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| Grenfell Tower exposed the confusion about who is responsible for fire safety | Grenfell Tower exposed the confusion about who is responsible for fire safety |
| (7 months later) | |
| Rita Dexter | |
| Sat 1 Jul 2017 20.38 BST | |
| Last modified on Sat 2 Dec 2017 03.01 GMT | |
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| As the news of the appalling fire at Grenfell Tower broke, my first thought was “we have been here before”. | As the news of the appalling fire at Grenfell Tower broke, my first thought was “we have been here before”. |
| Southwark council tried hard over several years to improve its Lakanal House block, and without any of the cost-cutting that seems to have happened at Grenfell Tower. Sadly, much of its work compromised the fire safety of the building and helped cause six deaths in a 2009 fire. The lessons of that fire took five years to reach only a limited audience, mainly those involved in the coroner’s inquest. There were letters from the coroner to the government and others, and that caused more letters to be written to local councils and housing authorities. But there were no arrangements for establishing what happened next. This is a common problem of fire safety management: there is not enough transparency; responsibilities are too dispersed; and there are few if any systems to ensure accountability. | Southwark council tried hard over several years to improve its Lakanal House block, and without any of the cost-cutting that seems to have happened at Grenfell Tower. Sadly, much of its work compromised the fire safety of the building and helped cause six deaths in a 2009 fire. The lessons of that fire took five years to reach only a limited audience, mainly those involved in the coroner’s inquest. There were letters from the coroner to the government and others, and that caused more letters to be written to local councils and housing authorities. But there were no arrangements for establishing what happened next. This is a common problem of fire safety management: there is not enough transparency; responsibilities are too dispersed; and there are few if any systems to ensure accountability. |
| The Lakanal fire is not the only example of refurbishment work gone wrong. In July 2014, a committee of the London Fire Authority was told of many other such fires, at least one involving a death and another involving a care home. | The Lakanal fire is not the only example of refurbishment work gone wrong. In July 2014, a committee of the London Fire Authority was told of many other such fires, at least one involving a death and another involving a care home. |
| The fire authority report also detailed wider issues of concern. While sharing some of the lessons of Lakanal with housing management and building control professionals, London Fire Brigade was told that the introduction of competition had harmed the performance of this vital function. Council building control teams said they were under-resourced. The prices they charged were too low to properly provide the work. Competition had forced reduced rigour in an effort to win work. And some projects were signed off prematurely because of pressure for schemes to be completed. | The fire authority report also detailed wider issues of concern. While sharing some of the lessons of Lakanal with housing management and building control professionals, London Fire Brigade was told that the introduction of competition had harmed the performance of this vital function. Council building control teams said they were under-resourced. The prices they charged were too low to properly provide the work. Competition had forced reduced rigour in an effort to win work. And some projects were signed off prematurely because of pressure for schemes to be completed. |
| As a result, the London Fire Brigade produced an audit tool and sent it to all 33 London councils. This was the first (and probably only) effort by a fire brigade to encourage elected members and senior managers to ask questions about projects, and to not leave fire safety oversight to a small group of professionals. Philip Hammond’s now disputed assertion that the cladding at Grenfell was unlawful, and the lack of clarity about the standards and methodology being applied to its emergency testing, are good examples of how difficult it is to penetrate the detail of regulations and standards. | As a result, the London Fire Brigade produced an audit tool and sent it to all 33 London councils. This was the first (and probably only) effort by a fire brigade to encourage elected members and senior managers to ask questions about projects, and to not leave fire safety oversight to a small group of professionals. Philip Hammond’s now disputed assertion that the cladding at Grenfell was unlawful, and the lack of clarity about the standards and methodology being applied to its emergency testing, are good examples of how difficult it is to penetrate the detail of regulations and standards. |
