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Why Lyndon Johnson Dropped Out Why Lyndon Johnson Dropped Out
(about 2 hours later)
A half-century has passed since President Lyndon B. Johnson stunned Americans by announcing, in a televised address on March 31, 1968, that he was drastically reducing the bombing of North Vietnam, appealing to the Hanoi government for negotiations and, most incredible of all, withdrawing from the presidential election that fall. One imagines the stupefied reaction in living rooms all across the country: “Did he just say what I think he said?”A half-century has passed since President Lyndon B. Johnson stunned Americans by announcing, in a televised address on March 31, 1968, that he was drastically reducing the bombing of North Vietnam, appealing to the Hanoi government for negotiations and, most incredible of all, withdrawing from the presidential election that fall. One imagines the stupefied reaction in living rooms all across the country: “Did he just say what I think he said?”
Johnson did what modern American presidents are never supposed to do: refrain from seeking re-election. (Since World War II, only Harry Truman in 1952 has done likewise.) He feared that his health could not withstand four more years, but what really worried him was the Vietnam War and the divisions it had created. The war was not just a threat to his personal legacy; it was a threat to the very foundations of the liberal political order that he cherished so deeply and that had built so many middle-class American dreams.” Johnson did what modern American presidents are never supposed to do: refrain from seeking re-election. (Since World War II, only Harry Truman in 1952 has done likewise.) He feared that his health could not withstand four more years, but what really worried him was the Vietnam War and the divisions it had created. The war was not just a threat to his personal legacy; it was a threat to the very foundations of the liberal political order that he cherished so deeply and that had built so many middle-class American dreams.
His viewers didn’t know it, but Johnson had always suspected this moment would come. From his earliest days in office, he repeatedly told his wife, Lady Bird, and aides that he felt trapped on Vietnam, that he would be crucified for whatever he did, that the conflict in far-off Southeast Asia would ultimately be his downfall.His viewers didn’t know it, but Johnson had always suspected this moment would come. From his earliest days in office, he repeatedly told his wife, Lady Bird, and aides that he felt trapped on Vietnam, that he would be crucified for whatever he did, that the conflict in far-off Southeast Asia would ultimately be his downfall.
Already in May 1964, a year before he committed the country to large-scale war, Johnson said to his national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy: “I don’t think it’s worth fighting for and I don’t think we can get out. It’s just the biggest damned mess.” A year later, shortly before the first American ground forces set foot in Vietnam, Johnson told Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee: “There ain’t no daylight in Vietnam. There’s not a bit.”Already in May 1964, a year before he committed the country to large-scale war, Johnson said to his national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy: “I don’t think it’s worth fighting for and I don’t think we can get out. It’s just the biggest damned mess.” A year later, shortly before the first American ground forces set foot in Vietnam, Johnson told Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee: “There ain’t no daylight in Vietnam. There’s not a bit.”
Publicly, Johnson projected optimism. But the truth is that he was always a bleak skeptic on Vietnam — skeptical that it could be won, even with American air power and ground troops, especially in view of the weaknesses of the South Vietnamese military and government, and skeptical that the outcome truly mattered to American and Western security.Publicly, Johnson projected optimism. But the truth is that he was always a bleak skeptic on Vietnam — skeptical that it could be won, even with American air power and ground troops, especially in view of the weaknesses of the South Vietnamese military and government, and skeptical that the outcome truly mattered to American and Western security.
This attitude was reinforced by the opinions of people he valued. The Senate Democratic leadership on foreign policy — J. William Fulbright, Russell and Mike Mansfield, the majority leader — privately warned him in 1964 and ’65 against Americanizing the war. Allied leaders abroad did the same, as did prominent voices in the press.This attitude was reinforced by the opinions of people he valued. The Senate Democratic leadership on foreign policy — J. William Fulbright, Russell and Mike Mansfield, the majority leader — privately warned him in 1964 and ’65 against Americanizing the war. Allied leaders abroad did the same, as did prominent voices in the press.
