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| Blair's 'psychological dominance' key in UK entering Iraq war, says Chilcot | Blair's 'psychological dominance' key in UK entering Iraq war, says Chilcot |
| (35 minutes later) | |
| Tony Blair’s “sheer psychological dominance” played a key role in the run-up to the Iraq war, and meant that flawed evidence justifying the 2003 invasion was never challenged, Sir John Chilcot told MPs on Wednesday. | Tony Blair’s “sheer psychological dominance” played a key role in the run-up to the Iraq war, and meant that flawed evidence justifying the 2003 invasion was never challenged, Sir John Chilcot told MPs on Wednesday. |
| Giving evidence to a parliamentary committee, Chilcot said “sofa government”, in which ministers were not consulted on crucial decisions, reached a high point under Blair. This reflected Blair’s personal preferences, he said. | |
| He said that on several occasions between 2002 and 2006-07 “things were decided without reference to cabinet”. They included the legal basis on which the UK went to war in 2003 as part of a US-led coalition and the decision, once Saddam Hussein had been toppled, for Britain to take over the administration of four of Iraq’s southern provinces. | |
| Referring to the evidence given to his inquiry, Chilcot said he recalled asking the then foreign secretary, Jack Straw, why the cabinet had not “provided more of a challenge” to Blair or demanded more information. | Referring to the evidence given to his inquiry, Chilcot said he recalled asking the then foreign secretary, Jack Straw, why the cabinet had not “provided more of a challenge” to Blair or demanded more information. |
| “The answer that came back was that Tony Blair had, as leader of the opposition and in government, rescued his party from a dire predicament. I had the sense from Straw’s answer that he had achieved a personal and political dominance, a sheer psychological dominance. | “The answer that came back was that Tony Blair had, as leader of the opposition and in government, rescued his party from a dire predicament. I had the sense from Straw’s answer that he had achieved a personal and political dominance, a sheer psychological dominance. |
| “He [Blair] had been right. Was he not right this time? That’s what I took from Mr Straw’s evidence.” | “He [Blair] had been right. Was he not right this time? That’s what I took from Mr Straw’s evidence.” |
| Chilcot was testifying for the first time since his devastating report on the Iraq war – seven years in the making – was published in July. The report eviscerated Blair’s style of government and decision-making and said that there was “no imminent threat” from Iraq when Blair decided to invade. | Chilcot was testifying for the first time since his devastating report on the Iraq war – seven years in the making – was published in July. The report eviscerated Blair’s style of government and decision-making and said that there was “no imminent threat” from Iraq when Blair decided to invade. |
| It also revealed that in a remarkable private note sent on 28 July 2002 Blair promised the then US president, George W Bush: “I will be with you, whatever.” | |
| Giving evidence on Wednesday, Chilcot said the cabinet was never told about the note. Only Jonathan Powell – Blair’s chief of staff – and David Manning – the UK’s ambassador to the U S– were aware of its existence. | Giving evidence on Wednesday, Chilcot said the cabinet was never told about the note. Only Jonathan Powell – Blair’s chief of staff – and David Manning – the UK’s ambassador to the U S– were aware of its existence. |
| “Both tried to persuade him [Blair] not to use those form of words. But he did,” Chilcot said. Straw found out about it after it had been issued, and when it was too late to say “you shouldn’t write it”, Chilcot added. | “Both tried to persuade him [Blair] not to use those form of words. But he did,” Chilcot said. Straw found out about it after it had been issued, and when it was too late to say “you shouldn’t write it”, Chilcot added. |
| Chilcot said that in future those at the top of Whitehall should challenge ministers, even if their advice was not ultimately taken, and should also make a note of what they said at the time. | Chilcot said that in future those at the top of Whitehall should challenge ministers, even if their advice was not ultimately taken, and should also make a note of what they said at the time. |
| He told MPs: “It’s vital for serious decisions to be recorded in the public archive, not for immediate release necessarily, but they should be written down. | He told MPs: “It’s vital for serious decisions to be recorded in the public archive, not for immediate release necessarily, but they should be written down. |
| “If someone is in serious disagreement the reason for that decision, and the fact of it, should be recorded. [This] allows different voices to be heard.” | “If someone is in serious disagreement the reason for that decision, and the fact of it, should be recorded. [This] allows different voices to be heard.” |