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| How Fear of Falling Explains the Love of Trump | How Fear of Falling Explains the Love of Trump |
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| I have written before about the fear of falling down the socioeconomic ladder, the fear of an irremediable loss of status, authority and prestige — and the desperate need to be rescued from this fate. But the topic bears further exploration because it has been such a prime motivation for one slice of the electorate, the swing voters who made President Trump’s unexpected triumph possible. | I have written before about the fear of falling down the socioeconomic ladder, the fear of an irremediable loss of status, authority and prestige — and the desperate need to be rescued from this fate. But the topic bears further exploration because it has been such a prime motivation for one slice of the electorate, the swing voters who made President Trump’s unexpected triumph possible. |
| The question that persists six months after Mr. Trump’s inauguration is why six key states — Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, along with 220 counties nationwide — flipped from Obama in 2012 to Trump in 2016. Why did these voters change their minds? These are men and women who are, in the main, still working, still attending church, still members of functioning families, but who often live in communities where neighbors, relatives, friends and children have been caught up in disordered lives. The worry that this disorder has become contagious — that decent working or middle class lives can unravel quickly — stalks many voters, particularly in communities where jobs, industries and a whole way of life have slowly receded, the culminating effect of which can feel like a sudden blow. | The question that persists six months after Mr. Trump’s inauguration is why six key states — Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, along with 220 counties nationwide — flipped from Obama in 2012 to Trump in 2016. Why did these voters change their minds? These are men and women who are, in the main, still working, still attending church, still members of functioning families, but who often live in communities where neighbors, relatives, friends and children have been caught up in disordered lives. The worry that this disorder has become contagious — that decent working or middle class lives can unravel quickly — stalks many voters, particularly in communities where jobs, industries and a whole way of life have slowly receded, the culminating effect of which can feel like a sudden blow. |
| One suggestive line of thinking comes from Arlie Hochschild, the author of “Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right” and professor emerita of sociology at Berkeley. Hochschild has studied Americans whom she calls “the elite of the left-behind.” Her findings shed light, I think, on the concerns of some of the voters who tipped the balance for Trump last year. Hochschild wrote to me that common refrains among these voters were “America’s heading downhill” and “I think our kids are headed for hard times.” In these conversations, she said, | One suggestive line of thinking comes from Arlie Hochschild, the author of “Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right” and professor emerita of sociology at Berkeley. Hochschild has studied Americans whom she calls “the elite of the left-behind.” Her findings shed light, I think, on the concerns of some of the voters who tipped the balance for Trump last year. Hochschild wrote to me that common refrains among these voters were “America’s heading downhill” and “I think our kids are headed for hard times.” In these conversations, she said, |
| Nancy Isenberg, a history professor at Louisiana State University and the author of “White Trash: The 400 Year Untold History of Class in America,” responded to my inquiry about Americans anxious about losing their place: | Nancy Isenberg, a history professor at Louisiana State University and the author of “White Trash: The 400 Year Untold History of Class in America,” responded to my inquiry about Americans anxious about losing their place: |
| Isenberg expanded on this theme in the preface to the 2017 paperback edition of her book. “The election has opened up festering wounds. The deepest of these exposes how we measure the value of civic virtue and hard work,” she wrote. The 2016 campaign | Isenberg expanded on this theme in the preface to the 2017 paperback edition of her book. “The election has opened up festering wounds. The deepest of these exposes how we measure the value of civic virtue and hard work,” she wrote. The 2016 campaign |
| There is no question that the communities where Trump received crucial backing — rural to small-city America — are, in many ways, on a downward trajectory. | There is no question that the communities where Trump received crucial backing — rural to small-city America — are, in many ways, on a downward trajectory. |
