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Congress Releases Secret 9/11 Document Detailing Possible Saudi Ties to Al Qaeda In 9/11 Document, View of a Saudi Effort to Thwart U.S. Action on Al Qaeda
(about 5 hours later)
WASHINGTON — Congress on Friday made public a long-classified document detailing possible connections between the Saudi government and the Sept. 11 terrorist plot. WASHINGTON — The long-classified document detailing possible connections between the government of Saudi Arabia and the Sept. 11 terrorist plot released on Friday is a wide-ranging catalog of meetings and suspicious coincidences.
The 28-page document is a wide-ranging catalog of possible links between Saudi officials and Qaeda operatives. It details contacts that Saudi operatives in Southern California had with the hijackers and describes the discovery of a telephone number in a Qaeda operative’s phone book that was traced to a corporation managing a Colorado home of Prince Bandar bin Sultan, then the Saudi ambassador to Washington. It details contacts between Saudi officials and some of the Sept. 11 hijackers, checks from Saudi royals to operatives in contact with the hijackers and the discovery of a telephone number in a Qaeda militant’s phone book that was traced to a corporation managing an Aspen, Colo., home of Prince Bandar bin Sultan, then the Saudi ambassador to Washington.
The document, a section of a 2002 congressional inquiry into the Sept. 11 attacks, had been kept secret out of concern that it might fray diplomatic relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Its release marks the end of a yearslong fight by lawmakers and families of the Sept. 11 victims to make public any evidence that the kingdom might have played a role in the attacks. The document, 28 pages of a congressional inquiry into the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, is also an unflattering portrayal of the kingdom’s efforts to thwart American attempts to combat Al Qaeda in the years before the attacks.
The majority of the facts surrounding the attacks are not in serious dispute, but the enduring controversy over what role — if any — Saudi officials played is a reminder that some mysteries linger even as the 15th anniversary of the attacks approaches. But it is also a frustrating time capsule, completed in late 2002 and kept secret for nearly 14 years out of concern that it might fray diplomatic relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Subsequent investigations into the terror attacks pursued the leads described in the document and found that many had no basis in fact. But the mythology surrounding the document grew with each year it remained classified.
The Obama administration sent a declassified version of the document, with some redactions, to the congressional leadership on Friday. It was released hours later on the website of the House Intelligence Committee. The Obama administration sent a declassified version of the document, with some redactions, to the congressional leadership on Friday. Its release on the website of the House Intelligence Committee later in the day marked the end of a years-long fight by lawmakers and families of the Sept. 11 victims to make public any evidence that Saudi Arabia may have played a role in the attacks.
Much of the push over more than a decade to get the document declassified was led by former Senator Bob Graham, the Florida Democrat who was one of the co-chairmen of the congressional inquiry. Mr. Graham has long said that releasing it would provide compelling evidence that the Saudi government had a direct hand in the terrorist plot. It is by no means a Rosetta Stone that deciphers the lingering mysteries behind the attacks. But it is also a far more substantial document than many American and Saudi officials — from the White House press secretary to some members of Congress to the Saudi foreign minister — tried to indicate in a flurry of news conferences and emailed news releases on Friday afternoon.
And yet the document is also something of a historical curiosity. The 28 pages have been kept secret for so many years that their significance seems to have been magnified over time. Subsequent investigations by the Sept. 11 commission and the F.B.I. have pursued many of the leads in the 28 pages and found some had no basis in fact. And it was made public at a particularly troubled moment in America’s decades-long relationship with Saudi Arabia. The Senate unanimously passed a bill in May that would make it easier for families of Sept. 11 victims to sue the Saudi government for any role in the attacks. The bill is now being considered in the House.
In an interview last month, Eleanor J. Hill, the staff director of the congressional inquiry, called the 28 pages a “summary of the information given to the agencies for further investigation” rather than a list of firm conclusions. The Sept. 11 plot remains an open investigation at the F.B.I. The White House has threatened to veto the legislation, but the Obama administration has had its own recent period of tension with Saudi leaders over the Iran nuclear deal and the grinding war in Syria.
In its final report, released in 2004, the Sept. 11 commission said it had found no evidence that the “Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded” Al Qaeda. But some commission staff members point out that the wording did not rule out the possibility that lower ranking Saudi officials had assisted the hijackers and said that the commission operated under extreme time pressure and could not run down every lead. Much of the push over more than a decade to get the document declassified was led by former Senator Bob Graham, the Florida Democrat who was one of the co-chairmen of the congressional inquiry. In a statement on Friday, Senator Graham compared the release to the “removal of the cork at the end of the bottle” that should lead to even more information to be declassified.
Josh Earnest, the White House press secretary, said on Friday that the document “does not change the assessment of the U.S. government that there’s no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded Al Qaeda,” quoting the commission’s finding word for word. The panel that Senator Graham helped lead did not try to reach definitive conclusions about what the 28 pages called the “Saudi issue” in its final report in 2002. “It was not the task of this Joint Inquiry to conduct the kind of extensive investigation that would be required to determine the true significance of any such alleged connections to the Saudi Government,” the document states.
Mr. Earnest said the hints that investigators had about potential support for the attacks by the Saudi government or top officials “didn’t really turn up anything.” The most extensive investigation into the attacks was conducted by the September 11 Commission, which pursued many of the leads presented in the 28 pages. The commission’s final report, released in 2004, said that the panel had found no evidence that the “Saudi government as an institution, or senior Saudi officials individually funded” Al Qaeda.
