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Incident commander felt 'helpless' as Grenfell Tower burned Incident commander felt 'helpless' as Grenfell Tower burned
(about 3 hours later)
The incident commander in the first hour of the Grenfell Tower fire felt “helpless” as the fire raged out of control and questioned why he was left in charge of a blaze that should have been commanded by a more senior officer, the Grenfell inquiry has heard.The incident commander in the first hour of the Grenfell Tower fire felt “helpless” as the fire raged out of control and questioned why he was left in charge of a blaze that should have been commanded by a more senior officer, the Grenfell inquiry has heard.
Michael Dowden, a firefighter for 14 years and a watch manager at North Kensington fire station, was in charge of the response at Grenfell for the first hour, in which time the full height of the building became engulfed in flames.Michael Dowden, a firefighter for 14 years and a watch manager at North Kensington fire station, was in charge of the response at Grenfell for the first hour, in which time the full height of the building became engulfed in flames.
He questioned whether he was “the most experienced officer, the right and proper officer on that night”, adding that even as he saw people emerging with blackened faces and coughing and spluttering he did not consider discussing with the control room whether to change the “stay put” advice given to the tower’s occupants.He questioned whether he was “the most experienced officer, the right and proper officer on that night”, adding that even as he saw people emerging with blackened faces and coughing and spluttering he did not consider discussing with the control room whether to change the “stay put” advice given to the tower’s occupants.
The fire was consuming the tower so rapidly that by 1.28am – 34 minutes after the first 999 call – Dowden had ordered 15 fire engines to the fire. Under London fire brigade rules, he should not have been incident commander in charge of a fire with more than four pumps. Ordering 10 and 15 pumps to a fire should be a decision made by a LFB deputy assistant commissioner, a much more senior firefighter. The fire was consuming the tower so rapidly that by 1.28am – 34 minutes after the first 999 call – Dowden had ordered 15 fire engines to the scene. Under London fire brigade rules, he should not have been incident commander in charge of a fire with more than four pumps. Ordering 10 and 15 pumps to a fire should be a decision made by a LFB deputy assistant commissioner, a much more senior firefighter.
Of the moment he had to order eight pumps, he said: “I have never been an incident commander and had to make that rapid increase in resource before.”Of the moment he had to order eight pumps, he said: “I have never been an incident commander and had to make that rapid increase in resource before.”
The inquiry heard he was being told by less senior firefighters to order resources. Dowden was overwhelmed by emotion when Richard Millett QC, counsel to the inquiry, started to ask him about a victim called Jessica, and he had to halt his evidence. One of the counsel to the inquiry read out the rest of his statement, which detailed how he saw people banging at windows for help, he watched children being carried out in breathing apparatus sets and how the smoke was so toxic inside the building “two mouthfuls of that air would cause them to become unconscious, which unfortunately did occur”.
When he ordered that it was a 10-pump fire another firefighter, Chris Secrett, told him: “I would make it 15 to 20 because it looks like we’re losing it,” according to Secrett’s witness statement. Dowden was praised for his three days of evidence by Sir Martin Moore-Bick, the inquiry chairman, who said he had shown “courage and candour”. Afterwards he said these remarks had caused concern, apparently from some inquiry participants, and he made clear that they would not prejudice his view of Dowden’s evidence.
The inquiry saw notes from a meeting shortly after the disaster in which Dowden told his superiors: “All of my experience had now gone out of the window. Very daunting moment. I felt helpless.” There was widespread support for Dowden online, with his sister, Jane Dowden, tweeting: “The bravest man I know and so very proud to call him my brother. #IAmMichaelDowden.” The hashtag was widely shared.
Asked about this by Richard Millett QC, counsel to the inquiry, he said: “There probably was moments when I did feel helpless. It’s a very difficult place to be as an incident commander ... it’s just relentless. This was like nothing else I have ever experienced before. The ferocity of the way that fire was developing was just relentless.” Dowden admitted he felt out of his depth and the inquiry heard that during the first hour of the response he was told by less senior firefighters he was not ordering enough resources.
He continued: “I have had some searching moments whether I was the most experienced officer, the right and proper officer on that night because I’ve got some fantastic colleagues around me in the London fire brigade who are very experienced in what they do.” When he ordered that it was a 10-pump fire, another firefighter, Chris Secrett, told him: “I would make it 15 to 20 because it looks like we’re losing it,” according to Secrett’s witness statement.