His own vice president, Hubert H. Humphrey, a savvy politician who needed no reminder of the risks of “losing” a nation to Communism, insisted, in a memo in mid-February 1965, that the risks of escalation were far greater.His own vice president, Hubert H. Humphrey, a savvy politician who needed no reminder of the risks of “losing” a nation to Communism, insisted, in a memo in mid-February 1965, that the risks of escalation were far greater.
“If we find ourselves leading from frustration to escalation and end up short of a war with China but embroiled deeper in fighting in Vietnam over the next few months,” Humphrey warned, “political opposition will steadily mount,” because Americans had not been persuaded that a major war on behalf of an ineffectual Saigon government was justified.“If we find ourselves leading from frustration to escalation and end up short of a war with China but embroiled deeper in fighting in Vietnam over the next few months,” Humphrey warned, “political opposition will steadily mount,” because Americans had not been persuaded that a major war on behalf of an ineffectual Saigon government was justified.
At the same time, no senior military leader in 1965 offered the White House even a chance of rapid victory in Vietnam. Five years, 500,000 troops, was the general estimate Johnson heard. Where would that put the president in early 1968, as his campaign for re-election began in earnest? Right where he found himself as he sat down to deliver his announcement on March 31: in a protracted war with no end in sight.At the same time, no senior military leader in 1965 offered the White House even a chance of rapid victory in Vietnam. Five years, 500,000 troops, was the general estimate Johnson heard. Where would that put the president in early 1968, as his campaign for re-election began in earnest? Right where he found himself as he sat down to deliver his announcement on March 31: in a protracted war with no end in sight.
So why did he go in? Part of the answer, surely, is that escalation, if done quietly, gradually and without putting the nation on full war footing, offered Johnson the path of least immediate resistance (always a tempting option for a policymaker), especially in domestic political terms. Given his repeated public affirmations of Vietnam’s importance to American security, it made sense that he would remain steadfast, in the hope that the new military measures would succeed, lest he face accusations of backing down, of going soft.So why did he go in? Part of the answer, surely, is that escalation, if done quietly, gradually and without putting the nation on full war footing, offered Johnson the path of least immediate resistance (always a tempting option for a policymaker), especially in domestic political terms. Given his repeated public affirmations of Vietnam’s importance to American security, it made sense that he would remain steadfast, in the hope that the new military measures would succeed, lest he face accusations of backing down, of going soft.
More than that, Johnson made the leap because for him, “retreat” from the struggle was inconceivable. He personalized the war, saw attacks on the policy as attacks on himself, and failed to see that his landslide victory in 1964 and the international and domestic context in early 1965 gave him considerable freedom of action — a point Humphrey cogently underscored in his February memo.More than that, Johnson made the leap because for him, “retreat” from the struggle was inconceivable. He personalized the war, saw attacks on the policy as attacks on himself, and failed to see that his landslide victory in 1964 and the international and domestic context in early 1965 gave him considerable freedom of action — a point Humphrey cogently underscored in his February memo.
From Day 1 to the end, Johnson was a hawk on Vietnam, which proves again that doubting warriors can be committed warriors. He always framed his options in such a way that standing firm appeared the only reasonable choice — it was full retreat, bomb the hell out of China, or stay the course. Never did he fully explore imaginative ways out of the conflict; for him, extrication without victory signified humiliation and defeat.From Day 1 to the end, Johnson was a hawk on Vietnam, which proves again that doubting warriors can be committed warriors. He always framed his options in such a way that standing firm appeared the only reasonable choice — it was full retreat, bomb the hell out of China, or stay the course. Never did he fully explore imaginative ways out of the conflict; for him, extrication without victory signified humiliation and defeat.
This didn’t mean Johnson rejected all talk of negotiations. After mid-1965 he pressed Under Secretary of State George Ball for new diplomatic ideas — although, as Ball later remarked, “he really meant merely new channels and procedures.”This didn’t mean Johnson rejected all talk of negotiations. After mid-1965 he pressed Under Secretary of State George Ball for new diplomatic ideas — although, as Ball later remarked, “he really meant merely new channels and procedures.”
