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You can find the current article at its original source at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/14/with-trump-and-tillerson-abbotts-shirtfront-comment-looks-even-sillier
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| With Trump and Tillerson, Abbott's 'shirtfront' comment looks even sillier With Trump and Tillerson, Abbott's 'shirtfront' comment looks even sillier | |
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| President-elect Donald Trump’s foreign policy will bring together the two most important trends sweeping world politics. One is the surge of anti-establishment consciousness across the west. Trump’s pick for secretary of state, Washington outsider and friend of Russia, Rex Tillerson, is the latest manifestation of this. The other is the rise of Asia after half a millennium of relative stagnation. | President-elect Donald Trump’s foreign policy will bring together the two most important trends sweeping world politics. One is the surge of anti-establishment consciousness across the west. Trump’s pick for secretary of state, Washington outsider and friend of Russia, Rex Tillerson, is the latest manifestation of this. The other is the rise of Asia after half a millennium of relative stagnation. |
| For Australia, this is an opportunity for an overdue recalibration of our foreign policy thinking, one that harnesses the benefits of our diverse population and puts people first. | For Australia, this is an opportunity for an overdue recalibration of our foreign policy thinking, one that harnesses the benefits of our diverse population and puts people first. |
| The pick of Tillerson is the strongest indication yet that Trump will defy establishment hawks and run foreign policy his own way. A Trumpian foreign policy has been touted by his supporters as a course-correction towards prioritising ordinary Americans at home, and away from maintaining the “liberal international order”. This order, epitomised by hawkish liberal Hillary Clinton, is increasingly attacked by the right as charity to undeserving foreigners, and has long been critiqued by the left as imperialism in the service of global capitalists. | The pick of Tillerson is the strongest indication yet that Trump will defy establishment hawks and run foreign policy his own way. A Trumpian foreign policy has been touted by his supporters as a course-correction towards prioritising ordinary Americans at home, and away from maintaining the “liberal international order”. This order, epitomised by hawkish liberal Hillary Clinton, is increasingly attacked by the right as charity to undeserving foreigners, and has long been critiqued by the left as imperialism in the service of global capitalists. |
| The maintenance of this order has led to massive military spending in a period when middle class Americans have seen no real growth in income. The American people, including those who opposed Trump, were increasingly dissatisfied with the foreign policy their government had prosecuted. John Howard would have probably called them anti-American. | The maintenance of this order has led to massive military spending in a period when middle class Americans have seen no real growth in income. The American people, including those who opposed Trump, were increasingly dissatisfied with the foreign policy their government had prosecuted. John Howard would have probably called them anti-American. |
| In practice, noting Trump’s trademark inconsistency, his changes will likely mean less influence by traditional “pro-war” special interest groups and wins for a new group of private sector elites in the president’s inner-circle. Incoming secretary of state Tillerson, alongside chief strategist Steve Bannon and his “economic nationalists” faction, and Russia-friendly national security adviser Mike Flynn, constitute formidable opposition to the hawkish Republican establishment. For ordinary Americans, however, all this means is potential slight, short-term gains for workers in certain industries. | In practice, noting Trump’s trademark inconsistency, his changes will likely mean less influence by traditional “pro-war” special interest groups and wins for a new group of private sector elites in the president’s inner-circle. Incoming secretary of state Tillerson, alongside chief strategist Steve Bannon and his “economic nationalists” faction, and Russia-friendly national security adviser Mike Flynn, constitute formidable opposition to the hawkish Republican establishment. For ordinary Americans, however, all this means is potential slight, short-term gains for workers in certain industries. |
| What it means for Australia | What it means for Australia |
| The Trumpian paradigm is straightforward and realist, at least overtly: if you mess with us, you’re a bad guy, to be bombed (Islamic terrorists) or slapped with tariffs (China), and everyone else (from Australia to Russia) can sink or swim on their own. | The Trumpian paradigm is straightforward and realist, at least overtly: if you mess with us, you’re a bad guy, to be bombed (Islamic terrorists) or slapped with tariffs (China), and everyone else (from Australia to Russia) can sink or swim on their own. |
