This article is from the source 'nytimes' and was first published or seen on . It last changed over 40 days ago and won't be checked again for changes.

You can find the current article at its original source at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/08/opinion/dont-let-the-new-start-treaty-lapse.html

The article has changed 4 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.

Version 2 Version 3
Don’t Let the New START Treaty Lapse Don’t Let the New START Treaty Lapse
(30 minutes later)
BRUSSELS — The New START Treaty, the last and most important nuclear arms limitation agreement still in force between Russia and the United States, expires early in 2021. Perhaps it can be extended. But it has long been criticized by the Trump administration, on two points: The treaty does not limit new nuclear weapon systems that the Russians are threatening to use against us; and it does not include the Chinese, who are busily modernizing their nuclear arsenal. BRUSSELS — The New START Treaty, the last and most important nuclear arms limitation agreement still in force between Russia and the United States, expires early in 2021. Perhaps it can be extended. But it has long been criticized by the Trump administration, on two points: The treaty does not limit new nuclear weapons systems that the Russians are threatening to use against us; and it does not include the Chinese, who are busily modernizing their nuclear arsenal.
Those concerns are valid and cannot be ignored in any effort to renew the 10-year pact. The new Russian systems will pose a threat to the United States if they are deployed. And the Chinese, although they are far behind the United States and Russia in numbers of warheads, continue to build them and have not said when they will stop. Nor is China bound now by any arms limitation agreement. Those concerns are valid and cannot be ignored in any effort to renew the 10-year pact. The new Russian systems will pose a threat to the United States if they are deployed. And although China is far behind the United States and Russia in numbers of warheads, it continues to build them and has not said when it will stop. Nor is China bound now by any arms limitation agreement.
The administration’s attention to these issues is welcome, and we should be looking for ways to resolve them.The administration’s attention to these issues is welcome, and we should be looking for ways to resolve them.
At the same time, we should recognize the benefits the New START treaty brings to American national security. During the coming decade, the United States will be modernizing its nuclear forces. If the treaty is extended until 2026, it will continue to cap Russian deployed warheads at 1,550 and delivery systems — missiles and bombers — at 700, giving the United States a stable environment in which to modernize. At the same time, we should recognize the benefits the New START Treaty brings to American national security. During the coming decade, the United States will be modernizing its nuclear forces. If the treaty is extended until 2026, it will continue to cap Russian deployed warheads at 1,550 and delivery systems — missiles and bombers — at 700, giving the United States a stable environment in which to modernize.
Without the treaty, things could change drastically and quickly. There is no faster way for the Russians to outrun us than to deploy more nuclear warheads on their missiles.Without the treaty, things could change drastically and quickly. There is no faster way for the Russians to outrun us than to deploy more nuclear warheads on their missiles.
This is not a new issue. Starting in the 1970s, the Soviets and now the Russians have built larger and heavier intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, on which they can load more warheads at will — and they have plenty of them in storage. Ten or more warheads were estimated for the old SS-18 heavy missile, which remains deployed; it will be replaced by a new heavy missile, one of the systems that concern Mr. Trump’s administration. This is not a new issue. Starting in the 1970s, the Soviets and now the Russians have built larger and heavier intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, on which they can load more warheads at will — and they have plenty of them in storage. Ten or more warheads were estimated for the old SS-18 heavy missile, which remains deployed; it will be replaced by a new heavy missile, one of the systems that concern President Trump’s administration.
If released from the current 1,550 limit on warheads, the Russians could readily add several hundred more warheads to their ICBMs, forcing the United States into a difficult targeting problem at best, and a strategic crisis at worst. The Russians, whose missiles have grown more capable of a highly accurate first strike, might be tempted to try to knock out the strategic command and control systems of the United States.If released from the current 1,550 limit on warheads, the Russians could readily add several hundred more warheads to their ICBMs, forcing the United States into a difficult targeting problem at best, and a strategic crisis at worst. The Russians, whose missiles have grown more capable of a highly accurate first strike, might be tempted to try to knock out the strategic command and control systems of the United States.
Stability depends on such temptation never taking shape. As far-fetched as it seems, that very possibility drove both sides in the arms reduction negotiations in the 1980s and 1990s to acknowledge that we must ensure parity in numbers of deployed warheads and delivery vehicles.Stability depends on such temptation never taking shape. As far-fetched as it seems, that very possibility drove both sides in the arms reduction negotiations in the 1980s and 1990s to acknowledge that we must ensure parity in numbers of deployed warheads and delivery vehicles.
We cannot afford to lose this parity. The outcome would be too dangerous to our national security. But if New START lapses, that could happen, and fast.We cannot afford to lose this parity. The outcome would be too dangerous to our national security. But if New START lapses, that could happen, and fast.
So it serves American interests to extend the treaty. At the same time, we need to tackle the problems that the administration has highlighted. The agreement can be extended for five years, or until it is superseded by a new treaty. Success in a new negotiation should be something that we all welcome.So it serves American interests to extend the treaty. At the same time, we need to tackle the problems that the administration has highlighted. The agreement can be extended for five years, or until it is superseded by a new treaty. Success in a new negotiation should be something that we all welcome.
