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Can McMaster Stabilize Trump’s Foreign Policy Team? Can McMaster Stabilize Trump’s Foreign Policy Team?
(about 3 hours later)
Monday’s appointment of Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster as national security adviser, after President Trump fired his predecessor, Michael T. Flynn, should augur at least a fleeting period of stability at the dysfunctional National Security Council. General McMaster is a compelling choice: a scholar-warrior in the mold of Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, with the bonus of looking every inch the part — allegedly a critical asset in the image-conscious Trump administration.Monday’s appointment of Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster as national security adviser, after President Trump fired his predecessor, Michael T. Flynn, should augur at least a fleeting period of stability at the dysfunctional National Security Council. General McMaster is a compelling choice: a scholar-warrior in the mold of Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, with the bonus of looking every inch the part — allegedly a critical asset in the image-conscious Trump administration.
Yet those very qualities could spell more trouble ahead. General McMaster’s deep understanding of civil-military relations, and his reputation for not suffering fools, could quickly make him an irrepressible critic — and political enemy — of Mr. Trump and his senior adviser, Stephen K. Bannon.Yet those very qualities could spell more trouble ahead. General McMaster’s deep understanding of civil-military relations, and his reputation for not suffering fools, could quickly make him an irrepressible critic — and political enemy — of Mr. Trump and his senior adviser, Stephen K. Bannon.
General McMaster, who is and will remain on active duty, is both a proven cavalry officer and a formidable defense intellectual, with a doctorate in history. His performance in combat at Tal Afar, Iraq, as commander of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment is already studied as an exemplary application of counterinsurgency doctrine. In the 1991 gulf war, he led a legendary tank assault that completely destroyed a much larger Iraqi force and earned him a Silver Star. General McMaster, who is and will remain on active duty, is both a proven cavalry officer and a formidable defense intellectual, with a doctorate in history. His performance in combat at Tal Afar, Iraq, as commander of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, is already studied as an exemplary application of counterinsurgency doctrine. In the 1991 gulf war, he led a legendary tank assault that completely destroyed a much larger Iraqi force and earned him a Silver Star.
At the same time, General McMaster has a cooler head than Mr. Flynn, or for that matter John Bolton, whom he beat out for the job. Although General McMaster may place undue faith in robust military force and counterinsurgency, like General Mattis he values stability. He most likely wouldn’t advocate anything pointlessly disruptive, like reversing (again) the One China policy, tearing up the Iran deal or barring Muslims. It’s a quality one would want in a national security crisis; unfortunately, it’s also one that may put him on a collision course with the hot heads who occupy Mr. Trump’s inner circle.At the same time, General McMaster has a cooler head than Mr. Flynn, or for that matter John Bolton, whom he beat out for the job. Although General McMaster may place undue faith in robust military force and counterinsurgency, like General Mattis he values stability. He most likely wouldn’t advocate anything pointlessly disruptive, like reversing (again) the One China policy, tearing up the Iran deal or barring Muslims. It’s a quality one would want in a national security crisis; unfortunately, it’s also one that may put him on a collision course with the hot heads who occupy Mr. Trump’s inner circle.
Perhaps the best indication of General McMaster’s thinking, and the likelihood of conflict with Mr. Bannon and others, is his 1997 book, “Dereliction of Duty,” a merciless, meticulous study of the early days of the Vietnam War, and how senior civilian officials and the Joint Chiefs of Staff led the country into a quagmire.Perhaps the best indication of General McMaster’s thinking, and the likelihood of conflict with Mr. Bannon and others, is his 1997 book, “Dereliction of Duty,” a merciless, meticulous study of the early days of the Vietnam War, and how senior civilian officials and the Joint Chiefs of Staff led the country into a quagmire.
His central thesis is that the Joint Chiefs became inordinately politicized, caving to senior civilian officials in the Johnson administration like McGeorge Bundy, the national security adviser, who knew little about Vietnam, or military doctrine. Those officials were more concerned about appearing just strong enough not to lose hawkish domestic support without compromising the Great Society agenda than they were about actually winning the war. This yielded the tentative “graduated pressure” approach, rather than a decisive early concentration of military resources — especially combat ground troops.His central thesis is that the Joint Chiefs became inordinately politicized, caving to senior civilian officials in the Johnson administration like McGeorge Bundy, the national security adviser, who knew little about Vietnam, or military doctrine. Those officials were more concerned about appearing just strong enough not to lose hawkish domestic support without compromising the Great Society agenda than they were about actually winning the war. This yielded the tentative “graduated pressure” approach, rather than a decisive early concentration of military resources — especially combat ground troops.
“The war in Vietnam was not lost in the field nor was it lost on the front page of The New York Times or the college campuses,” he wrote. “It was lost in Washington,” even before “the first American units were deployed.”“The war in Vietnam was not lost in the field nor was it lost on the front page of The New York Times or the college campuses,” he wrote. “It was lost in Washington,” even before “the first American units were deployed.”
