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| I was once Orbán’s ally. I despair at what he has done to Hungary | I was once Orbán’s ally. I despair at what he has done to Hungary |
| (1 day later) | |
| I was still in university when, after Hungary’s first free elections in 1990, I entered parliament as a member of the newly founded, ambitious Fidesz party, which had been launched by a group of students that included Viktor Orbán, then a courageous young democrat. We felt that we genuinely represented the hopes of our generation. We gained 22 parliamentary seats. | I was still in university when, after Hungary’s first free elections in 1990, I entered parliament as a member of the newly founded, ambitious Fidesz party, which had been launched by a group of students that included Viktor Orbán, then a courageous young democrat. We felt that we genuinely represented the hopes of our generation. We gained 22 parliamentary seats. |
| I come from a family that relates strongly to the legacy of Hungary’s 1956 revolution – I couldn’t resist the new winds of change. In parliament, we were ardent critics of everything anti-liberal or that threatened freedom of expression. We wanted to break entirely with the one-party communist state and develop a truly democratic society – something Hungarians had never enjoyed. | I come from a family that relates strongly to the legacy of Hungary’s 1956 revolution – I couldn’t resist the new winds of change. In parliament, we were ardent critics of everything anti-liberal or that threatened freedom of expression. We wanted to break entirely with the one-party communist state and develop a truly democratic society – something Hungarians had never enjoyed. |
| Nearly 30 years on, it has been painful to witness how Fidesz has created a hegemonic party-state that questions not only the relevance of democratic institutions in one country, but in Europe at large. How could this possibly have happened? | Nearly 30 years on, it has been painful to witness how Fidesz has created a hegemonic party-state that questions not only the relevance of democratic institutions in one country, but in Europe at large. How could this possibly have happened? |
| Mistakes were made early. The new constitution, negotiated in 1989 between the opposition and the Communist party, included flaws that were never corrected – such as a highly majoritarian electoral system that quickly marginalised smaller parties. The early 1990s brought drastic inequality and related resentment. Soviet-era informants were allowed to take part in the new government. | Mistakes were made early. The new constitution, negotiated in 1989 between the opposition and the Communist party, included flaws that were never corrected – such as a highly majoritarian electoral system that quickly marginalised smaller parties. The early 1990s brought drastic inequality and related resentment. Soviet-era informants were allowed to take part in the new government. |
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| Then came the power struggles within Fidesz: deals and compromises were made, running counter to promises of transparency and openness. After we elected Orbán as party chairman in 1993, he lost no time in taking control of party resources and building a loyal circle around him. Soon, the party suffered deep internal divisions – especially after we learned that its leadership used party funds to run a number of businesses, and that money was channelled through crony companies. | Then came the power struggles within Fidesz: deals and compromises were made, running counter to promises of transparency and openness. After we elected Orbán as party chairman in 1993, he lost no time in taking control of party resources and building a loyal circle around him. Soon, the party suffered deep internal divisions – especially after we learned that its leadership used party funds to run a number of businesses, and that money was channelled through crony companies. |
| Orbán’s authoritarian style swiftly became clear, as did his relentless efforts to pull the party to the right. By 1994 the liberal wing of Fidesz, of which I was part, broke ranks and left. At my last meeting I said I couldn’t agree with an approach where the ends justified any means. | Orbán’s authoritarian style swiftly became clear, as did his relentless efforts to pull the party to the right. By 1994 the liberal wing of Fidesz, of which I was part, broke ranks and left. At my last meeting I said I couldn’t agree with an approach where the ends justified any means. |
| When Orbán became prime minister aged 35, much of Fidesz’s appeal came from its ability to competently represent the attractive prospect of European Union membership, something Hungarians longed for deeply. However, along with others, I watched with sadness at the way the party’s internal democratic culture was being dismantled. Political influence was imposed on public media and corruption spread, something that got worse once EU funds started flowing into the country in 2004. | When Orbán became prime minister aged 35, much of Fidesz’s appeal came from its ability to competently represent the attractive prospect of European Union membership, something Hungarians longed for deeply. However, along with others, I watched with sadness at the way the party’s internal democratic culture was being dismantled. Political influence was imposed on public media and corruption spread, something that got worse once EU funds started flowing into the country in 2004. |
| Orbán’s Fidesz was always on the offensive, even when electoral reversals set in. After losing the vote in 2002 he mobilised his followers by saying: “We can’t be in opposition because the nation can’t be in opposition.” Equating the party to the nation has been the main feature of his politics ever since. After his 2006 election defeat, he took Fidesz to the streets as an anti-establishment movement. He soon capitalised on a large government scandal and the 2008 financial crisis. When in 2010 Fidesz gained a parliamentary supermajority, Orbán embarked on a new form of regime change to consolidate his hold on power. The constitution was rewritten, as were laws governing the media and elections. A loyal oligarchy was nurtured on EU funds, some of which were awarded to his 32-year-old son-in-law’s firm. | Orbán’s Fidesz was always on the offensive, even when electoral reversals set in. After losing the vote in 2002 he mobilised his followers by saying: “We can’t be in opposition because the nation can’t be in opposition.” Equating the party to the nation has been the main feature of his politics ever since. After his 2006 election defeat, he took Fidesz to the streets as an anti-establishment movement. He soon capitalised on a large government scandal and the 2008 financial crisis. When in 2010 Fidesz gained a parliamentary supermajority, Orbán embarked on a new form of regime change to consolidate his hold on power. The constitution was rewritten, as were laws governing the media and elections. A loyal oligarchy was nurtured on EU funds, some of which were awarded to his 32-year-old son-in-law’s firm. |
