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| Australia needs its own Chilcot inquiry into Iraq war, former defence head says | Australia needs its own Chilcot inquiry into Iraq war, former defence head says |
| (about 2 months later) | |
| A former head of Australia’s defence department says the country needs its own version of the Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq war. | A former head of Australia’s defence department says the country needs its own version of the Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq war. |
| Sir John Chilcot’s report, published in London on Wednesday, delivered a series of critical verdicts on the Blair government’s decision-making in the run-up to the 2003 war. | Sir John Chilcot’s report, published in London on Wednesday, delivered a series of critical verdicts on the Blair government’s decision-making in the run-up to the 2003 war. |
| Paul Barratt, who headed Australia’s defence department from 1998 to 1999, said Chilcot’s excoriating 2.6m-word report demonstrated the “fragility” of the process for deciding to go to war, a weakness that still existed in Australia. | Paul Barratt, who headed Australia’s defence department from 1998 to 1999, said Chilcot’s excoriating 2.6m-word report demonstrated the “fragility” of the process for deciding to go to war, a weakness that still existed in Australia. |
| Barratt said that, in the wake of the failed intervention in Iraq, the UK had strengthened the checks and balances around the country’s decision to go to war – adopting the practice of a debate in the House of Commons over the decision to commit troops. Australia did not have a similar mechanism. | Barratt said that, in the wake of the failed intervention in Iraq, the UK had strengthened the checks and balances around the country’s decision to go to war – adopting the practice of a debate in the House of Commons over the decision to commit troops. Australia did not have a similar mechanism. |
| “We need a similar inquiry here,” Barratt told Guardian Australia. “Chilcot’s report – it is four times the length of War and Peace – has revealed so much about what was going on behind the scenes, between Blair and his advisers, Blair and his cabinet, Blair and Bush. Australia needs a similar comprehensive independent inquiry into how the decision was made to commit Australia to this war. | “We need a similar inquiry here,” Barratt told Guardian Australia. “Chilcot’s report – it is four times the length of War and Peace – has revealed so much about what was going on behind the scenes, between Blair and his advisers, Blair and his cabinet, Blair and Bush. Australia needs a similar comprehensive independent inquiry into how the decision was made to commit Australia to this war. |
| “Chilcot has demonstrated the fragility of the decision-making process to go to war. That fundamental power of the sovereign is left in the hands of one person, the prime minister.” | “Chilcot has demonstrated the fragility of the decision-making process to go to war. That fundamental power of the sovereign is left in the hands of one person, the prime minister.” |
| John Howard, the Australian prime minister who made the decision to commit Australian troops to the 2003 Iraq invasion, is mentioned only a handful of times in Chilcot’s report. One reference is taken from George W. Bush’s autobiography, Decision Points, where he quotes the Australian prime minister as saying that “a UN resolution was essential to winning public support” for the invasion. | John Howard, the Australian prime minister who made the decision to commit Australian troops to the 2003 Iraq invasion, is mentioned only a handful of times in Chilcot’s report. One reference is taken from George W. Bush’s autobiography, Decision Points, where he quotes the Australian prime minister as saying that “a UN resolution was essential to winning public support” for the invasion. |
| However, there are several references to Australia’s role in the invasion in the report. | However, there are several references to Australia’s role in the invasion in the report. |
| Chilcot notes that the Australian and US militaries had shown “agility and forethought” in responding to the challenges of fighting in Iraq, in particular countering the effects of improvised explosives. | Chilcot notes that the Australian and US militaries had shown “agility and forethought” in responding to the challenges of fighting in Iraq, in particular countering the effects of improvised explosives. |
| In comparison the UK military was “grindingly slow and ponderous” in responding. | In comparison the UK military was “grindingly slow and ponderous” in responding. |
| However, the most illuminating references to Australia’s role in the planning and prosecution of the Iraq war lie within the supporting documents to Chilcot’s report. | However, the most illuminating references to Australia’s role in the planning and prosecution of the Iraq war lie within the supporting documents to Chilcot’s report. |
| One reference is to a conversation in January 2003 in which Blair and Howard discussed obtaining a second resolution authorising military action from the UN. | One reference is to a conversation in January 2003 in which Blair and Howard discussed obtaining a second resolution authorising military action from the UN. |
| Australia joined the initial coalition of forces invading Iraq in March 2003, deploying three ships and a clearance diving team as well as a 500-strong special forces task group, supported by three Chinook helicopters. Three Australians died during the conflict, though none in combat with the Australian military. | Australia joined the initial coalition of forces invading Iraq in March 2003, deploying three ships and a clearance diving team as well as a 500-strong special forces task group, supported by three Chinook helicopters. Three Australians died during the conflict, though none in combat with the Australian military. |
| Paul Pardoel, an Australian citizen serving as a navigator with the British RAF, died in a plane crash in 2005. David Nary, a warrant officer, with the Australian SAS, was killing during a training exercise in Kuwait before deployment. And Jake Kovco, a member of the security detachment in Baghdad, died from an accidental self-inflicted gunshot wound inside his unit’s barracks. | Paul Pardoel, an Australian citizen serving as a navigator with the British RAF, died in a plane crash in 2005. David Nary, a warrant officer, with the Australian SAS, was killing during a training exercise in Kuwait before deployment. And Jake Kovco, a member of the security detachment in Baghdad, died from an accidental self-inflicted gunshot wound inside his unit’s barracks. |