| Those who aren’t experts, but are responsible for results, need to know the right questions to ask. The audit tool encouraged councillors to ask whether their council ensured that before any refurbishment works were carried out, there was a proper assessment of the impact on fire safety, and whether their council required that any work done must result in buildings at least as fire-safe as before. There were also questions to ask about how officers approached the task of ensuring that projects produced buildings that were more, not less, safe. The intention was to try to penetrate a world where projects are executed by building and engineering professionals, and where those with political and strategic responsibility often lack the means or chance to satisfy themselves that all is safe and well. | Those who aren’t experts, but are responsible for results, need to know the right questions to ask. The audit tool encouraged councillors to ask whether their council ensured that before any refurbishment works were carried out, there was a proper assessment of the impact on fire safety, and whether their council required that any work done must result in buildings at least as fire-safe as before. There were also questions to ask about how officers approached the task of ensuring that projects produced buildings that were more, not less, safe. The intention was to try to penetrate a world where projects are executed by building and engineering professionals, and where those with political and strategic responsibility often lack the means or chance to satisfy themselves that all is safe and well. |
| Like the letters that followed the Lakanal inquest, who knows what happened next? I left the London Fire Authority shortly after and never got the chance to ask. It’s no one’s job to put together a picture of fire safety in any locality, sector or industry. Fire safety laws are complex and responsibilities are spread across many agencies and individuals. My experience as deputy commissioner in London left me in no doubt that there was room for confusion. And I was sceptical that the policy approach and requirements for complex structures and buildings with multiple uses should really be the same as those for a corner shop. | Like the letters that followed the Lakanal inquest, who knows what happened next? I left the London Fire Authority shortly after and never got the chance to ask. It’s no one’s job to put together a picture of fire safety in any locality, sector or industry. Fire safety laws are complex and responsibilities are spread across many agencies and individuals. My experience as deputy commissioner in London left me in no doubt that there was room for confusion. And I was sceptical that the policy approach and requirements for complex structures and buildings with multiple uses should really be the same as those for a corner shop. |
| London Fire Brigade used to collect this data, but it isn’t routinely published | London Fire Brigade used to collect this data, but it isn’t routinely published |
| The Grenfell inquiry should recommend that councils be made responsible for an annual report on fire safety in their areas. They should know where in their area fire audits have been done, by whom and with what outcome. And fire authorities should have a duty to provide councils with information about enforcement action. Which care homes are failing in their duties? Which sheltered housing? Which high rise premises? Which schools? Councils should be told when buildings fail. Most fires result from action taken by people – smoking, cooking, or using dodgy charging cables. But some fires are made much worse by the building and what has been done to it. London Fire Brigade used to collect this data, but it isn’t routinely published. I think it’s time for that to change. There should be more fire investigators and the government should pay for them. | The Grenfell inquiry should recommend that councils be made responsible for an annual report on fire safety in their areas. They should know where in their area fire audits have been done, by whom and with what outcome. And fire authorities should have a duty to provide councils with information about enforcement action. Which care homes are failing in their duties? Which sheltered housing? Which high rise premises? Which schools? Councils should be told when buildings fail. Most fires result from action taken by people – smoking, cooking, or using dodgy charging cables. But some fires are made much worse by the building and what has been done to it. London Fire Brigade used to collect this data, but it isn’t routinely published. I think it’s time for that to change. There should be more fire investigators and the government should pay for them. |
| Fire brigades can be relied on to send brave men and women to try to save lives in even the worst and most dangerous fires. But we need public policy, review and accountability to reduce the number of fires that start in the first place, and make sure that they cause as little damage and danger as possible when they do. The Grenfell Tower disaster, like the Lakanal House fire before it, shows that we are currently failing in this vital task. | Fire brigades can be relied on to send brave men and women to try to save lives in even the worst and most dangerous fires. But we need public policy, review and accountability to reduce the number of fires that start in the first place, and make sure that they cause as little damage and danger as possible when they do. The Grenfell Tower disaster, like the Lakanal House fire before it, shows that we are currently failing in this vital task. |
| Rita Dexter was deputy commissioner of the London Fire Brigade from 2009 to 2015 | Rita Dexter was deputy commissioner of the London Fire Brigade from 2009 to 2015 |
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