| I re-entered parliament in 2014 as a liberal politician in opposition to Fidesz. During that period I tried to understand why Hungarians weren’t revolting against overt patronage politics and the concentration of power. Why was a country that had fought for its freedom, and gained it, seemingly giving in to the unacceptable? | I re-entered parliament in 2014 as a liberal politician in opposition to Fidesz. During that period I tried to understand why Hungarians weren’t revolting against overt patronage politics and the concentration of power. Why was a country that had fought for its freedom, and gained it, seemingly giving in to the unacceptable? |
| Much has been said about the opposition’s fragmentation and its failure to develop a strong alternative narrative to Orbán’s. But we should also be aware that the now huge gap between Fidesz’s financial resources and those of other parties, as well as the uneven access to media coverage, have done much to compound the problem. It is also hard to overlook how collective historical traumas have been exploited: the memory of the post-first world war Trianon treaty, in which Hungary lost most of its territory and population, a taboo for 70 years, has returned with a bang. | Much has been said about the opposition’s fragmentation and its failure to develop a strong alternative narrative to Orbán’s. But we should also be aware that the now huge gap between Fidesz’s financial resources and those of other parties, as well as the uneven access to media coverage, have done much to compound the problem. It is also hard to overlook how collective historical traumas have been exploited: the memory of the post-first world war Trianon treaty, in which Hungary lost most of its territory and population, a taboo for 70 years, has returned with a bang. |
| EU accession was the main collective identity-building concept of post-1989 socialist-led governments but, to a certain degree, the issue of national identity fell by the wayside. Orbán could therefore claim that he was picking up the mantle of the fight for Hungary’s sovereignty and protecting Hungarians from future existential threats, however imaginary. This brand of ethnic nationalism has stood at the heart of his anti-migrant, anti-EU campaign. | EU accession was the main collective identity-building concept of post-1989 socialist-led governments but, to a certain degree, the issue of national identity fell by the wayside. Orbán could therefore claim that he was picking up the mantle of the fight for Hungary’s sovereignty and protecting Hungarians from future existential threats, however imaginary. This brand of ethnic nationalism has stood at the heart of his anti-migrant, anti-EU campaign. |
| There is of course a deep irony in the fact that EU funds (which account for 3.5% of GDP) were precisely what allowed Orbán to prop up the economy, increase wages, cut public utility fees and so on. He also took personal credit for the country’s financial stability. Building up an artificial threat and combining that with paternalistic social policies, helped create a mindset in which the leader alone could guide the people to a bright future: the leader, not democratic institutions. | |
| It took the 2015 migration crisis, Brexit and the election of Donald Trump for complacent European elites to understand that Orbán represented a threat to the integrity of western democratic principles, and that he could even paralyse the EU. He is no doubt a talented opportunist, but I believe his strength has been drawn as much from exhausted European politics as from his ability to cast himself as a trendsetter. | It took the 2015 migration crisis, Brexit and the election of Donald Trump for complacent European elites to understand that Orbán represented a threat to the integrity of western democratic principles, and that he could even paralyse the EU. He is no doubt a talented opportunist, but I believe his strength has been drawn as much from exhausted European politics as from his ability to cast himself as a trendsetter. |
| The good news is that last month’s European parliament elections – in which nationalist-populist forces did not break through – clearly showed that Orbán’s influence had reached some kind of limit. See how his efforts are now focused on remaining within the mainstream rightwing European People’s party, rather than have Fidesz end up outside of it. Still, if he is left unchallenged at a European level, his hold on power will only tighten. With all the fear that he has sown in Hungarian minds, the best response must be for democratic forces across the continent to show that a more united European Union is the best way to protect the stability and security people want. | The good news is that last month’s European parliament elections – in which nationalist-populist forces did not break through – clearly showed that Orbán’s influence had reached some kind of limit. See how his efforts are now focused on remaining within the mainstream rightwing European People’s party, rather than have Fidesz end up outside of it. Still, if he is left unchallenged at a European level, his hold on power will only tighten. With all the fear that he has sown in Hungarian minds, the best response must be for democratic forces across the continent to show that a more united European Union is the best way to protect the stability and security people want. |
| Hungary may be a small country but the lessons its people have learned must serve everyone. | Hungary may be a small country but the lessons its people have learned must serve everyone. |
| • Zsuzsanna Szelényi is a psychologist and former member of the Hungarian parliament | • Zsuzsanna Szelényi is a psychologist and former member of the Hungarian parliament |
| Hungary | Hungary |
| Europe now | Europe now |
| Viktor Orbán | Viktor Orbán |
| European Union | European Union |
| Europe | Europe |
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