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| Democracy Can Plant the Seeds of Its Own Destruction | Democracy Can Plant the Seeds of Its Own Destruction |
| (about 3 hours later) | |
| Will President Trump’s assault on the norms underpinning constitutional democracy permanently alter American political life? | Will President Trump’s assault on the norms underpinning constitutional democracy permanently alter American political life? |
| On a daily basis, Trump tests the willingness of the public to accept a president who lies as a matter of routine. So far, Trump has persuaded a large swath of America to swallow what he feeds them. | On a daily basis, Trump tests the willingness of the public to accept a president who lies as a matter of routine. So far, Trump has persuaded a large swath of America to swallow what he feeds them. |
| Asked whether the media makes up stories about Trump, nearly half the population of the United States, 46 percent, now says yes, according to a Politico/Morning Consult poll conducted Oct. 12-16. This compares to 37 percent who say that the media does not fabricate material about the president. While Republicans and Democrats diverge in the directions you would expect, a plurality of independents, 44 percent, says that the media produces false stories; 31 percent say the media is accurate. | Asked whether the media makes up stories about Trump, nearly half the population of the United States, 46 percent, now says yes, according to a Politico/Morning Consult poll conducted Oct. 12-16. This compares to 37 percent who say that the media does not fabricate material about the president. While Republicans and Democrats diverge in the directions you would expect, a plurality of independents, 44 percent, says that the media produces false stories; 31 percent say the media is accurate. |
| Trump has flourished at a time when trust in basic institutions — organized religion, banks, medical services, Congress, the media, government, you name it — has eroded. His presidency is a product of this erosion, but it is also proving to be an accelerant of the process. | Trump has flourished at a time when trust in basic institutions — organized religion, banks, medical services, Congress, the media, government, you name it — has eroded. His presidency is a product of this erosion, but it is also proving to be an accelerant of the process. |
| Eight days after Trump was elected, Clare Malone, a senior political writer for the website FiveThirtyEight, put it this way: | Eight days after Trump was elected, Clare Malone, a senior political writer for the website FiveThirtyEight, put it this way: |
| Or, as Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk write in the July 2016 issue of the Journal of Democracy: | Or, as Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk write in the July 2016 issue of the Journal of Democracy: |
| The danger, they argue, cannot be underestimated: | The danger, they argue, cannot be underestimated: |
| Trump is the most prominent of the right-wing populist politicians continuing to gain strength both here and in Europe (despite some electoral setbacks), but because the viewpoint he represents is now so widespread, he is in one sense personally irrelevant; a symptom rather than a cause. | Trump is the most prominent of the right-wing populist politicians continuing to gain strength both here and in Europe (despite some electoral setbacks), but because the viewpoint he represents is now so widespread, he is in one sense personally irrelevant; a symptom rather than a cause. |
| As Sasha Polakow-Suransky, the author of “Go Back to Where You Came From: The Backlash Against Immigration and the Fate of Western Democracy,” warns in The New York Review of Books: | As Sasha Polakow-Suransky, the author of “Go Back to Where You Came From: The Backlash Against Immigration and the Fate of Western Democracy,” warns in The New York Review of Books: |
| The threat to democracy posed by the current outbreak of populist nationalism has become a matter of concern for both scholars and ordinary citizens. The central topic at a conference at Yale earlier this month was “How Do Democracies Fall Apart,” and the subject will be taken up again in November at a Stanford conference called “Global Populisms: A Threat to Democracy?” | The threat to democracy posed by the current outbreak of populist nationalism has become a matter of concern for both scholars and ordinary citizens. The central topic at a conference at Yale earlier this month was “How Do Democracies Fall Apart,” and the subject will be taken up again in November at a Stanford conference called “Global Populisms: A Threat to Democracy?” |
| I contacted several of the participants at the Yale gathering and was struck by their anxiety over the future prospects of democratic governance. | I contacted several of the participants at the Yale gathering and was struck by their anxiety over the future prospects of democratic governance. |
