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| Labour can fight for working people without dumping progressive ideas | Labour can fight for working people without dumping progressive ideas |
| (21 days later) | |
| What have we learned about what happened on 23 June? Some immediate myths have been dismantled. The young didn’t stay in bed – 64% of registered 18 to 24-year-olds voted, overwhelmingly to remain. Not all those who voted to leave the European Union in the referendum were northern left-behinds – many were middle-class people in the south. And Labour delivered 63% of its 2015 vote to remain, not that much lower than the Liberal Democrats’ 70%, and way above the Conservatives’ measly 42%. In fact, Labour’s remain vote was only 1% lower than the SNP’s. | What have we learned about what happened on 23 June? Some immediate myths have been dismantled. The young didn’t stay in bed – 64% of registered 18 to 24-year-olds voted, overwhelmingly to remain. Not all those who voted to leave the European Union in the referendum were northern left-behinds – many were middle-class people in the south. And Labour delivered 63% of its 2015 vote to remain, not that much lower than the Liberal Democrats’ 70%, and way above the Conservatives’ measly 42%. In fact, Labour’s remain vote was only 1% lower than the SNP’s. |
| That said, important truths remain. Leavers were older, poorer and less well-educated than the general population – the profile of the core Ukip vote, 4 million of whom voted to leave. And although the leave vote was not an emotional spasm (any more than all remainers were models of Olympian rationality), leavers as well as remainers were constrained by the options on offer and the political forces in play. | That said, important truths remain. Leavers were older, poorer and less well-educated than the general population – the profile of the core Ukip vote, 4 million of whom voted to leave. And although the leave vote was not an emotional spasm (any more than all remainers were models of Olympian rationality), leavers as well as remainers were constrained by the options on offer and the political forces in play. |
| Hence the big collateral damage is not on the right but on the left. Against all expectations, the Tories have emerged intact (their grassroots effectively sidelined), while Labour is in serious danger of implosion. That is because Conservatives could vote leave or remain but stay committed to the party’s principles; Labour voters supposedly faced the choice between voting for the progressive, socially liberal tradition, or for the interests of the working-class base. | Hence the big collateral damage is not on the right but on the left. Against all expectations, the Tories have emerged intact (their grassroots effectively sidelined), while Labour is in serious danger of implosion. That is because Conservatives could vote leave or remain but stay committed to the party’s principles; Labour voters supposedly faced the choice between voting for the progressive, socially liberal tradition, or for the interests of the working-class base. |
| I was part of the one third of the population that voted to come out of the Common Market in 1975, when different options were on offer. The no campaign arose out of a decade of oppositional activism – from the student revolt and women’s liberation to the strikes that brought down the Edward Heath government. | I was part of the one third of the population that voted to come out of the Common Market in 1975, when different options were on offer. The no campaign arose out of a decade of oppositional activism – from the student revolt and women’s liberation to the strikes that brought down the Edward Heath government. |
| Enoch Powell and the National Front were for leaving, but voting no was also about voting yes to a coherent, interventionist, alternative economic strategy. Had the anti-Common Market side won, it would have been the left wot won it. | Enoch Powell and the National Front were for leaving, but voting no was also about voting yes to a coherent, interventionist, alternative economic strategy. Had the anti-Common Market side won, it would have been the left wot won it. |
| This time, voting to leave the European Union was something very different, and so – without huge enthusiasm – I voted remain. In the intervening years, the fault lines of 20th-century politics have been redrawn. Conservatism used to be an often uneasy compound of Tory social paternalism and anti-statist economic liberalism; while on the left, an alliance between progressive social liberalism and egalitarianism created the best of postwar Britain, from the welfare state to the social reforms of the 1960s and 1970s. | This time, voting to leave the European Union was something very different, and so – without huge enthusiasm – I voted remain. In the intervening years, the fault lines of 20th-century politics have been redrawn. Conservatism used to be an often uneasy compound of Tory social paternalism and anti-statist economic liberalism; while on the left, an alliance between progressive social liberalism and egalitarianism created the best of postwar Britain, from the welfare state to the social reforms of the 1960s and 1970s. |
| The new fault line splits both alliances in half: allying economic with social liberalism (the coalition that brought you the coalition) on the one side, and economic intervention with social conservatism on the other. As a result, an ever-deepening wedge now divides Labour’s aspirational, liberal, globalised wing from its traditional base. Although good news for the Conservative party, this is best for the populist right, which has rushed to fill the vacuum created. | The new fault line splits both alliances in half: allying economic with social liberalism (the coalition that brought you the coalition) on the one side, and economic intervention with social conservatism on the other. As a result, an ever-deepening wedge now divides Labour’s aspirational, liberal, globalised wing from its traditional base. Although good news for the Conservative party, this is best for the populist right, which has rushed to fill the vacuum created. |
