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The military crackdown in Sudan lays bare the dark heart of Bashir’s regime The military crackdown in Sudan lays bare the dark heart of Bashir’s regime
(32 minutes later)
Even though it was not unexpected, it is still horrifying. To assume that the Sudanese revolution would manage to topple not only Omar al-Bashir, but also uproot the deeply entrenched network of military and security interests behind him was always optimistic. But the success of the protests so far and the size, consistency and willpower of the protesters’ efforts offered a glimmer of hope that while civilians were negotiating with the transitional military government to end military rule, their leverage in the streets was strong. Even though it was not unexpected, it is still horrifying. To assume that the Sudanese revolution would manage to topple not only Omar al-Bashir, but also uproot the deeply entrenched network of military and security interests behind him was always optimistic. But the success of the protests so far, and the extent and consistency of the protesters’ efforts, offered a glimmer of hope that while civilians were negotiating with the transitional military government to end military rule, their leverage in the streets was strong.
But it became obvious that the military regime and its associated security bodies were simply playing for time. They have finally run out of patience. On Monday night the massacre began. The Rapid Support Forces, the paramilitary shadow army created from the remnants of the infamous Janjaweed militia, moved against the main protest sit-in areas in Khartoum and opened fire. The troops burned the encampments, beat whoever they did not kill, and blocked roads and hospitals so that medical support could not reach the wounded and the dying. There are reports of rape, pillage, and bodies of the executed floating in the river Nile. It became obvious, however, that the military regime and its associated security bodies were simply playing for time. And they have finally run out of patience. On Monday night the massacre began. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary groupcreated from the remnants of the infamous Janjaweed militia, moved against the main areas where sit-ins were occuring in Khartoum and opened fire. The troops burned the encampments, beat whoever they did not kill, and blockaded roads and hospitals so that medical support could not reach the wounded and the dying. There are reports of rape, pillage, and the bodies of the executed floating in the river Nile.
The country was then plunged into a communications blackout, with sporadic access to the internet only resulting in howls of bereavement and desperation as faces of missing loved ones were circulated on social media. The body count continues to rise; the last official count was 31, but dozens more are missing and hundreds injured. These are unfamiliar scenes in Khartoum. The country was then plunged into a communications blackout, with sporadic access to the internet only producing howls of bereavement and desperation as faces of missing loved ones were circulated on social media. The body count continues to rise; the last official figure was 31, but dozens more are missing and hundreds injured.
In Darfur, where the Janjaweed originated, and in other parts of Sudan from where Bashir’s government, holed up in the garrison city of Khartoum, dispatched the mercenaries to violently suppress rebellion, they have been commonplace. But the rebellion finally came to Khartoum, and so the Janjaweed, briefly restrained by the military and led effectively by the deputy leader of the transitional government, were unmuzzled to do what they do best – scorched-earth suppression. These are unfamiliar scenes in Khartoum. In Darfur, where the Janjaweed originated, and in other parts of Sudan from where Bashir’s government, holed up in the garrison city of Khartoum, dispatched mercenaries to violently suppress rebellion, they were commonplace. But rebellion has finally come to Khartoum, and so the Janjaweed, briefly restrained by the military and led by the deputy leader of the transitional government, were unmuzzled to do what they do best – scorched-earth suppression.
Sudan, Algeria, Libya: new Arab spring stalls as Trump looks awaySudan, Algeria, Libya: new Arab spring stalls as Trump looks away
It was always clear that the Sudanese revolution was going to be a long one of attrition. Sudanese protesters were even praised for their canny maturity in understanding that, even though the dictator had been toppled, there would be no returning home until the military returned to the barracks. There would be no hoodwinking them with transitional periods and election promises only made to give the “new” military government time to bed in. But the immensity of the task has quickly become clear. It was always clear that the Sudanese revolution was going to be a long process of attrition. Sudanese protesters were praised for their canny maturity in understanding that, even though the dictator had been toppled, there would be no returning home until the military went back to the barracks. There would be no hoodwinking them with transitional periods and election promises only made in order to give the “new” military government time to bed in. But the immensity of the task has quickly become clear.