When negotiations with North Vietnam at last began in Paris in May 1968, Johnson took a firm line. He also continued the bombing and increased it below the 19th Parallel and in Laos. In the 10 months from March 1 to Dec. 31, 1968, the Pentagon dropped a greater tonnage of bombs on Indochina than had been expended in the three years prior. This expanded bombing, Daniel Ellsberg hauntingly concludes in his memoir of the war, was “obediently carried out” by men from Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford “on down to flight crews, who believed it served no national purpose whatever.” When negotiations with North Vietnam at last began in Paris in May 1968, Johnson took a firm line. He also continued the bombing and indeed increased it below the 19th Parallel and in Laos. In the 10 months from March 1 to Dec. 31, 1968, the Pentagon dropped a greater tonnage of bombs on Indochina than had been expended in the three years prior. This expanded bombing, Daniel Ellsberg hauntingly concludes in his memoir of the war, was “obediently carried out” by men from Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford “on down to flight crews, who believed it served no national purpose whatever.”
Humphrey won the Democratic nomination in 1968, yet Johnson was reluctant to throw his full support behind him, privately accusing the vice president of being cowardly and disloyal whenever he expressed a desire to move policy even modestly in a dovish direction. Some part of Johnson preferred to see Richard Nixon as his successor, expecting, with reason, that the Republican would be more resolute than Humphrey in pursuing the war.Humphrey won the Democratic nomination in 1968, yet Johnson was reluctant to throw his full support behind him, privately accusing the vice president of being cowardly and disloyal whenever he expressed a desire to move policy even modestly in a dovish direction. Some part of Johnson preferred to see Richard Nixon as his successor, expecting, with reason, that the Republican would be more resolute than Humphrey in pursuing the war.
And so it ended, the saga of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, its denouement having been anticipated by him at the beginning. He was a man who dreamed big dreams for the Great Society, who hoped that his prodigious efforts on civil rights, voting rights, education and Medicare would earn him a place alongside Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt — and who anticipated from the start that Vietnam would ruin it all.And so it ended, the saga of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, its denouement having been anticipated by him at the beginning. He was a man who dreamed big dreams for the Great Society, who hoped that his prodigious efforts on civil rights, voting rights, education and Medicare would earn him a place alongside Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt — and who anticipated from the start that Vietnam would ruin it all.
It bears all the markings of tragedy, but of a certain kind, more Shakespearean than Greek, more Macbeth than Agamemnon. Whereas for the Greek playwrights the universe tends to be deterministic, the hero at the mercy of forces beyond his control, for Shakespeare the tragedy lies in the very choices the protagonist makes. His Macbeth is no mere victim; he contributes to his own demise. The same must be said of Lyndon Johnson.It bears all the markings of tragedy, but of a certain kind, more Shakespearean than Greek, more Macbeth than Agamemnon. Whereas for the Greek playwrights the universe tends to be deterministic, the hero at the mercy of forces beyond his control, for Shakespeare the tragedy lies in the very choices the protagonist makes. His Macbeth is no mere victim; he contributes to his own demise. The same must be said of Lyndon Johnson.
For those seeking symbols there is, finally, this: On Jan. 22, 1973, Johnson died at his Texas ranch, two days after hearing Nixon, in his second inaugural address, hint at cuts to the Great Society and remind Americans how far they had come from that bleak time in 1968, when they faced “the prospect of seemingly endless war abroad and of destructive conflict at home.” The next day, Nixon announced a deal had been reached in Paris to end the war and “bring peace with honor.”For those seeking symbols there is, finally, this: On Jan. 22, 1973, Johnson died at his Texas ranch, two days after hearing Nixon, in his second inaugural address, hint at cuts to the Great Society and remind Americans how far they had come from that bleak time in 1968, when they faced “the prospect of seemingly endless war abroad and of destructive conflict at home.” The next day, Nixon announced a deal had been reached in Paris to end the war and “bring peace with honor.”