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Trump’s National Security Plan Warns of ‘Great Power Competition’ With Russia and China Trump Delivers a Mixed Message on His National Security Approach
(about 4 hours later)
WASHINGTON — President Trump declared Monday that the United States faced growing competition from Russia and China, two great-power rivals that he said “seek to challenge American influence, values and wealth.” WASHINGTON — President Trump presented a blueprint for the country’s national security on Monday that warns of a treacherous world in which the United States faces rising threats from an emboldened Russia and China, as well as from what it calls rogue governments, like North Korea and Iran.
But Mr. Trump, in presenting a new national security strategy that carried distinct echoes of the Cold War, said nothing about Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, even though the official strategy document itself warns briefly of “Russia using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies.” To fend off these multiple challenges, the report says with Cold War urgency, the government must put “America First,” fortifying its borders, ripping up unfair trade agreements and rebuilding its military might.
Mr. Trump referred instead to a Sunday telephone call from President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who thanked him for intelligence that the C.I.A. had passed on to Russian authorities, which Mr. Trump said foiled a terrorist attack in St. Petersburg that could have killed thousands of people. But in his speech announcing the strategy, Mr. Trump struck a much different tone. Instead of explaining the nature of these threats, he delivered a campaignlike address, with familiar calls to build a wall along the southern border with Mexico and a heavy dose of self-congratulation for the bull market, the low jobless rate and tax cuts, which, he promised, were “days away.”
“That’s a great thing,” he said, “and the way it’s supposed to work.” “America is in the game, and America is going to win,” he said, to an audience that included cabinet members and military officers.
Mr. Trump broke with his two most recent predecessors, Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush, in announcing the national security strategy himself. But Mr. Trump’s speech seemed oddly divorced from the 55-page document, a blueprint for American policy on issues including jihadi extremism, space exploration, bio-threats and pandemics. The disconnect between the president’s speech and the analysis in his administration’s document attests to the broader challenge his national security advisers have faced, as they have struggled to develop an intellectual framework that encompasses Mr. Trump’s unpredictable, domestically driven and Twitter-fueled approach to foreign policy. The same confusion has confronted foreign governments trying to understand Mr. Trump’s conflicting signals.
Speaking to an audience that included cabinet members and military officers, the president delivered a campaignlike address, with calls to build a wall along the nation’s southern border with Mexico and a heavy dose of self-congratulation for the bull market, the low jobless rate and tax cuts, which he said were “days away.” Mr. Trump, for example, spoke of how Russia and China “seek to challenge American influence, values and wealth.” But he made no mention of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, even though the document itself makes fleeting reference to “Russia using tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies.”
“America is in the game,” he said. “And America is going to win.” Indeed, Mr. Trump preferred to focus on a Sunday phone call from President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who thanked him for intelligence that the C.I.A. had passed on to Russian authorities, which Mr. Trump said foiled a terrorist attack in St. Petersburg that could have killed thousands of people.
Mr. Trump’s tone was decidedly more upbeat than the analysis in his own strategy. While he spoke of surging confidence and a fast-growing economy, the document describes a world that has been on a three-decade holiday from superpower rivalry, and suggests that holiday is over. “That’s a great thing,” he said, “And the way it’s supposed to work.”
“After being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned,” the document says. It then tries to lend intellectual coherence to a foreign policy that is often defined by Mr. Trump’s Twitter messages or his gut instincts about which world leaders are strong, which are weak and which are prepared to cut a deal. Outlining a national security strategy is mandated by Congress, but Mr. Trump broke with his two most recent predecessors, Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush, in announcing one himself. His aides said that reflected his enthusiastic approval of the exercise, and that the Trump administration published its strategy months earlier than either the Bush or Obama administrations.
