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London fire brigade chief denies she should have expected Grenfell
Fire chief: I would change nothing about Grenfell response
(about 5 hours later)
The London fire brigade commissioner, Dany Cotton, has claimed the ferocity of the Grenfell Tower fire was so unexpected that it was like “the space shuttle landing on the Shard”, even though she conceded that the brigade knew about the risk of cladding fires nine months before the blaze.
The London fire brigade commissioner, Dany Cotton, has said she would not change anything about the way the brigade responded to the Grenfell Tower disaster, in defensive testimony that angered survivors and the bereaved.
Giving evidence in front of a packed inquiry room, Cotton admitted she did not know about an internal fire brigade presentation detailing the risks. Survivors of the June 2017 disaster, which killed 72 people, and the bereaved listened as she also admitted that she did not know about several facade fires around the world that had happened before Grenfell.
Despite weeks of evidence from other firefighters about a lack of breathing apparatus, broken radio communications, a delay in ordering an evacuation and an absence of previous checks on the building, Cotton told the public inquiry into the blaze: “I wouldn’t change anything we did on the night.”
The most senior firefighter in London said she had never experienced in her 30-year LFB career the kind of widespread compartmentation failure in a high-rise residential block that happened at Grenfell or received training in spread of fire through cladding or facades, as happened on 14 June 2017.
The remark came at the end of six hours of testimony and stunned many in the inquiry room. Natasha Elcock, the chair of the Grenfell United residents group, said it was “heartbreaking and disrespectful” to the dead.
But the inquiry was shown an October 2016 slideshow prepared by LFB fire engineers and shared among LFB safety officers at the time when Cotton was director of safety and assurance which detailed many such fires and the risks. It was titled Tall Building Facades and showed photographs of cladding fires around the world. It warned “new construction materials and methods of construction are being used in facades and with a limited understanding of their fire behaviour/ performance” and that “there is a need to understand what products are being used in the facade system and their fire behaviour and if they are used appropriately and meet the relevant guidance. These could affect the way fires develop and spread in a building.”
Tiago Alves, who escaped with his family from the 13th floor, said that if Cotton did not think anything needed to change then “if another Grenfell happens tomorrow, the brigade would not be prepared.”
Cotton said she did not see the presentation and said that even since Grenfell she only “looked through it but I’ve not studied it in detail”.
Cotton instead mounted a defence of her firefighters, saying: “Without exception my firefighters and my officers and my control staff performed in a fantastic way given the incredible circumstances they faced. They were put in an untenable situation in a building that behaved in a way it should never have done.”
She said she did not know why it was not distributed to watch managers or seen by her.
But Elcock said that while the firefighters had been very brave and saved lives, “mistakes were made with tragic results. It’s disappointing and frustrating that the head of the fire service cannot accept those failings and learn from them.”
Richard Millett QC, counsel to the inquiry, asked if that did not “indicate a structural or cultural failure” whereby insufficient attention was being paid to the science of fire safety at the LFB.
Cotton, who has 30 years’ experience in the LFB, arrived at Grenfell at 2.49am on the night of the fire, 14 June 2017, by which time the blaze was out of control. She told the inquiry it looked like a scene from the film The Towering Inferno.
She said it did not.
When Richard Millett QC, counsel to the inquiry, pressed her on the LFB’s preparedness for a high-rise cladding fire, Cotton repeatedly said it would have been impossible to prepare because the way the building behaved was so unexpected. “I wouldn’t develop a training package for a space shuttle landing on the Shard,” she told the inquiry.
Millett asked: “Was this [Grenfell] not the unexpected which you should be expecting?”
Millett suggested the fire was not as unusual as that analogy suggested. He asked Cotton whether she knew about several overseas cladding-related fires that had taken place before Grenfell, and she said she did not.
She replied: “I wouldn’t develop a training package for a space shuttle landing on the Shard.”
He showed her a slideshow prepared by LFB fire engineers in October 2016, when Cotton was director of safety and assurance. It was titled Tall Building Facades and showed photographs of cladding fires. It warned of “a need to understand what products are being used in the facade system and their fire behaviour … These could affect the way fires develop and spread in a building.”
Cotton insisted repeatedly there was no way firefighters could be expected to know if cladding was flammable and claimed that even if they did know they would not have been able to put the fire out. She insisted it was the responsibility of building inspectors, designers and builders to ensure that buildings performed as they should to allow firefighters to extinguish fires and rescue people.
Cotton said she had not seen the presentation. Since Grenfell she had “looked through it but I’ve not studied it in detail”. She said she did not know why it had not been distributed to watch managers or seen by her.
Earlier she also admitted that she had not read 2014 government operational guidance for fire and rescue authorities about fighting fires in high-rise buildings.
Millett asked whether that indicated a “structural or cultural failure” whereby insufficient attention was being paid to the science of fire safety at the LFB. She said it did not.
It says: “Combustible material in voids and cavities and poor quality of construction can also contribute to the spread of fire and smoke beyond the compartment of origin.”
Cotton said she had never in her 30-year LFB career experienced the kind of widespread compartmentation failure in a high-rise residential block that happened at Grenfell or received training in fire spread through facades.
