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| If the Mosul offensive is a success, what could this mean for Isis? | If the Mosul offensive is a success, what could this mean for Isis? |
| (about 2 hours later) | |
| Some time in the not too distant future, perhaps weeks, perhaps months, Islamic State will almost certainly be forced to relinquish Mosul, the second city of Iraq and the seat of the caliphate it declared more than two years ago. The offensive to retake the city, which once had two million or more inhabitants, is now under way. | Some time in the not too distant future, perhaps weeks, perhaps months, Islamic State will almost certainly be forced to relinquish Mosul, the second city of Iraq and the seat of the caliphate it declared more than two years ago. The offensive to retake the city, which once had two million or more inhabitants, is now under way. |
| The aim of the operation is to restore Mosul to the authority of the Iraqi government. By the time this happens, Isis may already have been forced out of almost all the territory it seized during its blitzkrieg offensives of 2014. Even if the group is still holding out in Raqqa, the eastern Syrian provincial town, it will no longer hold swaths of territory – nor will it control, more importantly, the lives of millions of people in the heart of the Middle East. | |
| The question of what this means for the group and the threat it poses to the west has been hotly debated by policymakers, counter-terrorist officials and analysts in recent months. One key discussion has focused on the immediate aftermath of the battle of Mosul for Iraq and for the region. | The question of what this means for the group and the threat it poses to the west has been hotly debated by policymakers, counter-terrorist officials and analysts in recent months. One key discussion has focused on the immediate aftermath of the battle of Mosul for Iraq and for the region. |
| Mosul is of profound significance to both Kurds and Arabs, and to Sunni and Shia Muslims. Its recapture may widen faultlines between these communities, rather than heal them. Iraq’s Sunni minority have long felt alienated by the country’s Shia-led government in Baghdad, and it is Shia-dominated government forces who will reoccupy the city. | Mosul is of profound significance to both Kurds and Arabs, and to Sunni and Shia Muslims. Its recapture may widen faultlines between these communities, rather than heal them. Iraq’s Sunni minority have long felt alienated by the country’s Shia-led government in Baghdad, and it is Shia-dominated government forces who will reoccupy the city. |
| The defeat of Isis as a territorial power would dramatically rearrange the bloodstained three-dimensional chessboard of the Syrian civil war too. It could potentially benefit the regime of Bashar al-Assad, or other rival Islamic militant groups there, such as the major al-Qaida-linked faction now known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. This is a conflict where unforeseen consequences have long been the rule, not the exception. | The defeat of Isis as a territorial power would dramatically rearrange the bloodstained three-dimensional chessboard of the Syrian civil war too. It could potentially benefit the regime of Bashar al-Assad, or other rival Islamic militant groups there, such as the major al-Qaida-linked faction now known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. This is a conflict where unforeseen consequences have long been the rule, not the exception. |
| The most intense discussions have been about the threat an Isis without territory may pose to the west. Many analysts and officials predict a spike in attacks, particularly in Europe. Some of these, analysts predict, will be carried out by trained and commissioned extremists which the group will unleash as it is forced out of its final redoubts. Others will be by individuals who will return to European nations from the Syrian or Iraqi battlefields seeking revenge and, possibly, martyrdom. Then there may be some “freelance” attacks, by angry sympathisers. | The most intense discussions have been about the threat an Isis without territory may pose to the west. Many analysts and officials predict a spike in attacks, particularly in Europe. Some of these, analysts predict, will be carried out by trained and commissioned extremists which the group will unleash as it is forced out of its final redoubts. Others will be by individuals who will return to European nations from the Syrian or Iraqi battlefields seeking revenge and, possibly, martyrdom. Then there may be some “freelance” attacks, by angry sympathisers. |
| But can Isis survive – even thrive – after the evident defeat of the caliphate? | But can Isis survive – even thrive – after the evident defeat of the caliphate? |
| Optimists believe the obvious failure of the Isis project to restore the lost power of the world’s Muslims and counter that of the west will fatally undermine the group’s appeal to potential recruits in both the Islamic world and the west. They point out territorial losses mean no tax, oil or other revenue streams, and no space for training, resting or preparing elaborate and effective propaganda. They say Isis 2.0 will be a shadow of its former self: a threat certainly, but one which will steadily weaken as time passes. A precedent here is the fate of al-Qaida once it had been forced from Afghanistan. By 2009, even with a safe haven in parts of Pakistan, the organisation was a shadow of its former self. | Optimists believe the obvious failure of the Isis project to restore the lost power of the world’s Muslims and counter that of the west will fatally undermine the group’s appeal to potential recruits in both the Islamic world and the west. They point out territorial losses mean no tax, oil or other revenue streams, and no space for training, resting or preparing elaborate and effective propaganda. They say Isis 2.0 will be a shadow of its former self: a threat certainly, but one which will steadily weaken as time passes. A precedent here is the fate of al-Qaida once it had been forced from Afghanistan. By 2009, even with a safe haven in parts of Pakistan, the organisation was a shadow of its former self. |
| The pessimists point out Isis, in previous incarnations, survived from about 2007 to 2014 in Iraq without ever controlling significant amounts of territory, and eventually emerged to conduct the single most effective Islamic extremist military campaign seen anywhere in the world for many decades. They predict a long-running campaign mixing terrorism and insurgency lasting many years, which will range across much of the Islamic world and will be fuelled by the continuing political instability in key states as well as rivalry with other militant groups. | |
| They argue the group’s ability to build a new state and declare a restored caliphate will be an inspiration to both aspirant and current Islamic extremists in a “terrorist diaspora” for decades even if the project did not endure, and that the setbacks of recent months can be explained as trials sent to test the faithful. | |
| The truth is no one knows. The only thing we can be sure of for the moment is that, much as the capture of Mosul by Isis in 2014 dramatically changed the entire landscape of Islamic militancy, so too will its loss. | The truth is no one knows. The only thing we can be sure of for the moment is that, much as the capture of Mosul by Isis in 2014 dramatically changed the entire landscape of Islamic militancy, so too will its loss. |