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| Empires collapse when they overreach. The imperial presidency is no different. It has long been disdainful of Congress, but now, under the Trump administration, it is reaching a peak of contempt for it. Even so, President Trump’s recent aggrandizement of the executive branch may have the ironic and salutary effect of shrinking the power of the presidency by awakening the countervailing power of a long-dormant Congress. | Empires collapse when they overreach. The imperial presidency is no different. It has long been disdainful of Congress, but now, under the Trump administration, it is reaching a peak of contempt for it. Even so, President Trump’s recent aggrandizement of the executive branch may have the ironic and salutary effect of shrinking the power of the presidency by awakening the countervailing power of a long-dormant Congress. |
| While the impeachment inquiry that Speaker Nancy Pelosi of the House of Representatives announced Tuesday is confined for now to the controversy over Mr. Trump’s dealings with Ukraine, it was also the culmination of several provocations. In recent days alone, Mr. Trump has directed Corey Lewandowski, who did not work for the White House, to refuse to answer certain questions before Congress. Mr. Trump’s lawyers, replying to Manhattan prosecutors’ subpoena of the president’s tax returns, argued not simply that the subpoena was politically motivated but also that sitting presidents cannot be criminally investigated at all. | While the impeachment inquiry that Speaker Nancy Pelosi of the House of Representatives announced Tuesday is confined for now to the controversy over Mr. Trump’s dealings with Ukraine, it was also the culmination of several provocations. In recent days alone, Mr. Trump has directed Corey Lewandowski, who did not work for the White House, to refuse to answer certain questions before Congress. Mr. Trump’s lawyers, replying to Manhattan prosecutors’ subpoena of the president’s tax returns, argued not simply that the subpoena was politically motivated but also that sitting presidents cannot be criminally investigated at all. |
| Most significantly, of course, the administration initially refused to comply with a broadly applicable legal requirement that Congress be informed of significant abuses involving intelligence officials. In this case, the complaint appears to suggest that Mr. Trump tried to pressure Ukraine into an investigation of one of his 2020 rivals, former Vice President Joe Biden, and that White House officials tried to cover his trail. | Most significantly, of course, the administration initially refused to comply with a broadly applicable legal requirement that Congress be informed of significant abuses involving intelligence officials. In this case, the complaint appears to suggest that Mr. Trump tried to pressure Ukraine into an investigation of one of his 2020 rivals, former Vice President Joe Biden, and that White House officials tried to cover his trail. |
| Mr. Trump’s inflation of his authority in several realms maintains a longstanding trend of presidential expansion in the face of Congressional acquiescence. The important constitutional point is less the fate of any particular president than the trajectory of the presidency as an office. It has been growing since the Great Depression. The war on terror inflated the presidency further still. President Barack Obama took executive unilateralism into the domestic realm. Eventually this growth reaches the point of imperial overextension. | Mr. Trump’s inflation of his authority in several realms maintains a longstanding trend of presidential expansion in the face of Congressional acquiescence. The important constitutional point is less the fate of any particular president than the trajectory of the presidency as an office. It has been growing since the Great Depression. The war on terror inflated the presidency further still. President Barack Obama took executive unilateralism into the domestic realm. Eventually this growth reaches the point of imperial overextension. |
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| In empires, such overextension creates vulnerabilities and encourages adversaries to exploit them. Similarly, Mr. Trump’s open contempt for Congress — which, like all his endeavors, is outsized — on so many fronts at once appears to have been the overreach necessary to provoke legislative ambition. The Ukraine controversy was merely the last straw. | In empires, such overextension creates vulnerabilities and encourages adversaries to exploit them. Similarly, Mr. Trump’s open contempt for Congress — which, like all his endeavors, is outsized — on so many fronts at once appears to have been the overreach necessary to provoke legislative ambition. The Ukraine controversy was merely the last straw. |