| From 1990 to 2009, the percentage of births to single mothers among whites without high school diplomas grew from 21 to 51 percent; among those who completed high school, the percentage rose from 11 to 34 percent. | From 1990 to 2009, the percentage of births to single mothers among whites without high school diplomas grew from 21 to 51 percent; among those who completed high school, the percentage rose from 11 to 34 percent. |
| Along parallel lines, the percentage of intact marriages among white adults 25 to 60 years old without high school degrees fell from 70 percent in the 1970s to 36 percent in the 2000s. For those who finished, the percentage fell from 76 to 46 percent. | Along parallel lines, the percentage of intact marriages among white adults 25 to 60 years old without high school degrees fell from 70 percent in the 1970s to 36 percent in the 2000s. For those who finished, the percentage fell from 76 to 46 percent. |
| As early as 2010, a report issued by the Institute for American Values and the University of Virginia, “When Marriage Disappears: The New Middle America,” found that the downward path of those without college degrees stood in contrast to the experience of those with degrees. | |
| College graduates, the report said, | College graduates, the report said, |
| The problems do not stop there. | The problems do not stop there. |
| The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported in 2014 that the number of opioid prescriptions outnumbered the number of people in 12 states. All 12 of these states voted for Donald Trump: Arkansas, Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee and West Virginia. | The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported in 2014 that the number of opioid prescriptions outnumbered the number of people in 12 states. All 12 of these states voted for Donald Trump: Arkansas, Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee and West Virginia. |
| According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, the overdose death rates in 2015 for opioids, including heroin, were far higher for whites, 13.9 per 100,000, than for blacks, 6.6 per 100,000, and Hispanics, 4.6 per 100,000. | According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, the overdose death rates in 2015 for opioids, including heroin, were far higher for whites, 13.9 per 100,000, than for blacks, 6.6 per 100,000, and Hispanics, 4.6 per 100,000. |
| Joan C. Williams, a law professor at the University of California, Hastings, and author of “The White Working Class: Overcoming Class Cluelessness in America,” described in an email how the downward trends are affecting the Trump electorate. “Working-class whites are deeply upset that they are losing traditional family structures,” she wrote: | Joan C. Williams, a law professor at the University of California, Hastings, and author of “The White Working Class: Overcoming Class Cluelessness in America,” described in an email how the downward trends are affecting the Trump electorate. “Working-class whites are deeply upset that they are losing traditional family structures,” she wrote: |
| In her book, Williams argues that the values of the liberal elite — self-expression, creativity, personal fulfillment — are not only different from the values of those in the “missing middle,” but a threat to their economic survival: | In her book, Williams argues that the values of the liberal elite — self-expression, creativity, personal fulfillment — are not only different from the values of those in the “missing middle,” but a threat to their economic survival: |
| Adding insult to injury for those with the grit to survive on an assembly line or in a steel mill, the decades-long shift from manufacturing to services is creating the type of jobs that are distinctly unappealing to many men. | Adding insult to injury for those with the grit to survive on an assembly line or in a steel mill, the decades-long shift from manufacturing to services is creating the type of jobs that are distinctly unappealing to many men. |
| As Claire Cain Miller, a reporter for The Upshot, wrote last January in The Times, | As Claire Cain Miller, a reporter for The Upshot, wrote last January in The Times, |
| “I ain’t gonna be a nurse; I don’t have the tolerance for people,” Tracy Dawson, a 53-year-old welder struggling to find work in St. Clair, Mo. told Miller: | “I ain’t gonna be a nurse; I don’t have the tolerance for people,” Tracy Dawson, a 53-year-old welder struggling to find work in St. Clair, Mo. told Miller: |
| “Talk about insensitivity,” Joan Williams wrote about those advising men with high-school educations to take pink-collar jobs: | “Talk about insensitivity,” Joan Williams wrote about those advising men with high-school educations to take pink-collar jobs: |