| Australia’s six-year involvement in Iraq is believed to have cost more than $5bn. Combat troops were withdrawn by July 2009. | Australia’s six-year involvement in Iraq is believed to have cost more than $5bn. Combat troops were withdrawn by July 2009. |
| Andrew Wilkie, the newly-re-elected independent MP for Denison, resigned in 2003 from his role as an intelligence analyst with the Office of National Assessments in protest against the Australian government’s decision to join the invasion of Iraq, arguing military intervention was not justified and intelligence was misrepresented by politicians. | Andrew Wilkie, the newly-re-elected independent MP for Denison, resigned in 2003 from his role as an intelligence analyst with the Office of National Assessments in protest against the Australian government’s decision to join the invasion of Iraq, arguing military intervention was not justified and intelligence was misrepresented by politicians. |
| He said Chilcot had clearly revealed the flaws in the planning and prosecution of the invasion and alleged the then prime minister, John Howard, had taken “Australia to war on the basis of a lie”. | He said Chilcot had clearly revealed the flaws in the planning and prosecution of the invasion and alleged the then prime minister, John Howard, had taken “Australia to war on the basis of a lie”. |
| “There was simply no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein, peaceful options had not been exhausted, there was great doubt over the claims about weapons of mass destruction, a military campaign contained enormous risks and ultimately the mission was a failure,” he said. | “There was simply no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein, peaceful options had not been exhausted, there was great doubt over the claims about weapons of mass destruction, a military campaign contained enormous risks and ultimately the mission was a failure,” he said. |
| Wilkie said the mistakes of the Iraq invasion had helped create the current Islamist terrorist threat in the Middle East and around the world. | Wilkie said the mistakes of the Iraq invasion had helped create the current Islamist terrorist threat in the Middle East and around the world. |
| “The Iraq debacle turbo-charged al Qaida and created the circumstances for the eventual emergence of Islamic State. In other words the terrorist danger confronting Australians to this very day is a result of Australia’s involvement in Iraq. | “The Iraq debacle turbo-charged al Qaida and created the circumstances for the eventual emergence of Islamic State. In other words the terrorist danger confronting Australians to this very day is a result of Australia’s involvement in Iraq. |
| “Frankly the blood of the Australians killed in the 2005 Bali bombing, and in the Lindt cafe siege and elsewhere, is on their hands.” | “Frankly the blood of the Australians killed in the 2005 Bali bombing, and in the Lindt cafe siege and elsewhere, is on their hands.” |
| Wilkie said he fully supported calls for a Chilcot-style inquiry in Australia. | Wilkie said he fully supported calls for a Chilcot-style inquiry in Australia. |
| But Australia’s former chief of army Peter Leahy – who oversaw the army from 2002 to 2008 – said a Chilcot-style inquiry was not needed in Australia. But he said the country should not “blindly” follow its ally the United States into war. | But Australia’s former chief of army Peter Leahy – who oversaw the army from 2002 to 2008 – said a Chilcot-style inquiry was not needed in Australia. But he said the country should not “blindly” follow its ally the United States into war. |
| “Frankly, some of the decisions the United States, our senior partner in our strategic alliance, have made over the last 20 or 30 years have been a bit crook,” he told ABC TV. | “Frankly, some of the decisions the United States, our senior partner in our strategic alliance, have made over the last 20 or 30 years have been a bit crook,” he told ABC TV. |
| “I think it does give us this really important guide to the future, that we need to be able to take independent, sovereign decisions based on our own national interests and what the strategies might be.” | “I think it does give us this really important guide to the future, that we need to be able to take independent, sovereign decisions based on our own national interests and what the strategies might be.” |
| Leahy said he did not believe there needed to be a similar review in Australia. | Leahy said he did not believe there needed to be a similar review in Australia. |
| “Let’s have a discussion not an inquiry around our relationship with the United States, how we decide to go to war and very importantly how we decide every day when we are at war to stay at war.” | “Let’s have a discussion not an inquiry around our relationship with the United States, how we decide to go to war and very importantly how we decide every day when we are at war to stay at war.” |
| The Chilcot report, which took seven years to complete, found: | The Chilcot report, which took seven years to complete, found: |
| Retired Australian army general Jim Molan, who was chief of operations in the second year of the war and who authored a book, Running the War in Iraq, said he had no regrets about Australia’s involvement in the conflict. | Retired Australian army general Jim Molan, who was chief of operations in the second year of the war and who authored a book, Running the War in Iraq, said he had no regrets about Australia’s involvement in the conflict. |
| “None at all,” he told ABC radio Melbourne on Thursday morning. “Because I didn’t do the planning or make the decision [to go to war],” he said. | “None at all,” he told ABC radio Melbourne on Thursday morning. “Because I didn’t do the planning or make the decision [to go to war],” he said. |
| He said Chilcot’s finding that all peaceful options had not been exhausted before invading Iraq was merely a “judgment”. | He said Chilcot’s finding that all peaceful options had not been exhausted before invading Iraq was merely a “judgment”. |
| “There will always be someone you didn’t talk to,” he said. “Often there will be consequences for no action as there are for action. So no, I have no regrets at all.” | “There will always be someone you didn’t talk to,” he said. “Often there will be consequences for no action as there are for action. So no, I have no regrets at all.” |