But some investigators remain puzzled by the exact role played by Fahad al-Thumairy, a Saudi consular official based in the Los Angeles area at the time of the attacks. They believe that if there had been any Saudi government role in the plot, it probably would have involved him. Josh Earnest, the White House press secretary, quoted that assessment word for word on Friday, adding that the various leads that investigators pursued about top Saudi officials having a role in the plot “didn’t really turn up anything.”
Adel al Jubeir, the Saudi foreign minister, echoed that sentiment hours later at a news conference at the Saudi Embassy, saying that all the allegations in the document “have been dealt with in the subsequent investigations and they have found that they were without merit.”
“The surprise in the 28 pages is that there is no surprise,” he said.
But some former September 11 Commission staff members pointed out that the wording in the group’s final report did not rule out the possibility that lower ranking Saudi officials had assisted the hijackers and said that the commission operated under extreme time pressure and could not run down every lead.
In particular, some investigators remain puzzled by the exact role played by Fahad al-Thumairy, a Saudi consular official based in the Los Angeles area at the time of the attacks. They believe that if there had been any Saudi government role in the plot, it probably would have involved him.
Mr. Thumairy was the imam of a mosque visited by two of the Sept. 11 hijackers, and some American government officials have long suspected that Mr. Thumairy assisted the two men — Nawaq Alhamzi and Khalid al-Midhar — after they arrived in Los Angeles in early 2000.Mr. Thumairy was the imam of a mosque visited by two of the Sept. 11 hijackers, and some American government officials have long suspected that Mr. Thumairy assisted the two men — Nawaq Alhamzi and Khalid al-Midhar — after they arrived in Los Angeles in early 2000.
An F.B.I. document from 2012, cited last year by an independent review panel, concluded that Mr. Thumairy “immediately assigned an individual to take care” of Mr. Alhamzi and Mr. Midhar “during their time in the Los Angeles area,” but the F.B.I. has been unable to piece together other details of the movement of the two men during their early days in the United States. An F.B.I. document from 2012, cited last year by an independent review panel, concluded that Mr. Thumairy “immediately assigned an individual to take care of” of Mr. Alhamzi and Mr. Midhar “during their time in the Los Angeles area,” but the F.B.I. has been unable to piece together other details of the movement of the two men during their early days in the United States.
Two investigators for the Sept. 11 commission interviewed Mr. Thumairy for several hours in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, in February 2004, but he denied having any ties to the hijackers — even after being presented with phone records that seemed to link him to the two men.Two investigators for the Sept. 11 commission interviewed Mr. Thumairy for several hours in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, in February 2004, but he denied having any ties to the hijackers — even after being presented with phone records that seemed to link him to the two men.
The 28 pages discuss the possible role Mr. Thumairy played, as well as a number of possible connections between Qaeda operatives and Saudi officials. One section of the report details how a phone number in a book found with Abu Zubayda, who was captured in Pakistan in March 2002 by the C.I.A., was traced to a corporation in Aspen, Colo., that “manages the affairs of the Colorado residence of Prince Bandar. The 28 pages discuss the role that Mr. Thumairy is said to have played, as well as a number of possible connections between Qaeda operatives and Saudi officials. One section of the report details how a phone number in a telephone book found with Abu Zubaydah, who was captured in Pakistan in March 2002 by the C.I.A., was traced to a corporation in Aspen, Colo., that manages the affairs of the Colorado residence of Prince Bandar.
Abdullah al-Saud, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, said in a statement Friday that the kingdom “welcomes the release” of the document. The Saudi government on Friday issued a lengthy rebuttal to the 28 pages, saying it was “one of the more peculiar ironies” that a nation that has done so much to combat terrorism finds itself “the object of ceaseless suspicion.” American officials broadly agree that Saudi Arabia, since the Sept. 11 attacks, has been aggressive in its efforts to stamp out terror networks inside the kingdom and to clamp down on the financing private individuals in the country historically have given to militant groups.
“Since 2002, the 9/11 Commission and several government agencies, including the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., have investigated the contents of the ‘28 pages’ and have confirmed that neither the Saudi government, nor senior Saudi officials, nor any person acting on behalf of the Saudi government provided any support or encouragement for these attacks,” he said. But the document released on Friday is unsparing in its criticism of Saudi efforts to undermine American attempts to dismantle Al Qaeda in the years before the Sept. 11 attacks. Moreover, it portrays the F.B.I as generally in the dark about the maneuverings of Saudi officials inside the United States during that period.
“We hope the release of these pages will clear up, once and for all, any lingering questions or suspicions about Saudi Arabia’s actions, intentions, or long-term friendship with the United States.” It closes with a snippet of testimony from October 2002, when a senator asked Robert Mueller III, the F.B.I director, during a closed-door session, whether the work of the congressional inquiry had unearthed information of which he had been unaware.
The document was released at a particularly troubled moment in America’s decades-long relationship with Saudi Arabia. The Senate unanimously passed a bill in May that would make it easier for families of Sept. 11 victims to sue the Saudi government for any role in the attacks. The bill is now being considered in the House. “Yes,” he said.
The White House has threatened to veto the legislation, but the Obama administration has had its own recent period of tension with Saudi leaders over the Iran nuclear deal and the grinding war in Syria.