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You can find the current article at its original source at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/06/tony-blair-wrong-iraq-publicly-admit-it-chilcot-report
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| Version 1 | Version 2 |
|---|---|
| Blair was wrong on Iraq – and he should have the humility to admit it | Blair was wrong on Iraq – and he should have the humility to admit it |
| (about 2 months later) | |
| The invasion of Iraq was, as Sir John Chilcot put it today, the first invasion of a sovereign state by the UK since the second world war. It was also, as Chilcot said, in his dry, meticulous terms, a failure which went badly wrong. | The invasion of Iraq was, as Sir John Chilcot put it today, the first invasion of a sovereign state by the UK since the second world war. It was also, as Chilcot said, in his dry, meticulous terms, a failure which went badly wrong. |
| Those words “failure” and “badly wrong” will sound like a weak and feeble form of condemnation to the many who feel the Iraq war should be condemned as a crime, a moral outrage, a terrible deception or as simply unforgivable. But “failure” in fact goes to the absolute heart of what was so very wrong about Tony Blair’s policy, way of governing and premiership. | Those words “failure” and “badly wrong” will sound like a weak and feeble form of condemnation to the many who feel the Iraq war should be condemned as a crime, a moral outrage, a terrible deception or as simply unforgivable. But “failure” in fact goes to the absolute heart of what was so very wrong about Tony Blair’s policy, way of governing and premiership. |
| Was the invasion the wrong policy? Yes. Was it as wrong as anything in British foreign policy since Suez in 1956? Yes. Has the Iraq invasion been a disaster? Yes. Did it change modern British politics for the worse? Yes. Will it haunt the reputation of Tony Blair for ever? Absolutely. | Was the invasion the wrong policy? Yes. Was it as wrong as anything in British foreign policy since Suez in 1956? Yes. Has the Iraq invasion been a disaster? Yes. Did it change modern British politics for the worse? Yes. Will it haunt the reputation of Tony Blair for ever? Absolutely. |
| But the problem on the day of the publication of the Chilcot inquiry is that we have known most of these things since 2003. Some of us warned about them long before the invasion. Not all the disasters of Iraq were easily foreseeable. But lots were both foreseeable and foreseen. Hindsight, as Chilcot quietly but devastatingly put it, was not required. | But the problem on the day of the publication of the Chilcot inquiry is that we have known most of these things since 2003. Some of us warned about them long before the invasion. Not all the disasters of Iraq were easily foreseeable. But lots were both foreseeable and foreseen. Hindsight, as Chilcot quietly but devastatingly put it, was not required. |
| Blair fundamentally underestimated the danger of the Bush administration and fundamentally overestimated his own influence over it. These things were already clear in 2001 – many of us wrote about them at the time. That was why this newspaper among many others did everything that it could possibly do in 2001-3 to persuade Blair against the folly of invasion that so many foolishly supported across British politics. | Blair fundamentally underestimated the danger of the Bush administration and fundamentally overestimated his own influence over it. These things were already clear in 2001 – many of us wrote about them at the time. That was why this newspaper among many others did everything that it could possibly do in 2001-3 to persuade Blair against the folly of invasion that so many foolishly supported across British politics. |
| Tragically, we failed. The facts on the ground remain a living reprimand to our own failure and, even more, to those who gave the orders. Thousands of Iraqis have died. Millions have been displaced. Millions live without the security that makes civilised life possible. But Iraq was not unique. From the Trojan war to the invasion of Iraq, the march of folly has been a human constant. | Tragically, we failed. The facts on the ground remain a living reprimand to our own failure and, even more, to those who gave the orders. Thousands of Iraqis have died. Millions have been displaced. Millions live without the security that makes civilised life possible. But Iraq was not unique. From the Trojan war to the invasion of Iraq, the march of folly has been a human constant. |
| Chilcot has produced a damning report on a damnable act. So the issue in Chilcot is less whether Iraq was a disaster – but why? And, even harder to say in some ways, how can fallible human beings devise robust means of making sure that they are not repeated in some future crisis? | Chilcot has produced a damning report on a damnable act. So the issue in Chilcot is less whether Iraq was a disaster – but why? And, even harder to say in some ways, how can fallible human beings devise robust means of making sure that they are not repeated in some future crisis? |
| We will all have to read the report in as much detail as we have an appetite for before answering these questions objectively and in a measured manner, as we all should. | We will all have to read the report in as much detail as we have an appetite for before answering these questions objectively and in a measured manner, as we all should. |
| But 13 years have not dimmed the urgency of doing better, and Chilcot’s emphasis on UK government and state failure should be taken seriously. It applies, and with immense implications, in the fields of intelligence, legal advice, war planning, governance and diplomacy. In some ways the last of these is the most important of all. Blair’s policy of attempting to keep George W Bush’s administration on the diplomatic UN route failed when it became clear that there was not enough support for a second security council resolution. | But 13 years have not dimmed the urgency of doing better, and Chilcot’s emphasis on UK government and state failure should be taken seriously. It applies, and with immense implications, in the fields of intelligence, legal advice, war planning, governance and diplomacy. In some ways the last of these is the most important of all. Blair’s policy of attempting to keep George W Bush’s administration on the diplomatic UN route failed when it became clear that there was not enough support for a second security council resolution. |
| That was the point at which the UK government could and should have said the US must count the UK out. Blair should have admitted that this was a line in the sand. But he didn’t call a halt. He didn’t accept that he had failed. He went with the Americans. This was the key moment in the whole story. His cabinet should have stopped him. Gordon Brown and others should have resigned with Robin Cook. The course of British politics since 2003 would have been very different if that had happened. | That was the point at which the UK government could and should have said the US must count the UK out. Blair should have admitted that this was a line in the sand. But he didn’t call a halt. He didn’t accept that he had failed. He went with the Americans. This was the key moment in the whole story. His cabinet should have stopped him. Gordon Brown and others should have resigned with Robin Cook. The course of British politics since 2003 would have been very different if that had happened. |
| There is no getting away from the principal personal failing at the heart of the whole tale. Nothing would be served by war crimes tribunals or impeachment proceedings brought against Blair, and I still think highly of much of Blair’s record and approach to politics. But he was wrong about Iraq, acted wrongly in Iraq and should publicly apologise far more profoundly than he has yet had the humility to do. We were right. He was wrong. And he should admit it. | There is no getting away from the principal personal failing at the heart of the whole tale. Nothing would be served by war crimes tribunals or impeachment proceedings brought against Blair, and I still think highly of much of Blair’s record and approach to politics. But he was wrong about Iraq, acted wrongly in Iraq and should publicly apologise far more profoundly than he has yet had the humility to do. We were right. He was wrong. And he should admit it. |