Bashir’s regime had not only impoverished the country and murdered its restive and marginalised ethnicities, it had created an entire parallel security infrastructure, outside the army, one that grew from an informal ragtag group of village-torchers, to a large organised body with its own culture, its own economy, its own grudges against the coddled elites of Khartoum – even its own foreign policy and funding. An organised body that seems to relish the opportunity to show those comfortable Khartoum dwellers – absent from the bush and desert, the cut and thrust of wars and skirmishes over the past 20 years – who is boss. What the Sudanese revolution is reckoning with now is the very heart of Bashir’s government, distilled to its essential parts: networks of patronage with too much to lose, militias grown too large to disband, and dirty deals with regional allies too important to jettison. Bashir’s regime not only impoverished the country and murdered its restive and marginalised ethnic groups, it created an entire parallel security infrastructure outside the army. This grew from an informal ragtag band of village-torchers, to a large organised body with its own culture, its own economy, its own grudges against the coddled elites of Khartoum – even its own foreign policy and funding. An organised body that seems to relish the opportunity to show those comfortable Khartoum dwellers – absent from the bush and desert, the wars and skirmishes of the past 20 years – who is boss. What the Sudanese revolution is reckoning with now is the very heart of Bashir’s government, distilled to its essential parts: networks of patronage with too much to lose, militias grown too large to disband, and dirty deals with regional allies too important to jettison.
And it is the RSF’s and the military’s foreign alliances with the powers of the gulf that has erected another front against the Sudanese revolution. The RSF’s leader, General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, has extended support to the Saudi war in Yemen by providing Sudanese soldiers – some of them reported to be children – in exchange for financial support. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi’s partner in the coalition in Yemen, also has a strong interest in ensuring that this access to Sudan’s cannon fodder continues. The RSF and the military’s foreign alliances with the powers of the gulf represent another front against the Sudanese revolution. The RSF’s leader, General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, has supported to the Saudi war in Yemen by providing Sudanese soldiers – some of them reported to be children – in exchange for financial assistance. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi’s partner in the coalition in Yemen, also has a strong interest in ensuring that this access to Sudan’s cannon fodder continues.
Egypt, another ally in the axis of the counter-revolution, is also wary of any civilian government in Sudan. Visits were made and a delegation met with all three countries in the run-up to this week’s massacre, strongly suggesting that the plan was hatched, or at least blessed, by these allies who are eager not only to prevent the disruption of any military support they receive from Sudan, but for whom the optics of a successful civilian revolution in the region are not desirable. Egypt, another ally in the axis of the counter-revolution, is also wary of any civilian government in Sudan. A delegation met with representatives of all three countries in the run-up to this week’s massacre, strongly suggesting that the plan was hatched, or at least blessed, by these allies, eager to prevent the disruption of any military support they receive from Sudan, and keen to avoid the undesirable optics of a successful civilian revolution in the region.
And so the Sudanese revolution is fighting against four governments. The international community – so interested and morally exercised by Bashir’s human rights abuses in the past that it has left Sudan still hobbled by the aftermath of years of economic sanctions and international isolation – has now moved on. It will only issue the usual boilerplate condemnations of violence. And so the Sudanese revolution is fighting against four governments. The international community – so interested and morally exercised by Bashir’s human rights abuses in the past that it has left Sudan hobbled by years of economic sanctions and international isolation – has now moved on. It will only issue the usual boilerplate condemnations of violence.
The Sudanese remain alone, locked in a death grip with a government that has now dropped all pretence of negotiation or compromise. Layer by layer, Bashir’s regime has been stripped back to show its core. There is no longer any amnesty afforded to those from the right class or ethnic background, if the price for that mercy would mean the relinquishing of power. Sudan’s wars have come home to the capital. The Sudanese remain alone, locked in a death grip with a government that has now dropped all pretence of negotiation or compromise. Layer by layer, Bashir’s regime has been stripped back to show its true face. There is no longer any amnesty afforded to those from the right class or ethnic background, if the price for that mercy would mean the relinquishing of power. Sudan’s wars have come home to the capital.
• Nesrine Malik is a Guardian columnist• Nesrine Malik is a Guardian columnist
SudanSudan
OpinionOpinion
AfricaAfrica
Middle East and North AfricaMiddle East and North Africa
Omar al-BashirOmar al-Bashir
ProtestProtest
Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia
YemenYemen
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