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| What Happens When Our Leaders Lack Moral Courage | What Happens When Our Leaders Lack Moral Courage |
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| Over the years, thousands of cadets at the United States Military Academy, myself included, have memorized and recited West Point’s Cadet Prayer. “Make us to choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong,” the prayer goes, “and never to be content with a half-truth when the whole can be won. Endow us with courage that is born of loyalty to all that is noble and worthy, that scorns to compromise with vice and injustice, and knows no fear when truth and right are in jeopardy.” | Over the years, thousands of cadets at the United States Military Academy, myself included, have memorized and recited West Point’s Cadet Prayer. “Make us to choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong,” the prayer goes, “and never to be content with a half-truth when the whole can be won. Endow us with courage that is born of loyalty to all that is noble and worthy, that scorns to compromise with vice and injustice, and knows no fear when truth and right are in jeopardy.” |
| The prayer describes the value of acting for good, and how moral authority is itself the deepest source of power. Cadets are taught that one’s values ought to be the primary reason to seek power, and its only justification for use. This is the essence of the “courage” described in the prayer, the courage that should be a part of every leader’s core. | The prayer describes the value of acting for good, and how moral authority is itself the deepest source of power. Cadets are taught that one’s values ought to be the primary reason to seek power, and its only justification for use. This is the essence of the “courage” described in the prayer, the courage that should be a part of every leader’s core. |
| But we as a nation and as leaders have not always demonstrated this courage. Two major events in my career illustrate when we acted for good with our values in mind, and when we did not. | But we as a nation and as leaders have not always demonstrated this courage. Two major events in my career illustrate when we acted for good with our values in mind, and when we did not. |
| On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Juvénal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, the Hutu presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, was shot down over Kigali, the Rwandan capital. Their assassinations sparked a campaign of ethnic cleansing whose scope and brutality would shock the world. Early in the crisis, the American government expressed concern and called on Hutu authorities in Rwanda to halt the unfolding genocide. Washington pleaded for the United Nations to reinforce its small peacekeeping force in Rwanda to end the slaughter. But that was the extent of it. | On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Juvénal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, the Hutu presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, was shot down over Kigali, the Rwandan capital. Their assassinations sparked a campaign of ethnic cleansing whose scope and brutality would shock the world. Early in the crisis, the American government expressed concern and called on Hutu authorities in Rwanda to halt the unfolding genocide. Washington pleaded for the United Nations to reinforce its small peacekeeping force in Rwanda to end the slaughter. But that was the extent of it. |
| At the time I served as the director for strategic plans and policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In response to a request from Madeleine Albright, then ambassador to the United Nations, my staff and I submitted a military concept plan to halt the Rwandan genocide. But it went nowhere. A common refrain we heard was: “Do you really think Congress would authorize 20,000 troops and $2 billion in the heart of Africa?” Over the following months, my staff and many others in the government read and discussed the accounts of the atrocities in Africa with growing horror. | At the time I served as the director for strategic plans and policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In response to a request from Madeleine Albright, then ambassador to the United Nations, my staff and I submitted a military concept plan to halt the Rwandan genocide. But it went nowhere. A common refrain we heard was: “Do you really think Congress would authorize 20,000 troops and $2 billion in the heart of Africa?” Over the following months, my staff and many others in the government read and discussed the accounts of the atrocities in Africa with growing horror. |
| In the early moments of the crisis, the United States failed, despite its unchallenged power in the world, to act decisively and intercede. Eventually some 800,000 men, women and children were killed in Rwanda in hideous ways. | In the early moments of the crisis, the United States failed, despite its unchallenged power in the world, to act decisively and intercede. Eventually some 800,000 men, women and children were killed in Rwanda in hideous ways. |
| America’s failure was deeply unsettling. By 1994 the Cold War was over and the Soviet Union had collapsed; democracy had been restored in Panama; Saddam Hussein had been kicked out of Kuwait; and now, under a new and young President Bill Clinton, we were the world’s lone superpower. Yet did we not have the power to stop the mass murder in Rwanda? Could we not stop it with the United Nations? Not with our armed forces? | America’s failure was deeply unsettling. By 1994 the Cold War was over and the Soviet Union had collapsed; democracy had been restored in Panama; Saddam Hussein had been kicked out of Kuwait; and now, under a new and young President Bill Clinton, we were the world’s lone superpower. Yet did we not have the power to stop the mass murder in Rwanda? Could we not stop it with the United Nations? Not with our armed forces? |
| With regard to the Rwandan genocide, we hadn’t been wise or compassionate. We hadn’t acted on our values. But many of us became determined to never let something like this happen again. | With regard to the Rwandan genocide, we hadn’t been wise or compassionate. We hadn’t acted on our values. But many of us became determined to never let something like this happen again. |
| The next year, in the midst of the Bosnian war, Bosnian Serb soldiers seized the United Nations-designated “safe area” of Srebrenica and massacred some 8,000 Muslim men and boys. The United States called on NATO for a response plan and renewed diplomatic efforts led by Richard Holbrooke, the assistant secretary of state, to end the fighting. Soon the Serbs struck at Bosnian civilians again, this time with a mortar attack on a crowded marketplace, and the Atlantic alliance responded with air power. | The next year, in the midst of the Bosnian war, Bosnian Serb soldiers seized the United Nations-designated “safe area” of Srebrenica and massacred some 8,000 Muslim men and boys. The United States called on NATO for a response plan and renewed diplomatic efforts led by Richard Holbrooke, the assistant secretary of state, to end the fighting. Soon the Serbs struck at Bosnian civilians again, this time with a mortar attack on a crowded marketplace, and the Atlantic alliance responded with air power. |
