferation strategy was needed for the region as a whole.” | |
| He also warned Blair at the same time that “if a coalition takes control of Baghdad (especially without catching Saddam), it will probably have to stay there for many years”. | |
| Hoon also urged Blair to use a meeting with the US defence secretary,Donald Rumsfeld, in June 2002 to investigate the US’s thinking in detail. | |
| “Further, by raising in general terms, that our contingency planning has shown we need plenty of warning in order to be able to contribute to military action I would reinforce the need for the UK to be exposed fully to US thinking as soon as possible,” he said in a note. But Chilcot records: “Mr Blair wrote alongside the last point: “No, that will send a wobbly message.” |