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The 'unlikely' jihadi bomber The 'unlikely' jihadi bomber
(about 9 hours later)
By Frank Gardner BBC security correspondent Abdulla did not seem to be taking orders from central al-Qaeda figures By Frank Gardner Security correspondent, BBC News Abdulla did not seem to be taking orders from central al-Qaeda figures
Last year's failed car bomb attacks in London's Haymarket and Glasgow airport were markedly different from other jihadist plots to attack Britain.Last year's failed car bomb attacks in London's Haymarket and Glasgow airport were markedly different from other jihadist plots to attack Britain.
Operation Seagram, the computer-generated police codename for the investigation into the failed attacks, revealed early on that there was an Iraq connection, not a Pakistani one.Operation Seagram, the computer-generated police codename for the investigation into the failed attacks, revealed early on that there was an Iraq connection, not a Pakistani one.
In the immediate aftermath of the discovery of cars packed full of explosives in London's West End then the small inferno at Glasgow airport, there was a real concern in police and intelligence circles that a trained al-Qaeda attack team was on the loose in Britain.In the immediate aftermath of the discovery of cars packed full of explosives in London's West End then the small inferno at Glasgow airport, there was a real concern in police and intelligence circles that a trained al-Qaeda attack team was on the loose in Britain.
On 30 June 2007, on the advice of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), the government raised the national threat level from severe to critical, the highest alert state possible, meaning that an attack was imminent and probable.On 30 June 2007, on the advice of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), the government raised the national threat level from severe to critical, the highest alert state possible, meaning that an attack was imminent and probable.
'Self-motivated''Self-motivated'
The fear was that for the first time al-Qaeda's franchise in Iraq, known as AQI, had decided to extend its operations beyond the Middle East and hit Britons at home.The fear was that for the first time al-Qaeda's franchise in Iraq, known as AQI, had decided to extend its operations beyond the Middle East and hit Britons at home.
But three days after Kafeel Ahmed rammed his burning jeep into Glasgow airport terminal and both men were taken into custody, the police concluded that the "cell" had been stopped and the alert state was lowered back to severe, where it remains today.But three days after Kafeel Ahmed rammed his burning jeep into Glasgow airport terminal and both men were taken into custody, the police concluded that the "cell" had been stopped and the alert state was lowered back to severe, where it remains today.
Investigators were surprised to find that Bilal Abdulla, an Iraqi doctor working for the NHS, appeared to be self-motivated.Investigators were surprised to find that Bilal Abdulla, an Iraqi doctor working for the NHS, appeared to be self-motivated.
Instead of being indoctrinated or "groomed" by recruiters in the manner of other British jihadists, Abdulla had made this his own personal mission.The bombers worked quietly in Britain in summer 2007 plotting the attacksInstead of being indoctrinated or "groomed" by recruiters in the manner of other British jihadists, Abdulla had made this his own personal mission.The bombers worked quietly in Britain in summer 2007 plotting the attacks
Although he had spent time with insurgents in his native Iraq after the invasion of 2003, he did not appear to be receiving orders, instructions or even help from any kind of central al-Qaeda figure.Although he had spent time with insurgents in his native Iraq after the invasion of 2003, he did not appear to be receiving orders, instructions or even help from any kind of central al-Qaeda figure.
Unlike others, he did not go off to a secret militant training camp in the forested hills of Pakistan's tribal areas, he just worked quietly in Britain with Kafeel Ahmed throughout the early summer of 2007, downloading information from the internet and carrying out reconnaissance.Unlike others, he did not go off to a secret militant training camp in the forested hills of Pakistan's tribal areas, he just worked quietly in Britain with Kafeel Ahmed throughout the early summer of 2007, downloading information from the internet and carrying out reconnaissance.
As an NHS doctor, Bilal Abdulla was also quite different from many of those monitored or picked up by the police in Britain, suspected of involvement in violent jihad.As an NHS doctor, Bilal Abdulla was also quite different from many of those monitored or picked up by the police in Britain, suspected of involvement in violent jihad.
Unlike many of them, he had no known association with petty criminals like credit card fraudsters or mobile phone thieves.Unlike many of them, he had no known association with petty criminals like credit card fraudsters or mobile phone thieves.
Instead he was in a respected profession with no outward reason to rail against the country that had offered him opportunities.Instead he was in a respected profession with no outward reason to rail against the country that had offered him opportunities.
But like the lead London bomber, Mohammed Siddique Khan, Abdulla hid his hatred well, nurturing an almost pathological determination to wreak revenge for the injustices he considered had been done to his country, yet in the end targeting people who had nothing to do with the invasion of Iraq or its occupation.But like the lead London bomber, Mohammed Siddique Khan, Abdulla hid his hatred well, nurturing an almost pathological determination to wreak revenge for the injustices he considered had been done to his country, yet in the end targeting people who had nothing to do with the invasion of Iraq or its occupation.
For the police and intelligence agencies this plot marked a whole new level of threat and it has proved once again there is no such thing as a stereotypical jihadi bomber.For the police and intelligence agencies this plot marked a whole new level of threat and it has proved once again there is no such thing as a stereotypical jihadi bomber.