While the document’s description of pushing back against China on trade is familiar from the campaign, its description of the challenge posed by Russia seems at odds with Mr. Trump’s own refusal to criticize Mr. Putin for his seizure of Crimea, efforts to destabilize Ukraine and his violations of a key nuclear treaty with the United States. In fact, the document describes Russia’s behavior in far more critical terms than Mr. Trump himself did. The strategy — which administration officials said was drawn from speeches that Mr. Trump had delivered during the 2016 campaign and as president while at the United Nations and on trips in Europe and Asia — ranges widely and includes jihadi extremism, space exploration, nuclear proliferation and pandemics. But it is animated by a single idea: that the world has been on a three-decade holiday from superpower rivalry, and it suggests that that holiday is now over.
China and Russia, the document says, “are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.” “After being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned,” the document says. China and Russia, it says, “are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.”
“These competitions require the United States to rethink the policies of the past two decades — policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners,” the document continues. “For the most part, this premise turned out to be false.” The document’s call to push back against China on trade is familiar from the campaign, but its description of the challenge posed by Russia seems at odds with Mr. Trump’s own refusal to criticize Mr. Putin for his seizure of Crimea, his efforts to destabilize Ukraine and his violations of a key nuclear treaty with the United States.
While Mr. Obama’s two national security strategies emphasized cooperation with allies and economic partners, Mr. Trump’s attempts to walk the line between his campaign slogan of “America First” and an insistence that he is not rejecting working with American partners — as long as they do so on terms advantageous to the United States. While Mr. Obama’s two national security strategies emphasized cooperation with allies and economic partners, Mr. Trump’s strategy attempts to walk the line between his campaign slogan of “America First” and an insistence that he is not rejecting working with American partners — as long as they do so on terms advantageous to the United States.
While Mr. Obama used his strategies to de-emphasize nuclear weapons as a key to American defense, Mr. Trump calls those weapons “the foundation of our strategy to preserve peace and stability by deterring aggression against the United States, our allies and our partners.” Mr. Trump’s strategy contains more than a few hints of a return to a Cold War view of the world. Mr. Obama used his strategies to de-emphasize nuclear weapons as a key to American defense, but Mr. Trump calls those weapons “the foundation of our strategy to preserve peace and stability by deterring aggression against the United States.”
The national security strategies of past administrations were sometimes strong predictors of future action: It was Mr. Bush’s strategy, in 2002, that revived a national debate about the justifications for pre-emptive military action. That document helped form the rationale for the invasion of Iraq six months later, arguing that the risks of inaction in the face of a major threat made “a compelling case for taking anticipatory actions to defend ourselves.” The national security strategies of past administrations were sometimes strong predictors of future action: It was Mr. Bush’s 2002 strategy that revived a national debate about the justifications for pre-emptive military action. And it helped frame the rationale for the invasion of Iraq six months later, arguing that the risks of inaction in the face of a major threat made “a compelling case for taking anticipatory actions to defend ourselves.”
The new strategy never uses the word “pre-emption,” including in its discussion of North Korea. This omission comes despite the fact that Mr. Trump’s national security adviser, Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, has said that if diplomacy and sanctions fail, “preventive war,” or a pre-emptive strike, might be needed to keep the North from attacking the United States. The new strategy never uses the word “pre-emption,” including in its discussion of North Korea. This omission comes despite the fact that Mr. Trump’s national security adviser, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, has said that if diplomacy and sanctions fail, “preventive war,” or a pre-emptive strike, might be needed to keep the North from attacking the United States.
Administration officials, previewing the document, also noted it refers to China as a “strategic competitor.” That is a radical shift from the language that the Obama administration used toward Beijing, which Mr. Obama viewed as a partner in confronting global threats, from Iran’s nuclear program to climate change. Mr. Obama viewed China as a potential partner in confronting global threats, from Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programs to climate change, although he was critical of it on human rights issues.
Mr. Bush used the phrase “strategic competitor” in reference to China when he ran for the White House in 2000, drawing a contrast with Bill Clinton, who liked to refer to China as a “strategic partner.” The Trump administration’s language suggests the United States will push back robustly on China’s state-driven economic practices and expansionist claims in the South China Sea. Mr. Trump defines China as a “revisionist” power, reflecting the administration’s worry that Beijing is trying to rewrite the rules of the post-World War II order to match its own economic interests and global ambitions. (Russia is also described as revisionist, though it does not have China’s economic reach or influence.)