| This increases the urgency of the challenges Canberra already faces, like how to respond to an ascendant China and a multipolar Asia. Less US interest in regional disputes like the South China Sea reduces the risk of a great power war and relieves pressure on Australia to “pick a side”. However, a potential US trade war with China will harm sectors of our economy and would remove one of the biggest barriers to a real war between the superpowers. Furthermore, US withdrawal from the region may cause countries like Japan, and even India, to begin a military buildup, triggering an arms race in Asia. | This increases the urgency of the challenges Canberra already faces, like how to respond to an ascendant China and a multipolar Asia. Less US interest in regional disputes like the South China Sea reduces the risk of a great power war and relieves pressure on Australia to “pick a side”. However, a potential US trade war with China will harm sectors of our economy and would remove one of the biggest barriers to a real war between the superpowers. Furthermore, US withdrawal from the region may cause countries like Japan, and even India, to begin a military buildup, triggering an arms race in Asia. |
| The Trumpian foreign policy is a massive smackdown to the rightwingers in Australian politics | The Trumpian foreign policy is a massive smackdown to the rightwingers in Australian politics |
| At this juncture, Australia has a historic opportunity to rethink its foreign policy. For decades our leaders provided rhetorical support for almost all US foreign policies, including those that did not prioritise the Australian people’s interests. | At this juncture, Australia has a historic opportunity to rethink its foreign policy. For decades our leaders provided rhetorical support for almost all US foreign policies, including those that did not prioritise the Australian people’s interests. |
| Trump seems to envision a USA that is much closer to the way many countries in our region already view the US: as a powerful state pursuing its own interests. Unfortunately, Australia’s politicians had long ignored this view. Our relationship with Washington had been considered, to quote Paul Keating, as “sacrament”. | Trump seems to envision a USA that is much closer to the way many countries in our region already view the US: as a powerful state pursuing its own interests. Unfortunately, Australia’s politicians had long ignored this view. Our relationship with Washington had been considered, to quote Paul Keating, as “sacrament”. |
| The Trumpian foreign policy is a massive smackdown to the rightwingers in Australian politics and their Howard era “deputy sheriff” mentality, a doctrine that increased our risk of attack by terrorists. Our erstwhile approach of being “more Catholic than the Pope” as seen by former prime minister Tony Abbott’s unfulfilled pledge to “shirtfront” Vladimir Putin, and other inflammatory rhetoric that saw us excluded from talks on Syria (harming our anti-terror efforts), will no longer suffice now that the next US president has moved to rapprochement with Russia. | The Trumpian foreign policy is a massive smackdown to the rightwingers in Australian politics and their Howard era “deputy sheriff” mentality, a doctrine that increased our risk of attack by terrorists. Our erstwhile approach of being “more Catholic than the Pope” as seen by former prime minister Tony Abbott’s unfulfilled pledge to “shirtfront” Vladimir Putin, and other inflammatory rhetoric that saw us excluded from talks on Syria (harming our anti-terror efforts), will no longer suffice now that the next US president has moved to rapprochement with Russia. |
| With an America-firster in the White House, Australia needs to take a sober look at our US relationship, pros and cons. The Alliance’s key benefits include that Washington is bound into consulting on mutual threats. Our security ties provide access to US intelligence resources, military technology, preferred status in equipment purchasing, access to training and combined exercises. This relationship increases the likelihood of US protection, but does not guarantee it. | With an America-firster in the White House, Australia needs to take a sober look at our US relationship, pros and cons. The Alliance’s key benefits include that Washington is bound into consulting on mutual threats. Our security ties provide access to US intelligence resources, military technology, preferred status in equipment purchasing, access to training and combined exercises. This relationship increases the likelihood of US protection, but does not guarantee it. |
| Washington has, understandably, always looked out for itself first, and under Trump this will be more pronounced. Canberra should do likewise, seeing our two nations as rational actors working together where our interests converge. | Washington has, understandably, always looked out for itself first, and under Trump this will be more pronounced. Canberra should do likewise, seeing our two nations as rational actors working together where our interests converge. |