She said she knew this and it was something that officers were trained to watch out for, but it would be impossible to train officers to recognise poor quality construction.
She said she had not read the 2014 government operational guidance for fire and rescue authorities about fighting fires in high-rise buildings. She said she had never experienced a fire where fire survival guidance calls were being made to 999 by people inside burning buildings or being evacuated down a single stairwell.
The section on familiarisation visits expected to be made by firefighters says: “Information to be gathered should include: building construction features such as … the presence of sandwich panels, timber framing, cladding systems.”
Cotton conceded that the brigade knew about the risk of cladding fires nine months before the blaze, but said it was the responsibility of building inspectors, designers and builders to ensure buildings performed to allow firefighters to extinguish fires and rescue people.
Cotton said she did not know that “specifics around cladding” were expected to be gathered but said it would be “almost impossible” to see what was being used unless it was obvious, like timber.
During the fire Cotton was the monitoring officer, which she said meant she was to provide support, guidance and reassurance to the incident commander. She said she did not take command herself because she was satisfied with the firefighting plan. She could not remember the last time she had received training in operational incident command.
Cotton is the last of 77 members of the London Fire Brigade, including call handlers, to give evidence to the inquiry.
Cotton said she had felt she was not fully doing her job as monitoring officer, particularly when, as the night progressed, she found herself comforting firefighters. “I’ve never seen a situation on the fire ground where firefighters were openly crying and distressed,” she said
“People will quite rightly have questions, but for me I could not be more proud of the absolute commitment and dedication of the firefighters,” she said, adding she would have been terrified if she had been a firefighter on the upper floors.
Millett asked about “serious failures” in the LFB’s preparedness. Cotton admitted there was a “woefully inadequate” amount of information about Grenfell Tower available on the brigade’s database.
“But they did it,” she said. “They went in there, they worked as hard as they could to rescue as many people as they could. The difficult bit now is about people levelling criticism at them, when they put their lives on the line.”
Under a “plans and images” section there was just one aerial picture of the tower’s roof. The “tactical plan” for firefighting on the tower was dated 2009, seven years before a refurbishment had been completed, and had no tactics on it.
She described how as the night progressed she comforted “firefighters broken down in my arms, firefighters I never met before … I’ve never seen a situation on the fire ground where firefighters were openly crying and distressed.”
“It’s not ideal to have essentially no operational contingency plan on your [system], is it?” Millett asked. “Not at all,” Cotton replied.
She was asked about “serious failures” in the LFB’s preparedness.
In a statement she gave to a police investigation into the fire, Cotton said: “I have had issues with my memory, which I believe is linked to the traumatic nature and sheer scale of the incident. I’m still finding it very difficult to look at visual images and have conversations about Grenfell.
She admitted a “woefully inadequate” amount of information about Grenfell Tower was available on the brigade’s database, which firefighters access via the ORD system. The inquiry was shown how under a “plans and images” section there was just one aerial picture of the tower’s roof which was of little use. The “tactical plan” for firefighting on the tower was dated 2009, seven years before the refurbishment had been completed, and had no tactics on it.
“I’m still responsible for effectively running the London fire brigade, and everything else that’s involved in that. It would be no good for me to fall apart.”
“It’s not ideal to have essentially no operational contingency plan on your ORD is it?” asked Millett.
Grenfell Tower inquiry
“Not at all,” replied Cotton.
She said this was a failure but not a serious one. Firefighters knew enough about the building “to do our best to respond to a terrible situation that we should never have been placed in”, she said. The fact that detailed plans of the building were not available to firefighters, however, she said was a serious failure.
During the fire, Cotton’s role was as monitoring officer which she said meant she was to provide support, guidance and reassurance to the incident commander. One of her operational roles was “to take command and manage major operational incidents as required”, the inquiry heard. She did not take control because she said she was satisfied with the firefighting plan.
Asked about training in incident operational firefighting, she said: “I haven’t actually received training for a while because in the role I am in now … I can’t remember the last time I specifically had training.”
She said she had never experienced widespread compartmentation failure in a high-rise residential block and had no training in spread of fire through cladding or facades. She also said she had never experienced a fire where fire survival guidance calls were being made to 999 from people inside burning buildings. Neither had she ever evacuated residents down a single stairwell.
Her statement to police investigating the fire was published by the inquiry and described how she was asleep when she was alerted to the fire at 2.03am at her home 21 miles away.
She arrived at 2.49am, almost two hours after the fire started. She recalled how she was on the phone to her director of operations, Tom George, who was on holiday in the Caribbean and had called her. She said to him: “What the fuck? This can’t actually be happening; I can’t believe what I’m seeing,” she said. “It just looked like something from a disaster movie. Like a hideous mixture of Towering Inferno and a video I was shown in training school of a high-rise fire in São Paulo where people jumped to escape.”
She said: “I have had issues with my memory, which I believe is linked to the traumatic nature and sheer scale of the incident. I deliberately didn’t write any notes at the time of the incident, because I had such poor recall of the night’s events and I’d hoped they would improve.
“I’m still finding it very difficult to look at visual images and have conversations about Grenfell. I’m still responsible for effectively running the London fire brigade, and everything else that’s involved in that. It would be no good for me to fall apart.”