| Ms. Pelosi’s announcement of a formal impeachment investigation may be even more important for the institution of the presidency than it is for this president, regardless of his personal fate. In this sense, whether the impeachment power is successfully used against Mr. Trump is less significant than whether he and future presidents know it can be plausibly asserted. | Ms. Pelosi’s announcement of a formal impeachment investigation may be even more important for the institution of the presidency than it is for this president, regardless of his personal fate. In this sense, whether the impeachment power is successfully used against Mr. Trump is less significant than whether he and future presidents know it can be plausibly asserted. |
| It is possible that the push for impeachment was initially incited as much by the White House’s stonewalling as by the substance of the allegations against Mr. Trump. That is encouraging. It signals that Congress will act to defend its institutional pride as well as its prerogatives. Equally important, it assures that the allegations against Mr. Trump will be aired in a public and political forum rather than a private and prosecutorial one. Mr. Trump may assert that he is immune from criminal investigations, but there is no such claim to be made about the unquestionable impeachment power of Congress. | It is possible that the push for impeachment was initially incited as much by the White House’s stonewalling as by the substance of the allegations against Mr. Trump. That is encouraging. It signals that Congress will act to defend its institutional pride as well as its prerogatives. Equally important, it assures that the allegations against Mr. Trump will be aired in a public and political forum rather than a private and prosecutorial one. Mr. Trump may assert that he is immune from criminal investigations, but there is no such claim to be made about the unquestionable impeachment power of Congress. |
| There are subtler, and perhaps more revealing, signs of Congressional awakening as well. In fact, history may record last week as the high-water mark of the imperial presidency. That was when Representative Adam Schiff of California, the Democratic chair of the House Intelligence Committee, announced that one tool he might employ to bring the Trump Administration to heel was Congress’s power of the purse. Mr. Schiff threatened to withhold funding from the office of the acting director of national intelligence, Joseph Maguire, unless he complied with a subpoena for the whistle-blower complaint. | There are subtler, and perhaps more revealing, signs of Congressional awakening as well. In fact, history may record last week as the high-water mark of the imperial presidency. That was when Representative Adam Schiff of California, the Democratic chair of the House Intelligence Committee, announced that one tool he might employ to bring the Trump Administration to heel was Congress’s power of the purse. Mr. Schiff threatened to withhold funding from the office of the acting director of national intelligence, Joseph Maguire, unless he complied with a subpoena for the whistle-blower complaint. |
| That threat contained the rumblings of institutional conflict between Congress and the executive branch. The recent practice of Congress in the face of presidential power has been to resort to judicial cover. After Mr. Obama unilaterally delayed implementation of the employer mandate under the Affordable Care Act in 2013, the House of Representatives, then under Republican control, voted to sue him for exceeding his constitutional powers. In the current dispute, Mr. Schiff also warned that he might take the administration to court. | That threat contained the rumblings of institutional conflict between Congress and the executive branch. The recent practice of Congress in the face of presidential power has been to resort to judicial cover. After Mr. Obama unilaterally delayed implementation of the employer mandate under the Affordable Care Act in 2013, the House of Representatives, then under Republican control, voted to sue him for exceeding his constitutional powers. In the current dispute, Mr. Schiff also warned that he might take the administration to court. |
| But this is asking another branch to do Congress’s work when the legislature could instead flex its own institutional muscle, what the conservative constitutional scholar Richard M. Reinsch II has called “bodycheck constitutionalism.” No such muscle is stronger than Congress’s power over appropriations. What may seem like picayune politics — depriving Mr. Maguire’s office of funds — is in fact precisely what the Constitution contemplates as one of the foremost means of asserting Congressional authority. | But this is asking another branch to do Congress’s work when the legislature could instead flex its own institutional muscle, what the conservative constitutional scholar Richard M. Reinsch II has called “bodycheck constitutionalism.” No such muscle is stronger than Congress’s power over appropriations. What may seem like picayune politics — depriving Mr. Maguire’s office of funds — is in fact precisely what the Constitution contemplates as one of the foremost means of asserting Congressional authority. |