| Hence, across Europe, hitherto conventionally rightwing populist parties have turned to the working class. Geert Wilders’ Dutch Freedom party suddenly converts itself from free-market anti-statism to workers’ rights and the minimum wage. Once, the Austrian Freedom party opposed welfare spending and wanted to raise the retirement age; now it advocates the reverse. The French Front National wants to nationalise key industries. The Polish Law and Justice party transformed itself from traditional conservatism to the populist right, setting the impoverished rural east against the EU-leaning urban west. Now the Austrian Freedom party’s leader Norbert Hofer is poised to win a rerun of May’s presidential election, Marine le Pen is odds-on for a place in next year’s presidential run-off, and Law and Justice is the government of Poland. | Hence, across Europe, hitherto conventionally rightwing populist parties have turned to the working class. Geert Wilders’ Dutch Freedom party suddenly converts itself from free-market anti-statism to workers’ rights and the minimum wage. Once, the Austrian Freedom party opposed welfare spending and wanted to raise the retirement age; now it advocates the reverse. The French Front National wants to nationalise key industries. The Polish Law and Justice party transformed itself from traditional conservatism to the populist right, setting the impoverished rural east against the EU-leaning urban west. Now the Austrian Freedom party’s leader Norbert Hofer is poised to win a rerun of May’s presidential election, Marine le Pen is odds-on for a place in next year’s presidential run-off, and Law and Justice is the government of Poland. |
| Meanwhile, Donald Trump promises a programme of public works unmatched since Roosevelt’s New Deal. And, of course, many of the Ukip 4 million were attracted by the party’s deliberate move from libertarian free-market economics to backing the NHS, opposing the bedroom tax and standing up to big business: 80% of people who think social liberalism is a force for ill voted leave; but so did the 51% who think the same about capitalism. | Meanwhile, Donald Trump promises a programme of public works unmatched since Roosevelt’s New Deal. And, of course, many of the Ukip 4 million were attracted by the party’s deliberate move from libertarian free-market economics to backing the NHS, opposing the bedroom tax and standing up to big business: 80% of people who think social liberalism is a force for ill voted leave; but so did the 51% who think the same about capitalism. |
| Aside from its immediate woes, this presents Labour with a long-term strategic choice. Those who are now advocating splitting the party – creating the kind of progressive centrist coalition that might have emerged from the 2010 or 2015 elections – would hand Labour’s working-class core to Ukip. | Aside from its immediate woes, this presents Labour with a long-term strategic choice. Those who are now advocating splitting the party – creating the kind of progressive centrist coalition that might have emerged from the 2010 or 2015 elections – would hand Labour’s working-class core to Ukip. |
| Those who advocate splitting the party would hand Labour’s working-class core to Ukip | Those who advocate splitting the party would hand Labour’s working-class core to Ukip |
| But the alternative is just as dangerous. From Tristram Hunt on the right to Jon Cruddas on the non-Corbynite left, significant figures have been calling on the party to direct an English nationalist, faith, flag and family message at socially conservative working-class voters, on the presumption that such voters form the majority of Labour’s core and that those opinions never change. | But the alternative is just as dangerous. From Tristram Hunt on the right to Jon Cruddas on the non-Corbynite left, significant figures have been calling on the party to direct an English nationalist, faith, flag and family message at socially conservative working-class voters, on the presumption that such voters form the majority of Labour’s core and that those opinions never change. |
| A majority of the anti-EU core of the population does indeed – as remain pollster Andrew Cooper has reported – want to turn the clock back to the 1950s. But rejecting the strand of Labour policy that liberalised divorce and abortion law, legalised homosexuality and introduced the race relations and equal pay acts (and, later, the Human Rights Act and civil partnerships) would abandon not only that portion of the working class that is female, gay and non-white, but also millions of white, working-class men for whom the 1960s represented liberation from the stultifying cultural and social constraints of the previous decade. | A majority of the anti-EU core of the population does indeed – as remain pollster Andrew Cooper has reported – want to turn the clock back to the 1950s. But rejecting the strand of Labour policy that liberalised divorce and abortion law, legalised homosexuality and introduced the race relations and equal pay acts (and, later, the Human Rights Act and civil partnerships) would abandon not only that portion of the working class that is female, gay and non-white, but also millions of white, working-class men for whom the 1960s represented liberation from the stultifying cultural and social constraints of the previous decade. |
| The transformation in attitudes to women’s and – most dramatically – gay rights belies the idea that Britain is uniquely hostile to change. Leave’s victory demonstrated that the deprived and ignored are capable of taking on the establishment – and defeating it. | The transformation in attitudes to women’s and – most dramatically – gay rights belies the idea that Britain is uniquely hostile to change. Leave’s victory demonstrated that the deprived and ignored are capable of taking on the establishment – and defeating it. |
| And – as Scotland showed – white, working-class voters are willing to support policies that are both anti-austerity and pro-immigration if those options are convincingly on offer. | And – as Scotland showed – white, working-class voters are willing to support policies that are both anti-austerity and pro-immigration if those options are convincingly on offer. |
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