| One of the most insightful was Adam Przeworski, a political scientist at N.Y.U., who has written, but not yet published, his own analysis of current events under the title “What’s Happening.” | One of the most insightful was Adam Przeworski, a political scientist at N.Y.U., who has written, but not yet published, his own analysis of current events under the title “What’s Happening.” |
| First and foremost, Przeworski stresses, | First and foremost, Przeworski stresses, |
| These parties and candidates, he points out: | These parties and candidates, he points out: |
| In support of Przeworski’s argument, it is clear that the success of the Trump campaign in winning the Republican nomination was the result of a classic democratic insurgency: the Republican electorate’s rejection of its party’s establishment. | In support of Przeworski’s argument, it is clear that the success of the Trump campaign in winning the Republican nomination was the result of a classic democratic insurgency: the Republican electorate’s rejection of its party’s establishment. |
| The danger in the United States, in Przeworski’s view, is the possibility that the Trump administration will use the power of the presidency to undermine the procedures and institutions essential to the operation of democracy: | The danger in the United States, in Przeworski’s view, is the possibility that the Trump administration will use the power of the presidency to undermine the procedures and institutions essential to the operation of democracy: |
| Przeworski believes that | Przeworski believes that |
| Along similar lines, Anna Grzymala-Busse, a political scientist at Stanford, replied by email to my inquiry: | Along similar lines, Anna Grzymala-Busse, a political scientist at Stanford, replied by email to my inquiry: |
| Trump, in Grzymala-Busse’s assessment, “articulates a classic populist message that we see in Europe: the elite establishment is a collusive cartel uninterested in the problems of ‘the people,’” and, she continued, he has begun to follow the path of European populist leaders: | Trump, in Grzymala-Busse’s assessment, “articulates a classic populist message that we see in Europe: the elite establishment is a collusive cartel uninterested in the problems of ‘the people,’” and, she continued, he has begun to follow the path of European populist leaders: |
| The attacks on the courts, media and universities | The attacks on the courts, media and universities |
| Margaret Levi, another political scientist at Stanford, wrote me that she was | Margaret Levi, another political scientist at Stanford, wrote me that she was |
| Some form of right-wing populism, Levi argued, | Some form of right-wing populism, Levi argued, |
| She added that there was no guarantee that right-wing populism “will not transform into the fascist and Nazi forms.” | She added that there was no guarantee that right-wing populism “will not transform into the fascist and Nazi forms.” |
| Unless the Democratic Party in this country and moderate parties in the rest of the world “find a way to address the populace’s underlying economic insecurity and deterioration in the perceived (and actual in many cases) standard of living, the possibility for irreparable damage does exist,” Levi wrote: | Unless the Democratic Party in this country and moderate parties in the rest of the world “find a way to address the populace’s underlying economic insecurity and deterioration in the perceived (and actual in many cases) standard of living, the possibility for irreparable damage does exist,” Levi wrote: |
| While white identitarianism, anger over immigration and economic dislocation are often cited as causes of the emergence of right-wing populism, another argument is that there is a growing segment of the electorate that is alienated from cultural norms they see as imposed on them by a ruling elite — a repressive elite; politically correct and socially remote. | While white identitarianism, anger over immigration and economic dislocation are often cited as causes of the emergence of right-wing populism, another argument is that there is a growing segment of the electorate that is alienated from cultural norms they see as imposed on them by a ruling elite — a repressive elite; politically correct and socially remote. |
| In a research paper published in the current issue of the Journal of Democracy, “Eroding Norms and Democratic Deconsolidation,” Paul Howe, a political scientist at the University of New Brunswick, Canada, describes the increasing size of the nihilistic segment of the American electorate. | In a research paper published in the current issue of the Journal of Democracy, “Eroding Norms and Democratic Deconsolidation,” Paul Howe, a political scientist at the University of New Brunswick, Canada, describes the increasing size of the nihilistic segment of the American electorate. |