| This power of the purse, which assumes particular urgency in light of Congressional abdication of its authority to the executive, has generally been seen as a tool of policy. But the appropriations power is equally important as a means of enforcing Congressional will on procedural matters like compliance with oversight. Mr. Schiff’s threat to deprive Mr. Maguire’s office of funds signals a revival of institutional conflict to maintain the separation of powers. | This power of the purse, which assumes particular urgency in light of Congressional abdication of its authority to the executive, has generally been seen as a tool of policy. But the appropriations power is equally important as a means of enforcing Congressional will on procedural matters like compliance with oversight. Mr. Schiff’s threat to deprive Mr. Maguire’s office of funds signals a revival of institutional conflict to maintain the separation of powers. |
| That is not to say that starving one office will bring the imperial presidency down. But the combination of these Congressional responses has already forced Mr. Trump to deliver the whistle-blower complaint to Capitol Hill. Mr. Maguire is set to testify before Congress on Thursday. | That is not to say that starving one office will bring the imperial presidency down. But the combination of these Congressional responses has already forced Mr. Trump to deliver the whistle-blower complaint to Capitol Hill. Mr. Maguire is set to testify before Congress on Thursday. |
| It would be even more significant for the imperial presidency if these events are a prelude to escalating institutional conflict under this and future administrations. The original constitutional design anticipates that struggle, assuming that the elected branches of government will use their authorities to defend themselves. | It would be even more significant for the imperial presidency if these events are a prelude to escalating institutional conflict under this and future administrations. The original constitutional design anticipates that struggle, assuming that the elected branches of government will use their authorities to defend themselves. |
| James Madison wrote about this institutional self-defense in Federalist 51. One of the essay’s most famous lines reads, “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.” The key to understanding how ambition maintains the separation of powers comes shortly before that, though: | James Madison wrote about this institutional self-defense in Federalist 51. One of the essay’s most famous lines reads, “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.” The key to understanding how ambition maintains the separation of powers comes shortly before that, though: |
| But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. | But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. |
| Congress has long had the means to resist the presidency. It now appears to be reviving a desire to use them. | Congress has long had the means to resist the presidency. It now appears to be reviving a desire to use them. |
| There are legitimate criticisms of the dangerous practice of executive branch officials disclosing the details of private presidential conversations with other heads of state. But such questions should be answered by a clash between branches ultimately superintended by the people, to whom the president can also appeal. | There are legitimate criticisms of the dangerous practice of executive branch officials disclosing the details of private presidential conversations with other heads of state. But such questions should be answered by a clash between branches ultimately superintended by the people, to whom the president can also appeal. |
| Members of Congress, long indifferent to the enlargement of presidential power, appear to be stirring precisely because Mr. Trump has so consistently prodded them. The use of legislators’ institutional powers to impose their will may mark the resuscitation of the separation of powers, which places Congress at the center of the constitutional structure. | Members of Congress, long indifferent to the enlargement of presidential power, appear to be stirring precisely because Mr. Trump has so consistently prodded them. The use of legislators’ institutional powers to impose their will may mark the resuscitation of the separation of powers, which places Congress at the center of the constitutional structure. |
| Given the history of other expansive empires, it would be unsurprising if the imperial presidency began to retract because it overreached. A shrunken presidency and a revived Congress may be Mr. Trump’s most important, and most welcome, legacy. | Given the history of other expansive empires, it would be unsurprising if the imperial presidency began to retract because it overreached. A shrunken presidency and a revived Congress may be Mr. Trump’s most important, and most welcome, legacy. |
| Greg Weiner (@GregWeiner1) is a political scientist at Assumption College, a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of “The Political Constitution: The Case Against Judicial Supremacy.” | Greg Weiner (@GregWeiner1) is a political scientist at Assumption College, a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of “The Political Constitution: The Case Against Judicial Supremacy.” |
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