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| Documents Show Safety Concerns at Boeing Before Deadly Crashes | Documents Show Safety Concerns at Boeing Before Deadly Crashes |
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| One Boeing employee worried the 737 Max might be “vulnerable.” A company document said if pilots didn’t respond to a new automated system within seconds it would be “catastrophic.” A plan to include an alert for the system, known as MCAS, was considered but scrapped. | One Boeing employee worried the 737 Max might be “vulnerable.” A company document said if pilots didn’t respond to a new automated system within seconds it would be “catastrophic.” A plan to include an alert for the system, known as MCAS, was considered but scrapped. |
| The new revelations about how Boeing wrestled with the safety questions surrounding the new system on its best-selling plane came at a congressional hearing on Wednesday in Washington, adding to evidence that the company was aware of concerns about the plane’s safety before two crashes that left 346 people dead. | The new revelations about how Boeing wrestled with the safety questions surrounding the new system on its best-selling plane came at a congressional hearing on Wednesday in Washington, adding to evidence that the company was aware of concerns about the plane’s safety before two crashes that left 346 people dead. |
| Taken together with emails released this month showing that a top Boeing pilot was having trouble with the new system in the simulator before the plane was complete, the documents paint a fuller picture of Boeing employees’ developing and at times raising concerns about MCAS. | Taken together with emails released this month showing that a top Boeing pilot was having trouble with the new system in the simulator before the plane was complete, the documents paint a fuller picture of Boeing employees’ developing and at times raising concerns about MCAS. |
| The company, facing intense competitive pressure from its rival Airbus, ultimately determined the system was safe to install in the Max. And it continued to defend the safety of the plane after the accidents. | |
| The latest documents were made public at a hearing of the House transportation committee that lasted more than five hours. Committee members took turns grilling Boeing’s chief executive, Dennis A. Muilenburg, interspersing calls for his resignation with slides depicting damning internal company documents questioning the safety of the automated system. | The latest documents were made public at a hearing of the House transportation committee that lasted more than five hours. Committee members took turns grilling Boeing’s chief executive, Dennis A. Muilenburg, interspersing calls for his resignation with slides depicting damning internal company documents questioning the safety of the automated system. |
| In one partly redacted email from 2015, years before the plane was certified, a Boeing employee questioned whether the system was vulnerable to malfunctioning if a single sensor failed. Investigators believe that is what happened in both doomed flights, a Lion Air flight that crashed off the coast of Indonesia in October 2018 and another 737 Max that went down in Ethiopia in March. | In one partly redacted email from 2015, years before the plane was certified, a Boeing employee questioned whether the system was vulnerable to malfunctioning if a single sensor failed. Investigators believe that is what happened in both doomed flights, a Lion Air flight that crashed off the coast of Indonesia in October 2018 and another 737 Max that went down in Ethiopia in March. |
| The new documents again raise the question of why Boeing installed MCAS in the Max after making it more powerful and less reliable. Boeing played down the risks of the system to the Federal Aviation Administration during the development of the plane and asked the F.A.A. for permission to remove mention of it from the pilot’s manual. Pilots were not notified about MCAS until after the first crash. | The new documents again raise the question of why Boeing installed MCAS in the Max after making it more powerful and less reliable. Boeing played down the risks of the system to the Federal Aviation Administration during the development of the plane and asked the F.A.A. for permission to remove mention of it from the pilot’s manual. Pilots were not notified about MCAS until after the first crash. |
| Two days after the accident in Ethiopia on March 10, Mr. Muilenburg called President Trump and insisted the Max was safe. The United States grounded the plane the next day, however, after most other regulators around the world had already done so. | Two days after the accident in Ethiopia on March 10, Mr. Muilenburg called President Trump and insisted the Max was safe. The United States grounded the plane the next day, however, after most other regulators around the world had already done so. |
| Boeing’s actions were “inexplicable, inexcusable and as far as I know unprecedented in the history of passenger aviation,” said Representative Peter DeFazio, Democrat of Oregon and the chairman of the committee. | Boeing’s actions were “inexplicable, inexcusable and as far as I know unprecedented in the history of passenger aviation,” said Representative Peter DeFazio, Democrat of Oregon and the chairman of the committee. |
| The 737 Max remains grounded, and the crisis has cost Boeing more than $8 billion and roiled the broader aviation industry. | The 737 Max remains grounded, and the crisis has cost Boeing more than $8 billion and roiled the broader aviation industry. |