| This constituency of the disengaged and profoundly alienated provides a base of support in the United States and Europe for populist leaders who, in Howe’s view, fit the Trump mold: | This constituency of the disengaged and profoundly alienated provides a base of support in the United States and Europe for populist leaders who, in Howe’s view, fit the Trump mold: |
| Looking at data from World Values Surveys in recent decades, Howe finds that in the United States, | Looking at data from World Values Surveys in recent decades, Howe finds that in the United States, |
| These corrosive changes include an increase in the number of citizens who say it is O.K. to | These corrosive changes include an increase in the number of citizens who say it is O.K. to |
| When answers to these questions were correlated with political attitudes, Howe found that | When answers to these questions were correlated with political attitudes, Howe found that |
| He then argues that the | He then argues that the |
| Clearly, a sense of isolation, actual isolation, the breakdown of the family, the rise of opiates, the disappearance of associations, a nation “bowling alone” and “coming apart,” have all played a role in creating an antisocial constituency. This very constituency has produced some of the strongest Trump supporters and backing for the so-called alt-right. As Howe writes: | Clearly, a sense of isolation, actual isolation, the breakdown of the family, the rise of opiates, the disappearance of associations, a nation “bowling alone” and “coming apart,” have all played a role in creating an antisocial constituency. This very constituency has produced some of the strongest Trump supporters and backing for the so-called alt-right. As Howe writes: |
| Few people have looked at these issues as long and as hard as Ron Inglehart, a political scientist at the University of Michigan. In “The Danger of Deconsolidation: How Much Should We Worry?” (published alongside the Foa-Mounk essay in the July 2016 issue of the Journal of Democracy) Inglehart raises this question: | Few people have looked at these issues as long and as hard as Ron Inglehart, a political scientist at the University of Michigan. In “The Danger of Deconsolidation: How Much Should We Worry?” (published alongside the Foa-Mounk essay in the July 2016 issue of the Journal of Democracy) Inglehart raises this question: |
| The economic boom in the post-World War II years “produced rising security and an intergenerational shift toward self-expression values,” Inglehart wrote, but “in recent decades most advanced industrial societies have experienced economic stagnation, rising unemployment coupled with massive immigration, and the worst recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s.” | The economic boom in the post-World War II years “produced rising security and an intergenerational shift toward self-expression values,” Inglehart wrote, but “in recent decades most advanced industrial societies have experienced economic stagnation, rising unemployment coupled with massive immigration, and the worst recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s.” |
| The resulting “high levels of existential insecurity,” Inglehart argues, | The resulting “high levels of existential insecurity,” Inglehart argues, |
| While the contemporary explosion of right-wing populism is a recent phenomenon, its roots go deeper, best captured by Daniel Bell in his 1972 essay “The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism” which foreshadowed the Trump era. | While the contemporary explosion of right-wing populism is a recent phenomenon, its roots go deeper, best captured by Daniel Bell in his 1972 essay “The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism” which foreshadowed the Trump era. |
| American capitalism, Bell wrote, | American capitalism, Bell wrote, |
| The conflict between “the principles of economics and economizing” and a culture “rooted in a return to instinctual modes” has produced a “disjunction which is the historic crisis of Western society. This cultural contradiction, in the long run, is the deepest challenge to the society.” | The conflict between “the principles of economics and economizing” and a culture “rooted in a return to instinctual modes” has produced a “disjunction which is the historic crisis of Western society. This cultural contradiction, in the long run, is the deepest challenge to the society.” |
| For the moment, the Republican Party has become the main battleground for the struggle over authoritarianism, xenophobia and the erosion of received standards. | For the moment, the Republican Party has become the main battleground for the struggle over authoritarianism, xenophobia and the erosion of received standards. |