| While there were those who argued that there were no weapons of mass destruction being harboured by Saddam Hussein, Molan said those beliefs were based on an “emotional or intuitive view” and that those people likely “have never dealt with intelligence”. | While there were those who argued that there were no weapons of mass destruction being harboured by Saddam Hussein, Molan said those beliefs were based on an “emotional or intuitive view” and that those people likely “have never dealt with intelligence”. |
| “At that time, there was an honest belief that there were weapons of mass destruction and that they could impact on our way of life,” he said. | “At that time, there was an honest belief that there were weapons of mass destruction and that they could impact on our way of life,” he said. |
| “A lot of people who complained or who put the view that [the presence of] weapons of mass destruction was not correct had no real grounds to make that decision.” | “A lot of people who complained or who put the view that [the presence of] weapons of mass destruction was not correct had no real grounds to make that decision.” |
| Asked if it should be made a requirement in Australia that no leader take the country to war without a parliamentary debate and vote, Molan said there would be dangers in doing so. | Asked if it should be made a requirement in Australia that no leader take the country to war without a parliamentary debate and vote, Molan said there would be dangers in doing so. |
| “The ability to make a decision to go to war should be based on the highest level of intelligence,” Molan said. “Can you give the highest level of intelligence to all of our legislators and then get them to indulge in a debate which may have to, by its nature, include very, very sensitive intelligence information? If you want to go down that route, that’s what you have to address.” | “The ability to make a decision to go to war should be based on the highest level of intelligence,” Molan said. “Can you give the highest level of intelligence to all of our legislators and then get them to indulge in a debate which may have to, by its nature, include very, very sensitive intelligence information? If you want to go down that route, that’s what you have to address.” |
| A better system would be to have a review period after joining a war after three to six months, he said. | A better system would be to have a review period after joining a war after three to six months, he said. |
| In a speech in March 2003, Howard said the decision had been taken “to disarm Iraq because we believe it is right, it is lawful and it’s in Australia’s national interest”. | In a speech in March 2003, Howard said the decision had been taken “to disarm Iraq because we believe it is right, it is lawful and it’s in Australia’s national interest”. |
| “We are determined to join other countries to deprive Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction, its chemical and biological weapons, which even in minute quantities are capable of causing death and destruction on a mammoth scale.” | “We are determined to join other countries to deprive Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction, its chemical and biological weapons, which even in minute quantities are capable of causing death and destruction on a mammoth scale.” |
| Howard cited the 9/11 attacks as well as the bombing of a nightclub in Bali in 2002, which killed 202 people including 88 Australians, as examples of the lack of regard for human life shown by “international terrorists” and a reason why removing weapons from “countries run by despotic regimes” was crucial. | Howard cited the 9/11 attacks as well as the bombing of a nightclub in Bali in 2002, which killed 202 people including 88 Australians, as examples of the lack of regard for human life shown by “international terrorists” and a reason why removing weapons from “countries run by despotic regimes” was crucial. |
| The decision to commit Australian troops to Iraq was controversial. Before the decision had been announced, Simon Crean, the then leader of the opposition, made a statement to parliament in which he accused Howard of committing Australia’s young men and women to a war “without the mandate of the Australian people, the Australian parliament or the United Nations” but “solely on the say-so of George W Bush”. | The decision to commit Australian troops to Iraq was controversial. Before the decision had been announced, Simon Crean, the then leader of the opposition, made a statement to parliament in which he accused Howard of committing Australia’s young men and women to a war “without the mandate of the Australian people, the Australian parliament or the United Nations” but “solely on the say-so of George W Bush”. |
| But the foreign affairs minister, Julie Bishop, who was a backbench MP at the time, insisted on Thursday the decision to go to war “was based on information, the best information at the time. I was in the party room. I recall the information that was presented to us. It was the best information that was available and we took a decision at the time. Of course the government takes responsibility for all decisions that a government takes and we take responsibility for this one.” | But the foreign affairs minister, Julie Bishop, who was a backbench MP at the time, insisted on Thursday the decision to go to war “was based on information, the best information at the time. I was in the party room. I recall the information that was presented to us. It was the best information that was available and we took a decision at the time. Of course the government takes responsibility for all decisions that a government takes and we take responsibility for this one.” |
| There has not been the same concerted effort in Australia as there has been in the UK to hold leaders to account for what they knew before committing troops to Iraq, but various colleagues have cast doubt on Howard’s claims that he was working off the best evidence at the time. | There has not been the same concerted effort in Australia as there has been in the UK to hold leaders to account for what they knew before committing troops to Iraq, but various colleagues have cast doubt on Howard’s claims that he was working off the best evidence at the time. |
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