| The hearing was the second day in a row that Mr. Muilenburg had faced irate lawmakers, following an appearance at the Senate commerce committee on Tuesday where he acknowledged that he was aware of the emails from the pilot before the second crash. | The hearing was the second day in a row that Mr. Muilenburg had faced irate lawmakers, following an appearance at the Senate commerce committee on Tuesday where he acknowledged that he was aware of the emails from the pilot before the second crash. |
| “If we knew then what we know now we would have grounded right after the first accident,” Mr. Muilenburg said during Wednesday’s hearing. | “If we knew then what we know now we would have grounded right after the first accident,” Mr. Muilenburg said during Wednesday’s hearing. |
| Mr. DeFazio displayed an image of an early design for a cockpit indicator that would have notified pilots of an MCAS malfunction, a feature that never appeared on the plane. Another document showed that in June 2018, months before the Lion Air crash, an internal Boeing document said that if pilots took 10 seconds to respond once MCAS was activated, the result could be “catastrophic.” | Mr. DeFazio displayed an image of an early design for a cockpit indicator that would have notified pilots of an MCAS malfunction, a feature that never appeared on the plane. Another document showed that in June 2018, months before the Lion Air crash, an internal Boeing document said that if pilots took 10 seconds to respond once MCAS was activated, the result could be “catastrophic.” |
| The House hearing was longer, more sprawling in scope and, at times, more charged than the Senate’s. Multiple representatives criticized Mr. Muilenburg’s salary — he received a $23.4 million pay package last year — and demanded that he resign. Some of his answers brought groans or exclamations from victims’ family members in attendance. | The House hearing was longer, more sprawling in scope and, at times, more charged than the Senate’s. Multiple representatives criticized Mr. Muilenburg’s salary — he received a $23.4 million pay package last year — and demanded that he resign. Some of his answers brought groans or exclamations from victims’ family members in attendance. |
| “What does accountability mean?” Representative Stephen Cohen, Democrat of Tennessee, asked Mr. Muilenburg at one point in a raised voice. “Are you taking a cut in pay? Are you working for free from now on until you can cure this problem? These people’s relatives are not coming back. They’re gone. Your salary is still on.” | “What does accountability mean?” Representative Stephen Cohen, Democrat of Tennessee, asked Mr. Muilenburg at one point in a raised voice. “Are you taking a cut in pay? Are you working for free from now on until you can cure this problem? These people’s relatives are not coming back. They’re gone. Your salary is still on.” |
| Mr. Muilenburg’s face reddened, as he noted that the board determines his pay. | Mr. Muilenburg’s face reddened, as he noted that the board determines his pay. |
| The barrage of questions seemed to strike a chord with the cluster of more than a dozen victims’ family members gathered in a corner of the hearing room. Chris and Clariss Moore, the parents of Danielle Moore, who died in the Ethiopia crash, began to cry and a man brought over tissues. | The barrage of questions seemed to strike a chord with the cluster of more than a dozen victims’ family members gathered in a corner of the hearing room. Chris and Clariss Moore, the parents of Danielle Moore, who died in the Ethiopia crash, began to cry and a man brought over tissues. |
| “Mr. Muilenburg, if you had an ounce of integrity, you would know that the right thing to do is to step down,” Representative Debbie Mucarsel-Powell, Democrat of Florida, said later. | “Mr. Muilenburg, if you had an ounce of integrity, you would know that the right thing to do is to step down,” Representative Debbie Mucarsel-Powell, Democrat of Florida, said later. |
| Mr. Muilenburg repeatedly said he was “accountable” for the failures that led to the two crashes, but declined to resign and said he had not offered the board his resignation. (This month, the board stripped him of his chairman title.) He frequently mentioned that he grew up on a farm in Iowa, and said that his father taught him “you don’t run away from challenges.” | Mr. Muilenburg repeatedly said he was “accountable” for the failures that led to the two crashes, but declined to resign and said he had not offered the board his resignation. (This month, the board stripped him of his chairman title.) He frequently mentioned that he grew up on a farm in Iowa, and said that his father taught him “you don’t run away from challenges.” |
| Lawmakers were unmoved by his biography. “You’re no longer an Iowa farm boy,” Mr. DeFazio said. “You are the C.E.O. of the largest aircraft manufacturer in the world.” | Lawmakers were unmoved by his biography. “You’re no longer an Iowa farm boy,” Mr. DeFazio said. “You are the C.E.O. of the largest aircraft manufacturer in the world.” |
| Near the end of the hearing, Mr. Muilenburg said he did not expect to receive a bonus this year, after receiving a $13 million bonus last year. “I’m anticipating that this year’s annual bonus cycle will be zero,” he said. | Near the end of the hearing, Mr. Muilenburg said he did not expect to receive a bonus this year, after receiving a $13 million bonus last year. “I’m anticipating that this year’s annual bonus cycle will be zero,” he said. |