| At the Yale conference, Daniel Ziblatt, a professor of government at Harvard, warned that Trump and other right-wing leaders have breached traditional political boundaries that serve as “the soft guardrails of democracy.” The two “master norms,” in Ziblatt’s view, are mutual toleration, that is, the acceptance of “the basic legitimacy of our opponents,” and institutional forbearance — the responsible exercise of power by those in office. | At the Yale conference, Daniel Ziblatt, a professor of government at Harvard, warned that Trump and other right-wing leaders have breached traditional political boundaries that serve as “the soft guardrails of democracy.” The two “master norms,” in Ziblatt’s view, are mutual toleration, that is, the acceptance of “the basic legitimacy of our opponents,” and institutional forbearance — the responsible exercise of power by those in office. |
| Both his detractors and his supporters recognize that Trump has flouted countless rules — and revels in doing so. On Monday, Senator John McCain, awarded the Liberty Medal by the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia, challenged Trump on this score: | Both his detractors and his supporters recognize that Trump has flouted countless rules — and revels in doing so. On Monday, Senator John McCain, awarded the Liberty Medal by the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia, challenged Trump on this score: |
| Mounk and Ziblatt, writing for Vox in March of 2016, made the case that “Trump isn’t a fascist; he’s a demagogue.” Their conclusion, however, was that Trump’s demagoguery does not make him any “less dangerous.” Instead, Trump and politicians like him are “a profound threat to the survival of democratic politics.” | Mounk and Ziblatt, writing for Vox in March of 2016, made the case that “Trump isn’t a fascist; he’s a demagogue.” Their conclusion, however, was that Trump’s demagoguery does not make him any “less dangerous.” Instead, Trump and politicians like him are “a profound threat to the survival of democratic politics.” |
| Politicians in the Trump mold | Politicians in the Trump mold |
| Timothy Snyder, a historian at Yale and the author of “Bloodlands” and “Black Earth” (and also a contributor to these pages) was a participant at the conference in New Haven. He introduces his most recent book, “On Tyranny,” this way: | |
| Writing in 2012, well before the advent of Trump, three economists, Luigi Guiso, Helios Herrera and Massimo Morelli, argued that the populist political tradition itself is based first on “promises of redistribution to the masses” and second on “concealment of government budget constraints from the voters.” Promising redistribution to the masses and concealing government budget constraints was the essence of Trump’s campaign strategy, as he promised to build a multibillion dollar wall “which Mexico will pay for”; to repeal Obamacare and replace it with “health care which will expand choice, increase access, lower costs & provide better care”; to preserve Medicare; and to enact a gigantic tax cut for the middle class. So far, Trump has failed to fulfill any of these promises, boxed in by the reality of “government budget constraints.” | Writing in 2012, well before the advent of Trump, three economists, Luigi Guiso, Helios Herrera and Massimo Morelli, argued that the populist political tradition itself is based first on “promises of redistribution to the masses” and second on “concealment of government budget constraints from the voters.” Promising redistribution to the masses and concealing government budget constraints was the essence of Trump’s campaign strategy, as he promised to build a multibillion dollar wall “which Mexico will pay for”; to repeal Obamacare and replace it with “health care which will expand choice, increase access, lower costs & provide better care”; to preserve Medicare; and to enact a gigantic tax cut for the middle class. So far, Trump has failed to fulfill any of these promises, boxed in by the reality of “government budget constraints.” |
| Paul Waldman, writing in The Washington Post on Oct, 17, summed up Trump’s approach to veracity and to reality itself: | Paul Waldman, writing in The Washington Post on Oct, 17, summed up Trump’s approach to veracity and to reality itself: |
| Trump’s recklessness is disturbing enough on its own. But what makes it especially threatening is that much of the public — well beyond the 40 percent of the electorate that has shown itself to be unshakable in its devotion to the president — seems to be slowly accommodating itself to its daily dose of the Trump reality show, accepting the rhetorical violence that Trump inflicts on basic standards of truth as the new normal. | Trump’s recklessness is disturbing enough on its own. But what makes it especially threatening is that much of the public — well beyond the 40 percent of the electorate that has shown itself to be unshakable in its devotion to the president — seems to be slowly accommodating itself to its daily dose of the Trump reality show, accepting the rhetorical violence that Trump inflicts on basic standards of truth as the new normal. |