From Bolivia, Sad Lessons on How to Fix Semi-Democracies

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/opinion/bolivia-morales.html

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For liberal democrats lamenting the trend toward democratic erosion worldwide, the collapse of Evo Morales’s administration in Bolivia on Sunday offers a glimmer of hope. At last checks were effectively placed on a government that tried to do away with all checks. That is the good news.

The bad news is that the confrontation that was needed to contain this government was not as clean as one would hope. The process involved civil resistance, but also military bullying; peaceful demonstrations, as well as opportunistic radicals.

Perhaps this untidiness shouldn’t surprise us. Bolivia is a reminder that the process of stopping semi-democratic leaders is likely to be semi-democratic as well.

Under Mr. Morales, Bolivia was experiencing what has come to be known as democratic backsliding, a process whereby an existing democracy gradually acquires authoritarian features — never fully becoming a full-fledged dictatorship, but significantly undermining checks and balances and pluralism. As the country’s first indigenous leader, he arrived at the presidency promising to reduce inequality and integrate Bolivia’s indigenous peoples in its political institutions. For a while, he delivered.

But over the past five years, the popular and democratically elected president gradually became less popular and less democratic. Democratic institutions became extensions of his authority. His party, the Movement to Socialism, or MAS, became Mr. Morales’s “war machine,” helping him maintain his grip on power. Congress became a rubber stamp, and the courts became another agency of the executive branch. He frequently attacked critics, and played the victim and the race card often.

Armed with an overwhelming control of institutions, he ran for a fourth term in October, defying the very constitutional term limits he once backed. This latest attempt to hold on to power did not go over well.

Even traditional MAS voters resented his re-election drive. On the night of the election, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal abruptly stopped updating the vote count. The results eventually released gave Mr. Morales an unexpected 10.6 percentage-point advantage over the runner-up, former President Carlos Mesa — just enough to avoid a runoff. The opposition accused Mr. Morales of fraud. Bolivia entered a crisis, and in a matter of weeks, the government collapsed.

Many would-be autocrats suffer electoral setbacks like Mr. Morales did. But few collapse as a result of these setbacks. In this regard, the Bolivian case is unusual. It is truly one of the few examples of democratic backsliding in which the government ends defeated. The case offers lessons.

The main lesson is that this defeat was both glorious and inglorious. The opposition organized peaceful protests across the country, and these protests remained steadfast despite government repression and vitriol. Protesters forced the government to allow an international organization, the Organization of American States, to conduct an audit, which revealed widespread irregularities. As a result, the audit team recommended the country hold a new election.

And then events took a turn for the worse. The protests became more radicalized. A marginal opposition right-wing leader took things a step further, demanding that the president resign and government officials along with their supporters be punished. He also called for “bringing the Bible back to the palace.” Other groups, including police units and a large union that once supported the president, joined this radicalization drive.

By Sunday morning, the government was willing to offer a concession: a redo of the election with new electoral authorities, but not much else. Protesters were unmoved. When escalation was imminent, the military intervened.

In an old-fashioned military coup, military leaders deploy military force against a government target, usually the president, and proceed to repress demonstrators. In Bolivia, the process was subtler. The officers simply made a “suggestion” to the president: For the sake of order, resign.

Observers became instantly divided on how to interpret this suggestion.

Some considered it a coup, even if the government brought it on itself. For others, rather than a coup, this was a decision by the military to avoid staging a coup against protesters. Had they remained neutral, the military would have de facto sided with a government that was violating democracy, and worse, repressing the opposition.

To everyone’s surprise, Mr. Morales resigned, blaming the military, among other groups, for his decision. Many agreed — this was death by coup.

But this forensic conclusion is unsatisfying. Blaming the coup is to blame the symptoms and ignore the overall shock on the system caused by the preceding democratic backsliding.

Democratic backsliding shocks nations because it polarizes electorates. This is what makes democratic correction in these contexts so difficult. Opponents are angry and restricted in their democratic options. Meanwhile, supporters remain numerous and convinced that the government has never been more democratic. It is comforting to know that opposition groups can reassert themselves. But the Bolivian case suggests that in situations where democratic backsliding is advanced and civil unrest on the rise, it is naïve to expect restoration to occur in a perfectly democratic fashion. Radicals will emerge and the military will likely play a part.

We may need to confront this sad notion: Fixing a semi-democracy will not always follow strict democratic playbooks. This causes desperation and could lead to healthy resistance, but resistance in turn can provoke undemocratic responses. The chance of escalation is high, and so is the risk of military involvement.

The best that can be hoped for is that the military sides with moderate civilians, democratic norms, and constitutional rule.

Javier Corrales, a professor of political science at Amherst College, is the author, most recently, of “Fixing Democracy: Why Constitutional Change Often Fails to Enhance Democracy in Latin America.”

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