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North Korea Revives Coded Spy Broadcasts After 16-Year Silence North Korea Revives Coded Spy Broadcasts After 16-Year Silence
(about 5 hours later)
SEOUL, South Korea — When Pyongyang Radio recently broadcast a mysterious series of seemingly random numbers from inside North Korea, they sounded like a call from the past to one former spy. SEOUL, South Korea — In an era of sophisticated spycraft, North Korea appears to be returning to the days of shortwave radio.
Kim Dong-sik, a former intelligence officer for North Korea, said he used to listen for such broadcasts every midnight to check whether his spymasters had a message for him. The North broadcast a series of seemingly random numbers on Pyongyang Radio twice recently, an eerie reminder of the days when the North encrypted messages to its spies in South Korea.
“When I arrived in the South, I had five different call signs assigned to me,” said Mr. Kim, who now works as a senior analyst at the Institute for National Security Strategy, a think tank run by the South’s National Intelligence Service. “Each night, I listened for my call signs.” In the latest episode last Friday, an announcer read what she described as “a mathematics review assignment for investigative agent No. 27,” engaged in a “distance learning” program.
The cryptic numbers, broadcast last month, were the first such coded message in 16 years, leaving South Korean intelligence officials and analysts puzzled by the North’s motives. “Turn to Page 459, No. 35; Page 913, No. 55; Page 135, No. 86,” she said, continuing to cite numbers for 14 minutes.
A announcer on Pyongyang Radio again broadcast a string of numbers last Friday, reading what she described as “a mathematics review assignment for investigative agent No. 27,” engaged in a “distance learning” program. Decades ago, it was not unusual for late-night radio listeners in the South to hear mysterious numbers arriving on static-filled signals from the North. The South Korean government in Seoul tried to block the signals and barred its citizens from listening.
“Turn to Page 459, No. 35; Page 913, No. 55; Page 135, No. 86,” she said, citing numbers for 14 minutes. Kim Dong-sik, a former intelligence officer for North Korea, said he used to listen for such broadcasts at midnight each night to check whether his spymasters had a message for him. Mr. Kim was caught by the South in 1995 after a gun battle with South Korean agents and police officers.
Decades ago, it was not unusual for late-night radio listeners in South Korea to hear mysterious numbers arriving on static-filled signals from the North — an eerie reminder of the espionage at play across the divided Korean Peninsula. The South would try to block signals like those and barred citizens from listening. “When I arrived in the South, I had five different call signs assigned to me,” said Mr. Kim, who now works as a senior analyst at the Institute for National Security Strategy, a think tank run by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service. “Each night, I listened for my call signs.”
North Korea had stopped sending out such coded messages by shortwave radio after the Koreas held a historic summit meeting in 2000 and agreed to de-escalate their Cold War-era intrigue against each other. The June 24 and July 15 broadcasts, confirmed by the South Korean government on Wednesday, were the first such coded messages in 16 years, leaving intelligence officials and analysts puzzled by the North’s motives.
Since then, the North is believed to have adopted more sophisticated methods of communication. When the South’s intelligence service announced the capture of a spy ring in 2011, it said that the officers contacted the North through steganography, a technique for encrypting a message into a text, image or video file delivered online. The broadcasts come amid concerns about the behavior of the North, which has raised tension with the United States and its allies by conducting a series of missile tests. It has also issued bold claims of advances in its quest for a nuclear-tipped long-range missile, even though Washington’s attention has been focused elsewhere.
Some analysts said that the seeming redeployment by the North of what many had considered a bygone encryption tool was rekindling old fears among South Koreans, a possible escalation of psychological warfare. North Korea has reacted strongly to a plan by the United States to deploy an advanced missile defense system in the South. This week, it fired three ballistic missiles, saying that they were used in simulated tests to detonate nuclear warheads over seaports and airfields in the South, where American reinforcements are supposed to arrive in the event of a war.
In recent weeks, North Korea has been raising tensions over a plan by the United States to deploy an advanced missile defense system in the South. This week, it fired three ballistic missiles, saying that they were used in simulated tests of detonating nuclear warheads over seaports and airfields in the South, where American reinforcements were supposed to arrive should war break out again on the peninsula. The tests defied a new round of sanctions that the United Nations Security Council imposed against the North after a nuclear test in January and a long-range rocket launch in February.
Jeong Joon-hee, a government spokesman for South Korea, has called the resumption of the broadcasts “seriously regrettable” but declined to comment on possible motives. “The North should abandon its old ways,” he said.Jeong Joon-hee, a government spokesman for South Korea, has called the resumption of the broadcasts “seriously regrettable” but declined to comment on possible motives. “The North should abandon its old ways,” he said.
In the age of digital media and the internet, South Korea has also resorted to old-school propaganda in recent years, resuming loudspeaker and radio broadcasts into the North and juicing them up with synthesized K-pop music. South Korea itself has resorted to old-school propaganda in recent years, resuming loudspeaker and radio broadcasts into the North and juicing them up with synthesized Korean popular music known as K-pop.
Mr. Kim said that the broadcasts should be taken seriously. He said the North appeared to be bolstering its espionage operations since 2009, when it created the General Bureau of Reconnaissance by merging various party and military agencies in charge of sending spies to the South. (Washington has blacklisted the bureau after North Korean hackers were accused of wreaking havoc on the computer network of Sony’s movie studio in 2014.) Some analysts said the North’s use of a bygone encryption tool was rekindling old fear among South Koreans of an escalation in psychological warfare on the peninsula.
At a time when the counterintelligence authorities use sophisticated technology to monitor the digital communication of espionage suspects and closed-circuit television cameras watch over every internet cafe in South Korea, “the old number broadcasts are still a dependable and preferable means of communication for spies,” Mr. Kim said. North Korea had stopped sending out such coded messages by shortwave radio after the Koreas held a historic summit meeting in 2000, agreeing to de-escalate the Cold War-era intrigue on the divided peninsula.
Since then, the North is believed to have adopted more sophisticated methods of communication. When the South’s intelligence service announced the capture of a spy ring in 2011, it said that the officers contacted the North through steganography, a technique for encrypting a message into a text, image or video file delivered online.
Mr. Kim, the analyst and former spy, said the broadcasts should be taken seriously. He said the North appeared to be bolstering its espionage operations since 2009, when it created the General Bureau of Reconnaissance by merging various party and military agencies in charge of sending spies to the South.
Washington has blacklisted the bureau after North Korean hackers were accused of wreaking havoc on the computer network of Sony’s movie studio in 2014.
At a time when the counterintelligence authorities use sophisticated technology to monitor the digital communication of espionage suspects, “the old number broadcasts are still a dependable and preferable means of communication for spies,” Mr. Kim said.
“We should assume that the North is using the radio broadcasts to communicate with its agents here or is at least using them to train spies,” he added.“We should assume that the North is using the radio broadcasts to communicate with its agents here or is at least using them to train spies,” he added.
He recalled that when he was training in the 1980s, he spent countless hours listening to tape-recorded broadcasts and copying the numbers to master a so-called numbers station technique of encrypted communication.He recalled that when he was training in the 1980s, he spent countless hours listening to tape-recorded broadcasts and copying the numbers to master a so-called numbers station technique of encrypted communication.
Mr. Kim said he and his handlers in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, used an agreed-upon book — a popular novel in the South titled “Whale Hunt” — to decipher each other’s codes. As in the broadcast on Friday, a typical five-digit combination started with a three-digit page number from the book. The remaining two digits pointed at two Korean characters in the text of the page, he said. Mr. Kim said he and his handlers in the North used an agreed-upon book — a popular novel in the South entitled “Whale Hunt” — to decipher each other’s codes. As in the broadcast on Friday, a typical five-digit combination started with a three-digit page number from the book. The remaining two digits pointed at two Korean characters in the text of the page, he said.
Sometimes, four digits of each five-digit set, when decoded, yielded one single Korean character. Sometimes, four digits of each five-digit set yielded one single Korean character.
Long after the end of the Cold War, the two Koreas still accuse each other of spying. The North is holding at least four South Koreans, some of them sentenced to a labor camp for life, on charges of espionage.Long after the end of the Cold War, the two Koreas still accuse each other of spying. The North is holding at least four South Koreans, some of them sentenced to a labor camp for life, on charges of espionage.
In recent years, the South’s intelligence service has arrested people whom it deemed spies as they entered the country disguised as refugees. Last week, prosecutors said they arrested two South Korean men in their 50s on charges of spying for the North. They released closed-circuit video of counterespionage officers overpowering a suspect at an internet cafe. In recent years, the South’s intelligence service has arrested people it deemed spies as they entered the country disguised as refugees. Last week, prosecutors said they arrested two South Korean men in their 50s on charges of spying for the North. They released closed-circuit video of counterespionage officers overpowering a suspect at an internet cafe.
The men used encrypted emails to contact their handlers in the North, the prosecutors said.The men used encrypted emails to contact their handlers in the North, the prosecutors said.
Mr. Kim said that during his days as a spy, the radio was a main tool of communication.Mr. Kim said that during his days as a spy, the radio was a main tool of communication.
“If there was a certain song broadcast by Pyongyang Radio at an agreed-upon hour, that meant that there was something wrong and I should immediately abort my mission,” he said. “If not, it was all clear.”“If there was a certain song broadcast by Pyongyang Radio at an agreed-upon hour, that meant that there was something wrong and I should immediately abort my mission,” he said. “If not, it was all clear.”
Using similar methods, Mr. Kim successfully arranged in 1990 to have a North Korean submersible off the South’s west coast escort a high-ranking female spy back to the North. But five years later, he was caught while on another mission in the South.