| While whites without bachelor’s degrees flocked to Trump in the belief that he was their savior, the reality is that the many Americans are caught in a vicious cycle that Trump is in no way equipped to address. | While whites without bachelor’s degrees flocked to Trump in the belief that he was their savior, the reality is that the many Americans are caught in a vicious cycle that Trump is in no way equipped to address. |
| This cycle is described in a National Institutes of Health paper, “Family Inequality: Diverging Patterns in Marriage, Cohabitation, and Childbearing,” by Shelly Lundberg, a demographer at the University of California, Santa Barbara, Robert A. Pollak, a professor of economics at Washington University in St. Louis, and Jenna Stearns, a doctoral candidate in economics who is also at the University of California, Santa Barbara. | This cycle is described in a National Institutes of Health paper, “Family Inequality: Diverging Patterns in Marriage, Cohabitation, and Childbearing,” by Shelly Lundberg, a demographer at the University of California, Santa Barbara, Robert A. Pollak, a professor of economics at Washington University in St. Louis, and Jenna Stearns, a doctoral candidate in economics who is also at the University of California, Santa Barbara. |
| In brief, the vicious cycle works as follows. The declining employment and salaries of men without college degrees make them less attractive as marriage partners. The result is “a decoupling of marriage and childbearing,” according to the authors, with larger percentages of children brought up in single mother households. | In brief, the vicious cycle works as follows. The declining employment and salaries of men without college degrees make them less attractive as marriage partners. The result is “a decoupling of marriage and childbearing,” according to the authors, with larger percentages of children brought up in single mother households. |
| In contrast, for those with B.A. and B.S. degrees, “marriage has become the commitment device that supports intensive joint investments in children,” a project for “raising economically-successful children.” | In contrast, for those with B.A. and B.S. degrees, “marriage has become the commitment device that supports intensive joint investments in children,” a project for “raising economically-successful children.” |
| This produces a brutal form of intergenerational transmission. For the well-educated, “the expected returns to child investments” are high, well worth the time and effort, Lundberg and her collaborators write. For less-well educated parents “with limited resources and uncertain futures” the returns on investment are likely to “be lower than for more educated parents with greater and more secure investment capabilities.” | This produces a brutal form of intergenerational transmission. For the well-educated, “the expected returns to child investments” are high, well worth the time and effort, Lundberg and her collaborators write. For less-well educated parents “with limited resources and uncertain futures” the returns on investment are likely to “be lower than for more educated parents with greater and more secure investment capabilities.” |
| The result: | The result: |
| The decline of marriage among less well-educated men serves only to accelerate the downward spiral. Single men lose out on the benefits of marriage, which include “decreases in men’s risky behavior, such as binge drinking and drug use,” a stronger commitment to work and “an increase in time spent in home-oriented activities.” | The decline of marriage among less well-educated men serves only to accelerate the downward spiral. Single men lose out on the benefits of marriage, which include “decreases in men’s risky behavior, such as binge drinking and drug use,” a stronger commitment to work and “an increase in time spent in home-oriented activities.” |
| In other words, | In other words, |
| In a forthcoming Brookings paper, “The Geography of Desperation,” Carol Graham, a senior fellow, and two co-authors, point out that there is a high cost of failing to keep up “in a very wealthy society that prides itself on being a meritocracy.” | In a forthcoming Brookings paper, “The Geography of Desperation,” Carol Graham, a senior fellow, and two co-authors, point out that there is a high cost of failing to keep up “in a very wealthy society that prides itself on being a meritocracy.” |
| The starkest evidence of these costs, Graham and her co-authors write, | The starkest evidence of these costs, Graham and her co-authors write, |
| As these processes continue and accelerate, many Trump voters — the neighbors, relatives, friends, parents and children of those who have become mired in this “geography of desperation” — are deeply apprehensive about what might happen if Trump fails to fulfill his promise to make America great again. | As these processes continue and accelerate, many Trump voters — the neighbors, relatives, friends, parents and children of those who have become mired in this “geography of desperation” — are deeply apprehensive about what might happen if Trump fails to fulfill his promise to make America great again. |