| Trump’s election should force us to grasp the full reality of Asia’s strategic ascendance, not just its economic growth. Being seen as a rusted on US ally weakens our leverage in both Washington and Beijing. We must dare to imagine potential future scenarios where China is as powerful as the US in Asia, and where the American people and political class are unwilling to go to war over Asia with a nuclear-armed opponent. Is it worth damaging ties with Beijing because our “values” differ, when these values haven’t stopped us maintaining ties with other non-democratic states? | Trump’s election should force us to grasp the full reality of Asia’s strategic ascendance, not just its economic growth. Being seen as a rusted on US ally weakens our leverage in both Washington and Beijing. We must dare to imagine potential future scenarios where China is as powerful as the US in Asia, and where the American people and political class are unwilling to go to war over Asia with a nuclear-armed opponent. Is it worth damaging ties with Beijing because our “values” differ, when these values haven’t stopped us maintaining ties with other non-democratic states? |
| These challenges require a careful “triple bottom line” approach which assesses interests, values and public opinion. Publicly admonishing Beijing over the South China Sea while acquiescing to breaches of international law like Bush’s Iraq invasion fails to stand up to any of these tests. | These challenges require a careful “triple bottom line” approach which assesses interests, values and public opinion. Publicly admonishing Beijing over the South China Sea while acquiescing to breaches of international law like Bush’s Iraq invasion fails to stand up to any of these tests. |
| Trump’s anti-establishment win also reminds us not to exclude ordinary people from the discussion. More so than any other policy area, foreign policy has long been considered sacrosanct and above the uncouthness of public debate. But with the geopolitical ground shifting, the conversation must expand beyond Hugh White columns in newspapers and into mainstream political discussions. This includes harnessing Australia’s growing multicultural diversity. | Trump’s anti-establishment win also reminds us not to exclude ordinary people from the discussion. More so than any other policy area, foreign policy has long been considered sacrosanct and above the uncouthness of public debate. But with the geopolitical ground shifting, the conversation must expand beyond Hugh White columns in newspapers and into mainstream political discussions. This includes harnessing Australia’s growing multicultural diversity. |
| Should we still prioritise the “Anglosphere” due to cultural ties as some Liberal politicians prefer, when over 12% of Australians have Asian ancestry and Asians are among the fastest growing migrant groups? | Should we still prioritise the “Anglosphere” due to cultural ties as some Liberal politicians prefer, when over 12% of Australians have Asian ancestry and Asians are among the fastest growing migrant groups? |
| Policymaking needs to be diversified both demographically and professionally. Unlike the US, where a revolving door between government, academia and business spurs innovation, Australia’s foreign policy establishment has long been a closed shop with the majority of entrants joining at the graduate level. Thankfully this is beginning to change. | Policymaking needs to be diversified both demographically and professionally. Unlike the US, where a revolving door between government, academia and business spurs innovation, Australia’s foreign policy establishment has long been a closed shop with the majority of entrants joining at the graduate level. Thankfully this is beginning to change. |
| When I first joined the foreign service, I was one of only a few graduates who was both a migrant and from a working class, heavily multicultural suburb. Growing up in Dandenong and observing the cultures and inter-group dynamics between the Chinese, Serbs, Afghans etc. gave me a foundation for understanding the world of international relations. | When I first joined the foreign service, I was one of only a few graduates who was both a migrant and from a working class, heavily multicultural suburb. Growing up in Dandenong and observing the cultures and inter-group dynamics between the Chinese, Serbs, Afghans etc. gave me a foundation for understanding the world of international relations. |
| With Trump’s America accelerating the emergence of a multipolar world no longer dominated by European-heritage countries, Australia needs to look right here, to our own diverse population when shaping our future global direction. | With Trump’s America accelerating the emergence of a multipolar world no longer dominated by European-heritage countries, Australia needs to look right here, to our own diverse population when shaping our future global direction. |
| Trump’s rise, both through its implications and as a symbolic example, should teach politicians to put Australia’s people first in foreign policy, and encourage everyone to contribute to the discussion. | Trump’s rise, both through its implications and as a symbolic example, should teach politicians to put Australia’s people first in foreign policy, and encourage everyone to contribute to the discussion. |