In his book, and in the 20 years since its publication, General McMaster has shown he is not afraid to find fault with presidents and other powerful officials. Lyndon B. Johnson and his senior advisers, he wrote, “rendered the administration incapable of dealing adequately with the complexities of the situation in Vietnam,” which prompted “arrogance, weakness, and lying.”In his book, and in the 20 years since its publication, General McMaster has shown he is not afraid to find fault with presidents and other powerful officials. Lyndon B. Johnson and his senior advisers, he wrote, “rendered the administration incapable of dealing adequately with the complexities of the situation in Vietnam,” which prompted “arrogance, weakness, and lying.”
For General McMaster, the military must be able to forcefully assert its operational and strategic expertise in informing policy. The same holds for the intelligence and law enforcement communities.For General McMaster, the military must be able to forcefully assert its operational and strategic expertise in informing policy. The same holds for the intelligence and law enforcement communities.
Yet Mr. Trump’s inclusion of Mr. Bannon on the Security Council’s Principals Committee last month, and the sidelining of the Joint Chiefs, gives the administration’s most senior voice on domestic policy a central role in national security decision making — setting up the same scenario for disaster that General McMaster examined in “Dereliction of Duty.”Yet Mr. Trump’s inclusion of Mr. Bannon on the Security Council’s Principals Committee last month, and the sidelining of the Joint Chiefs, gives the administration’s most senior voice on domestic policy a central role in national security decision making — setting up the same scenario for disaster that General McMaster examined in “Dereliction of Duty.”
We’ve already had a taste of the kinds of mistakes this arrangement will produce: the fumbled writing and rollout of Mr. Trump’s executive order on immigration, and possibly the ill-fated raid in Yemen. An imbalance between political and operational considerations is precisely what General McMaster abhorred about the Vietnam-era process. He derisively referred to the Vietnam-era Joint Chiefs as “the five silent men.”We’ve already had a taste of the kinds of mistakes this arrangement will produce: the fumbled writing and rollout of Mr. Trump’s executive order on immigration, and possibly the ill-fated raid in Yemen. An imbalance between political and operational considerations is precisely what General McMaster abhorred about the Vietnam-era process. He derisively referred to the Vietnam-era Joint Chiefs as “the five silent men.”
Men like Mr. Bannon, of course, are not likely to be either silent or deferential. Instead, they will try to bureaucratically outflank dissenters. General McMaster, for his part, vehemently objected to the way President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara largely circumvented the Security Council’s interagency process in formulating and implementing Vietnam policy; it’s unlikely he’ll abide a similar move by Mr. Bannon and his circle. He’ll probably be joined by General Mattis, who has emerged as an important counterweight on the council to Mr. Bannon.Men like Mr. Bannon, of course, are not likely to be either silent or deferential. Instead, they will try to bureaucratically outflank dissenters. General McMaster, for his part, vehemently objected to the way President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara largely circumvented the Security Council’s interagency process in formulating and implementing Vietnam policy; it’s unlikely he’ll abide a similar move by Mr. Bannon and his circle. He’ll probably be joined by General Mattis, who has emerged as an important counterweight on the council to Mr. Bannon.
Expect fireworks. General McMaster’s unblinking, incisive criticism of national security officials reflects a conviction that they are duty bound to do all they can to avoid making or repeating historical mistakes — even at the risk of insubordination. At the same time, Mr. Trump does not take criticism well and lacks a sophisticated appreciation for operational nicety, policy deliberation or sound civil-military relations. He and Mr. Bannon are hostile to technocrats whose rigor and exactitude might impede their ideological agenda. And Mr. Trump, given his rhetoric, appears willing to indulge the use of military force with little regard to strategic consequences.Expect fireworks. General McMaster’s unblinking, incisive criticism of national security officials reflects a conviction that they are duty bound to do all they can to avoid making or repeating historical mistakes — even at the risk of insubordination. At the same time, Mr. Trump does not take criticism well and lacks a sophisticated appreciation for operational nicety, policy deliberation or sound civil-military relations. He and Mr. Bannon are hostile to technocrats whose rigor and exactitude might impede their ideological agenda. And Mr. Trump, given his rhetoric, appears willing to indulge the use of military force with little regard to strategic consequences.
General McMaster may well establish himself, with General Mattis, as an effective stabilizing force within the administration. Or he could find himself sidelined, or even ousted, if he brings too many inconvenient truths to the table. The drama would make for an entertaining piece of political theater — if it didn’t involve the risk of a strategic disaster.General McMaster may well establish himself, with General Mattis, as an effective stabilizing force within the administration. Or he could find himself sidelined, or even ousted, if he brings too many inconvenient truths to the table. The drama would make for an entertaining piece of political theater — if it didn’t involve the risk of a strategic disaster.