Mr. Trump has tried working with China to curb North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, even setting aside his “America First” trade agenda in an effort to persuade President Xi Jinping to put more economic pressure on the government of Kim Jong-un. The Trump administration’s language suggests it will push back hard on China’s state-driven economic practices and expansionist claims in the South China Sea, while not challenging it on rights issues.
But the strategy outlined in the document suggests a return to his campaign promises, and states explicitly that “the United States will no longer turn a blind eye to violations, cheating or economic aggression.” Mr. Trump has tried working with China to curb North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, even setting aside his America First trade agenda in an effort to persuade President Xi Jinping to put more economic pressure on the government of Kim Jong-un. But the document suggests a return to his campaign promises, and states explicitly that “the United States will no longer turn a blind eye to violations, cheating or economic aggression.”
Another section refers to preserving the “national security innovation base,” at a moment the administration is considering steps to keep China from investing in promising American technology. Another section refers to preserving the “national security innovation base,” at a moment that the administration is considering steps to keep China from investing in promising American technology.
In another shift from his predecessor, Mr. Trump’s strategy does not recognize the changing climate as a threat to national security. The document instead places climate under a section on embracing “energy dominance,” and says that while “climate policies will continue to shape the global energy system,” American leadership will be “indispensable to countering an anti-growth energy agenda.”In another shift from his predecessor, Mr. Trump’s strategy does not recognize the changing climate as a threat to national security. The document instead places climate under a section on embracing “energy dominance,” and says that while “climate policies will continue to shape the global energy system,” American leadership will be “indispensable to countering an anti-growth energy agenda.”
That puts it at odds with the Pentagon, which has continued to highlight national security threats from a changing climate, including refugee flows as a result of droughts and intensifying storms and the repercussions of rising sea waters.That puts it at odds with the Pentagon, which has continued to highlight national security threats from a changing climate, including refugee flows as a result of droughts and intensifying storms and the repercussions of rising sea waters.
In some key areas, like the use of cyberattacks against the United States, the document described the problems facing the nation rather than prescribing solutions. It refers to cyberweapons as a new threat because they can strike “without ever physically crossing our borders.” In describing the use of cyberattacks against the United States, the document described the problems facing the nation rather than prescribing solutions. It refers to cyberweapons as a new threat because they can strike “without ever physically crossing our borders.”
“Deterrence today is significantly more complex to achieve than during the Cold War,” the document reads, saying a mix of inexpensive weapons and “the use of cybertools have allowed state and nonstate competitors to harm the United States across various domains.”“Deterrence today is significantly more complex to achieve than during the Cold War,” the document reads, saying a mix of inexpensive weapons and “the use of cybertools have allowed state and nonstate competitors to harm the United States across various domains.”
America’s adversaries have learned to “operate below the threshold of open military conflict and at the edges of international law,” it continues.
But the document deals with the subject at some remove, not dwelling on how Russia used cybertechniques in an attempt to interfere with the 2016 election. And it does nothing to describe any broad national strategy to guard against meddling in future elections.But the document deals with the subject at some remove, not dwelling on how Russia used cybertechniques in an attempt to interfere with the 2016 election. And it does nothing to describe any broad national strategy to guard against meddling in future elections.
Some foreign policy experts praised the report for its vigorous tone.
“It’s a robust statement of U.S. leadership on the world stage,” said Nile Gardiner, the director of the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at the Heritage Foundation. “It’s a rejection of isolationism.”
Others, however, said the disjunction between Mr. Trump and his national security team raised questions about how relevant the strategy would be.
“Who does it represent? What does it represent? How seriously should we take it?” asked Richard N. Haass, who served in the State Department during the George W. Bush administration and is now the president of the Council on Foreign Relations.
“In my experience, national security strategies have a fairly short shelf life,” Mr. Haass added. “This administration will face that reality — and then some.”