How do we treat new Russian weapons? Here, too, the pact can help. Some of their systems, such as the new heavy missile, meet the definition of an ICBM under the treaty; they would therefore fall under it without any additional negotiation. The new boost-glide missile system might also be brought under the treaty, since it is launched on a version of an existing Russian ICBM. The Russians have all but said this system will be accountable under the treaty. How do we treat new Russian weapons? Here, too, the pact can help. Some of the Russian systems, such as the new heavy missile, meet the definition of an ICBM under the treaty; they would therefore fall under it without any additional negotiation. The new boost-glide missile system might also be brought under the treaty, since it is launched on a version of an existing Russian ICBM. The Russians have all but said this system will be accountable under the treaty.
But if New START is not extended, Russia would be able to field both the heavy missile and boost-glide system without any constraints.But if New START is not extended, Russia would be able to field both the heavy missile and boost-glide system without any constraints.
New systems like the Burevestnik, a nuclear-propelled cruise missile, would take more work, since they do not fit the category of missiles defined in the treaty. Here it might be worth a straightforward discussion with the Russians: Do they really need the system? As the radioactive explosion near Arkhangelsk in August showed, the missile will be dangerous to operate and dangerous to deploy — both for the experts handling it and the public living near its bases.New systems like the Burevestnik, a nuclear-propelled cruise missile, would take more work, since they do not fit the category of missiles defined in the treaty. Here it might be worth a straightforward discussion with the Russians: Do they really need the system? As the radioactive explosion near Arkhangelsk in August showed, the missile will be dangerous to operate and dangerous to deploy — both for the experts handling it and the public living near its bases.
The system is not needed. For more than 30 years, since Ronald Reagan’s Star Wars program was announced, the Soviets and Russians have poured money into ensuring that their missiles can penetrate defenses against incoming missiles. Chaff, decoys, maneuvering re-entry vehicles: Russia is best in class in all of these systems to keep ICBMs on course to their targets. The rationale for the new missile is that it would succeed if the ICBMs fail, but that is unlikely. That makes the Burevestnik an elaborate redundancy, and dangerous in the bargain. The system is not needed. For more than 30 years, since Ronald Reagan’s Star Wars program was announced, the Soviets and Russians have poured money into ensuring that their missiles can penetrate defenses against incoming missiles. Chaff, decoys, maneuvering re-entry vehicles: Russia is best in class in all of these systems to keep ICBMs on course to their targets. The rationale for the new missile is that it would succeed if the ICBMs fail, but that is unlikely. This makes the Burevestnik an elaborate redundancy, and dangerous in the bargain.
Straightforward discussion may also be the way to get the Chinese to play. In the 50 years since the United States and the Soviet Union, later Russia, have been negotiating about bilateral nuclear restraint, the Chinese have never been part of the process. They have expressed restraint through a national no-first-use policy and by keeping their nuclear arsenal small. But with their continuing nuclear modernization, we need to wonder — is China moving beyond assuring a second strike if hit first? Are they themselves striving for parity with the United States and Russia? Straightforward discussion may also be the way to get the Chinese to play. In the 50 years since the United States and the Soviet Union, later Russia, have been negotiating about bilateral nuclear restraint, the Chinese have never been part of the process. They have expressed restraint through a national no-first-use policy and by keeping their nuclear arsenal small. But with their continuing nuclear modernization, we need to wonder — is China moving beyond assuring a second strike if hit first? Is it striving for parity with the United States and Russia?
Seeking some clarity about Chinese intentions should be a first order of business. The Chinese are not allergic to all negotiated measures. They are signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and have cooperated to prevent proliferation — for example, working with the United States on nuclear security in their port complexes and elsewhere to prevent nuclear terrorism during the Beijing Olympic in 2008. Seeking some clarity about Chinese intentions should be a first order of business. The Chinese are not allergic to all negotiated measures. They are signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and they have cooperated to prevent proliferation — for example, working with the United States on nuclear security in their port complexes and elsewhere to prevent nuclear terrorism during the Beijing Olympics in 2008.
But time and patience will be needed to engage Beijing, alongside mutual goals of predictability and restraint. Early insistence that they reduce and eliminate their relatively small nuclear arsenal would only drive them away. But time and patience will be needed to engage Beijing, alongside mutual goals of predictability and restraint. Early insistence that the Chinese reduce and eliminate their relatively small nuclear arsenal would only drive them away.
The Trump administration is on the right track when it draws attention to the new Russian strategic systems, and the pace of Chinese nuclear modernization. We can win some progress in both of these arenas, and New START can help: its extension would make it easier to accomplish both goals. Some of the new systems would be constrained if the treaty survives. The Trump administration is on the right track when it draws attention to the new Russian strategic systems and the pace of Chinese nuclear modernization. We can win some progress in both of these arenas, and New START can help: Its extension would make it easier to accomplish both goals. Some of the new systems will be constrained if the treaty survives.
Most important, we will maintain stability and bolster America’s national security as we negotiate further. Russia will be locked in on warheads. It will not be able to outrun us.Most important, we will maintain stability and bolster America’s national security as we negotiate further. Russia will be locked in on warheads. It will not be able to outrun us.
Rose Gottemoeller, a former under secretary of state, was the chief United States negotiator for the New START Treaty. She was until recently the deputy secretary general of NATO.Rose Gottemoeller, a former under secretary of state, was the chief United States negotiator for the New START Treaty. She was until recently the deputy secretary general of NATO.
The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.
Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram.Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram.