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| Five things you may have missed about the Chilcot inquiry Five things you may have missed about the Chilcot inquiry | |
| (4 months later) | |
| When the long-awaited Chilcot report was published on 6 July, much attention was paid to the strong criticisms of Tony Blair – his “sofa government” style, his naive commitment to the Americans, and questions about the war’s legality and the misleading of parliament. The focus on one man only increased when he held a marathon press conference the same day to address these criticisms. | When the long-awaited Chilcot report was published on 6 July, much attention was paid to the strong criticisms of Tony Blair – his “sofa government” style, his naive commitment to the Americans, and questions about the war’s legality and the misleading of parliament. The focus on one man only increased when he held a marathon press conference the same day to address these criticisms. |
| However, there are many more failings revealed by the 2.6m-word report. Here are five inquiry findings you may have missed. | However, there are many more failings revealed by the 2.6m-word report. Here are five inquiry findings you may have missed. |
| 1. Iraq was not the country of greatest concern for WMDs | 1. Iraq was not the country of greatest concern for WMDs |
| The rationale for going to war with Iraq was the threat posed by Saddam’s WMD capability to the UK’s national interest. Yet in 2001-02, the greatest threats of nuclear and missile proliferation came from elsewhere. Sir William Ehrman, Foreign Office director of international security in 2000-02, told the inquiry that the nuclear programmes of Libya, Iran and North Korea were “maturing” and were “probably of greater concern than Iraq”. | The rationale for going to war with Iraq was the threat posed by Saddam’s WMD capability to the UK’s national interest. Yet in 2001-02, the greatest threats of nuclear and missile proliferation came from elsewhere. Sir William Ehrman, Foreign Office director of international security in 2000-02, told the inquiry that the nuclear programmes of Libya, Iran and North Korea were “maturing” and were “probably of greater concern than Iraq”. |
| In particular, by early 2000 it had become clear that Pakistan’s nuclear programme director, AQ Khan, had supplied uranium enriching equipment to Libya. British intelligence tracked this procurement network for some time and by January 2003 was stressing concern over Libyan proliferation progress. | In particular, by early 2000 it had become clear that Pakistan’s nuclear programme director, AQ Khan, had supplied uranium enriching equipment to Libya. British intelligence tracked this procurement network for some time and by January 2003 was stressing concern over Libyan proliferation progress. |
| 2. The UK was going to war regardless of the cost | 2. The UK was going to war regardless of the cost |
| In advance of the war, Gordon Brown, then chancellor of the exchequer, advised that he would not rule out any military options on the grounds of cost. The first comprehensive estimate of costs was only completed a month before the invasion, but was never sent to Blair or other ministers. | In advance of the war, Gordon Brown, then chancellor of the exchequer, advised that he would not rule out any military options on the grounds of cost. The first comprehensive estimate of costs was only completed a month before the invasion, but was never sent to Blair or other ministers. |
| Instead, ministers agreed to the military operation without any financial estimate or advice on affordability. A month after the invasion, the government also agreed to assume post-conflict leadership of four Iraqi provinces without any estimate of the costs involved. The war eventually cost £9.24bn. | Instead, ministers agreed to the military operation without any financial estimate or advice on affordability. A month after the invasion, the government also agreed to assume post-conflict leadership of four Iraqi provinces without any estimate of the costs involved. The war eventually cost £9.24bn. |
| 3. The number of civilians killed or injured was not recorded | 3. The number of civilians killed or injured was not recorded |
| From the outset Blair emphasised minimising civilian casualties, largely to sustain domestic support for operations. However, the government initially made no effort to record numbers of Iraqis killed or injured. | From the outset Blair emphasised minimising civilian casualties, largely to sustain domestic support for operations. However, the government initially made no effort to record numbers of Iraqis killed or injured. |
| Training of the Iraqi police and army was summed up with the word 'just enough is good enough' | Training of the Iraqi police and army was summed up with the word 'just enough is good enough' |
| Eventually, responsibility was ping-ponged across Whitehall but numbers were not determined and figures from external studies varied greatly. Chilcot concluded: “More time was devoted to the question of which department should have responsibility for the issue of civilian casualties than it was to efforts to determine the actual number.” The government also failed to maintain any record of deaths and injuries to UK civilians. | Eventually, responsibility was ping-ponged across Whitehall but numbers were not determined and figures from external studies varied greatly. Chilcot concluded: “More time was devoted to the question of which department should have responsibility for the issue of civilian casualties than it was to efforts to determine the actual number.” The government also failed to maintain any record of deaths and injuries to UK civilians. |
| 4. Britain knew Iraqi forces could not maintain security | 4. Britain knew Iraqi forces could not maintain security |
| Iraq’s long-term security was dependent upon the effective training of the Iraqi police service and army. In an endeavour to train enough officers to allow prompt troop withdrawal, the MoD took the lead at the end of 2005. Training standards were quickly lowered to facilitate Britain’s exit strategy and the UK’s chief police advisor, Colin Smith, reported that they were summed up with the words “just enough is good enough”. | Iraq’s long-term security was dependent upon the effective training of the Iraqi police service and army. In an endeavour to train enough officers to allow prompt troop withdrawal, the MoD took the lead at the end of 2005. Training standards were quickly lowered to facilitate Britain’s exit strategy and the UK’s chief police advisor, Colin Smith, reported that they were summed up with the words “just enough is good enough”. |
| As withdrawal progressed, the Iraqi police force suffered from corruption, infiltration and criminality. As late as April 2008, serious discussions were held over whether to disband the force entirely and start again. The Iraqi army was more successful, but neither the UK nor the US was confident it could maintain security without support. When Britain withdrew from Basra, the US sent its own troops to maintain supply lines and protect the border with Iran. | As withdrawal progressed, the Iraqi police force suffered from corruption, infiltration and criminality. As late as April 2008, serious discussions were held over whether to disband the force entirely and start again. The Iraqi army was more successful, but neither the UK nor the US was confident it could maintain security without support. When Britain withdrew from Basra, the US sent its own troops to maintain supply lines and protect the border with Iran. |
| 5. Debate on the inquiry’s findings has been woefully lacking | 5. Debate on the inquiry’s findings has been woefully lacking |
| The inquiry has taken seven years at a cost of more than £10m and examines a hugely significant and detrimental event in recent British history. Its findings are important and should be widely debated. Nonetheless, in opening the two-day Commons debate on the report, Philip Hammond noted: “I suspect that … the world’s eye will not be focused on our proceedings with quite the laser-like intensity that might have been expected.” In fact, after a packed house for David Cameron’s last PMQs, only 53 MPs remained for the debate. The following day this number had diminished to just 32. Those who participated made excellent contributions but it will take wide and detailed debate to ensure that crucial findings are not missed. | The inquiry has taken seven years at a cost of more than £10m and examines a hugely significant and detrimental event in recent British history. Its findings are important and should be widely debated. Nonetheless, in opening the two-day Commons debate on the report, Philip Hammond noted: “I suspect that … the world’s eye will not be focused on our proceedings with quite the laser-like intensity that might have been expected.” In fact, after a packed house for David Cameron’s last PMQs, only 53 MPs remained for the debate. The following day this number had diminished to just 32. Those who participated made excellent contributions but it will take wide and detailed debate to ensure that crucial findings are not missed. |