Dowden told the inquiry: “There probably was moments when I did feel helpless. It’s a very difficult place to be as an incident commander ... it’s just relentless. This was like nothing else I have ever experienced before. The ferocity of the way that fire was developing was just relentless.”
He said there was a “pivotal change” when he saw residents leaving the building, including a father and son coming out suffering smoke inhalation.He said there was a “pivotal change” when he saw residents leaving the building, including a father and son coming out suffering smoke inhalation.
“At that point I realised that there were potentially people involved … The primary role of the London fire brigade is to save life, so as soon as I became aware, from my point of view as incident commander I could see people were subject to smoke inhalation, that’s a big change.” But he admitted that even though he had seen people coming out blackened and coughing, he did not think about the possibility that the fire would spread internally beyond its original compartment in flat 16.
Cross-examined about his thoughts on ordering an evacuation, he admitted that even though he had seen people coming out blackened and coughing, he did not think about the possibility that the fire would spread internally beyond its original compartment in flat 16. He said evacuation was an “impossible situation” and he had not thought about contacting the control centre to change the fire survival advice to residents from “stay put”.
He said evacuation was an “impossible situation” and he had not thought about contacting the control centre to change the fire survival advice to residents. He said he had never been in a position before to change the “stay put” advice. By 1.35am he had ordered the fire needed 25 pumps but admitted to the inquiry that he had no plan of what to do with the additional resources.
He said he had never been in a position before to change the “stay put” advice and that at 1.29am, with the flames at or close to the top of the tower, he said he had no thoughts on whether the building was failing. By 1.35am he had ordered the fire needed 25 pumps but admitted to the inquiry that he had no plan of what to do with the additional resources.
At 1.35am a fire and rescue unit from Paddington arrived, equipped with extended breathing apparatus and specialist rescue equipment. Dowden detailed its commander to go up to roof level “to try and facilitate some drencher system utilising the fire brigade hose to try and extinguish the fire from the top of the building”. But that did not actually happen.At 1.35am a fire and rescue unit from Paddington arrived, equipped with extended breathing apparatus and specialist rescue equipment. Dowden detailed its commander to go up to roof level “to try and facilitate some drencher system utilising the fire brigade hose to try and extinguish the fire from the top of the building”. But that did not actually happen.
Dowden thought they could go up the internal staircase, but had no information about the safety of the staircase. “I felt as the incident commander my professional but moral obligation to try and do something ... try to think of something,” he said.Dowden thought they could go up the internal staircase, but had no information about the safety of the staircase. “I felt as the incident commander my professional but moral obligation to try and do something ... try to think of something,” he said.
He was asked if he considered declaring it a major incident. He said he did not, because he was “totally consumed by everything that was going on” around him.He was asked if he considered declaring it a major incident. He said he did not, because he was “totally consumed by everything that was going on” around him.
When an aerial appliance arrived from Paddington, Dowden decided it should be used to douse the building’s east elevation, which had flames all the way to the top, rather than rescue occupants. However, the ladder could only reach 10 storeys and apply water up to four or five further storeys.When an aerial appliance arrived from Paddington, Dowden decided it should be used to douse the building’s east elevation, which had flames all the way to the top, rather than rescue occupants. However, the ladder could only reach 10 storeys and apply water up to four or five further storeys.
The inquiry also heard that even though Dowden was the incident commander, he did not recall receiving messages from other firefighters. He was relieved of his command when senior officers arrived at 1.50am.
These included that two of the firefighters in the building “looked spooked and thought something was amiss”, while another had found black smoke on the 16th floor and expressed deep concern.
Dowden said he did not recall receiving these messages and others including that two people were unable to leave on the 11th and 16th floors, that the lobbies of the fifth and sixth floors were “completely smoked out”, that two people had been rescued on the 16th floor, and on the 14th floor numerous people had been found in heavy smoke.
At the opening of the his third day of evidence, Millett told him: “You have shown great courage in coming here and answering them in the way that you have and I hope, we hope, as the inquiry team, that the firefighters who follow you to give evidence to this inquiry will follow your example.”
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