| Other documents made public by lawmakers on Wednesday raised questions about why the F.A.A. did not ground the Max after the first crash. In December, after the first accident, Boeing made a presentation to the F.A.A. in which it noted that the failure of one sensor on the outside of the plane could be “catastrophic.” In both crashes, investigators believe a single sensor malfunctioned, triggering MCAS and sending the planes into nose dives. | Other documents made public by lawmakers on Wednesday raised questions about why the F.A.A. did not ground the Max after the first crash. In December, after the first accident, Boeing made a presentation to the F.A.A. in which it noted that the failure of one sensor on the outside of the plane could be “catastrophic.” In both crashes, investigators believe a single sensor malfunctioned, triggering MCAS and sending the planes into nose dives. |
| At another point, Representative Albio Sires, Democrat of New Jersey, read from an email he said was sent to the head of the 737 program in 2018, from a Boeing employee complaining of fatigue and safety concerns on the production line. Shortly after the second crash, The New York Times reported on the intense pressure to produce the Max. | At another point, Representative Albio Sires, Democrat of New Jersey, read from an email he said was sent to the head of the 737 program in 2018, from a Boeing employee complaining of fatigue and safety concerns on the production line. Shortly after the second crash, The New York Times reported on the intense pressure to produce the Max. |
| “Our work force is exhausted,” the employee wrote. “Fatigued employees make mistakes. | “Our work force is exhausted,” the employee wrote. “Fatigued employees make mistakes. |
| “Frankly right now all my internal warning bells are going off,” the email continued. “And for the first time in my life, I’m sorry to say that I’m hesitant about putting my family on a Boeing airplane.” | “Frankly right now all my internal warning bells are going off,” the email continued. “And for the first time in my life, I’m sorry to say that I’m hesitant about putting my family on a Boeing airplane.” |
| Several representatives also presented evidence they said showed that Boeing was consumed with minimizing pilot training for the Max, leading them to play down the importance of the new system and not include it in pilot manuals. Mr. DeFazio confirmed that Boeing had offered Southwest Airlines a $1 million discount per plane if the Max required simulator training, and displayed a slide from an internal presentation playing up the fact that the Max would not require simulator training. | Several representatives also presented evidence they said showed that Boeing was consumed with minimizing pilot training for the Max, leading them to play down the importance of the new system and not include it in pilot manuals. Mr. DeFazio confirmed that Boeing had offered Southwest Airlines a $1 million discount per plane if the Max required simulator training, and displayed a slide from an internal presentation playing up the fact that the Max would not require simulator training. |
| Representatives also questioned Mr. Muilenburg on messages that Mark Forkner, the plane’s chief technical pilot, sent to a colleague, Patrik Gustavsson, during the plane’s development. In the messages, which were made public this month, Mr. Forkner said that he was having trouble with MCAS during simulator training, and had unintentionally lied to regulators. | Representatives also questioned Mr. Muilenburg on messages that Mark Forkner, the plane’s chief technical pilot, sent to a colleague, Patrik Gustavsson, during the plane’s development. In the messages, which were made public this month, Mr. Forkner said that he was having trouble with MCAS during simulator training, and had unintentionally lied to regulators. |
| Mr. Gustavsson was removed from certification work at Boeing in recent days, according to two people with knowledge of the matter who were not authorized to discuss it publicly. | Mr. Gustavsson was removed from certification work at Boeing in recent days, according to two people with knowledge of the matter who were not authorized to discuss it publicly. |
| Mr. Muilenburg also faced sharp criticism from lawmakers about other Boeing airplanes facing challenges, including the 787 Dreamliner, which is plagued with production problems, and the KC-46, a long-delayed military refueling tanker. | Mr. Muilenburg also faced sharp criticism from lawmakers about other Boeing airplanes facing challenges, including the 787 Dreamliner, which is plagued with production problems, and the KC-46, a long-delayed military refueling tanker. |
| Representative John Garamendi, Democrat of California, accused Mr. Muilenburg of running a company that was relentlessly focused on the bottom line. | Representative John Garamendi, Democrat of California, accused Mr. Muilenburg of running a company that was relentlessly focused on the bottom line. |
| “Three of your principal product lines, the 737 Max, the KC-46 and the Dreamliner all have quality issues,” he said. “I would posit the reality that you are pushing profits over quality and safety.” | “Three of your principal product lines, the 737 Max, the KC-46 and the Dreamliner all have quality issues,” he said. “I would posit the reality that you are pushing profits over quality and safety.” |
| After the hearing, Nadia Milleron, whose daughter Samya Stumo was killed in the Ethiopian crash, confronted Mr. Muilenburg for the second day in a row and told him to resign. | After the hearing, Nadia Milleron, whose daughter Samya Stumo was killed in the Ethiopian crash, confronted Mr. Muilenburg for the second day in a row and told him to resign. |
| “You talked about Iowa just like one too many times,” she told Mr. Muilenburg, who listened to Ms. Milleron, his hands clasped. “Go back to the farm. Go back to Iowa.” | “You talked about Iowa just like one too many times,” she told Mr. Muilenburg, who listened to Ms. Milleron, his hands clasped. “Go back to the farm. Go back to Iowa.” |