| Three years of conflict in the former Yugoslavia had left more than 100,000 people dead, displaced perhaps two million more and threatened the peace and stability of the post-Cold War world. President Clinton’s determination to end the war, backed by airstrikes and skillful diplomacy, led to the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the fighting in Bosnia. Our resolve had been tested, and American leadership brought the fighting to an end. | Three years of conflict in the former Yugoslavia had left more than 100,000 people dead, displaced perhaps two million more and threatened the peace and stability of the post-Cold War world. President Clinton’s determination to end the war, backed by airstrikes and skillful diplomacy, led to the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the fighting in Bosnia. Our resolve had been tested, and American leadership brought the fighting to an end. |
| “When you can make a difference, you should,” Mr. Clinton used to say. We had,but beneath the achievements of Dayton lay the guilt over Rwanda. I had seen the ruins of shell-blasted Mostar, and listened as Bosnian leaders described the torture and rape their people had endured. We knew what the consequences would be if we failed to act. | “When you can make a difference, you should,” Mr. Clinton used to say. We had,but beneath the achievements of Dayton lay the guilt over Rwanda. I had seen the ruins of shell-blasted Mostar, and listened as Bosnian leaders described the torture and rape their people had endured. We knew what the consequences would be if we failed to act. |
| Three years later, the next chapter of Serb ethnic cleansing began, this time in a corner of Serbia known as Kosovo, the vast majority of whose inhabitants were Albanians. The Albanians fought back, and once again the Atlantic alliance was called upon to intervene. But the Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic pushed ahead with his atrocities despite the threat of airstrikes. As NATO’s supreme allied commander in Europe, I was responsible for the operation there. | Three years later, the next chapter of Serb ethnic cleansing began, this time in a corner of Serbia known as Kosovo, the vast majority of whose inhabitants were Albanians. The Albanians fought back, and once again the Atlantic alliance was called upon to intervene. But the Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic pushed ahead with his atrocities despite the threat of airstrikes. As NATO’s supreme allied commander in Europe, I was responsible for the operation there. |
| By late March 1999, Mr. Holbrooke’s diplomatic efforts had failed. Based on the advice of many of us, and his own judgment, of course, the president ordered the first airstrikes on March 24. | By late March 1999, Mr. Holbrooke’s diplomatic efforts had failed. Based on the advice of many of us, and his own judgment, of course, the president ordered the first airstrikes on March 24. |
| Not everyone in Washington saw the urgency in Kosovo. The Balkans was a distant problem, and some politicians and pundits wondered if America had any real interests there. Others viewed the Dayton agreement as a partisan, not American, achievement, and wanted nothing to do with the Balkans. | Not everyone in Washington saw the urgency in Kosovo. The Balkans was a distant problem, and some politicians and pundits wondered if America had any real interests there. Others viewed the Dayton agreement as a partisan, not American, achievement, and wanted nothing to do with the Balkans. |
| But the resolve of our NATO coalition, and that of the government, held. After 11 weeks of intensifying strikes and discussion of a ground campaign — along with an international diplomatic effort organized by the United States and led by Finland and Russia — President Milosevic folded. Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo, and under the watch of a NATO peacekeeping force, 1.4 million displaced Albanians eventually returned to their homes. Today, Kosovo is an independent nation. | But the resolve of our NATO coalition, and that of the government, held. After 11 weeks of intensifying strikes and discussion of a ground campaign — along with an international diplomatic effort organized by the United States and led by Finland and Russia — President Milosevic folded. Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo, and under the watch of a NATO peacekeeping force, 1.4 million displaced Albanians eventually returned to their homes. Today, Kosovo is an independent nation. |
| The group of Americans who ended the fighting and murder there acted for good, and demonstrated moral authority. We exercised our power effectively. | The group of Americans who ended the fighting and murder there acted for good, and demonstrated moral authority. We exercised our power effectively. |
| There were consequences, of course. The American-led actions in the Balkans provided China and Russia with excuses for later military buildups and more assertive policies. And Kosovo, after achieving independence, still faces hostility from Serbia and its friends. Perhaps we could have been more farsighted and acted to mitigate these effects. | |
| But NATO and the United States achieved their primary goal: halting the ethnic cleansing. And we succeeded because in the Balkans, unlike in Rwanda, we had acted with the “courage that is born of loyalty to all that is noble and worthy.” This was the true source of our power. | But NATO and the United States achieved their primary goal: halting the ethnic cleansing. And we succeeded because in the Balkans, unlike in Rwanda, we had acted with the “courage that is born of loyalty to all that is noble and worthy.” This was the true source of our power. |
| Retired Gen. Wesley K. Clark is a former NATO supreme allied commander. He is a senior fellow at the Burkle Center for International Relations at UCLA and chief executive of Renew America Together. | Retired Gen. Wesley K. Clark is a former NATO supreme allied commander. He is a senior fellow at the Burkle Center for International Relations at UCLA and chief executive of Renew America Together. |
| Now in print: “Modern Ethics in 77 Arguments,” and “The Stone Reader: Modern Philosophy in 133 Arguments,” with essays from the series, edited by Peter Catapano and Simon Critchley, published by Liveright Books. | Now in print: “Modern Ethics in 77 Arguments,” and “The Stone Reader: Modern Philosophy in 133 Arguments,” with essays from the series, edited by Peter Catapano and Simon Critchley, published by Liveright Books. |
| The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com. | The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com. |
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