This article is from the source 'bbc' and was first published or seen on . It will not be checked again for changes.
You can find the current article at its original source at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/rss/-/1/hi/world/americas/7805481.stm
The article has changed 7 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.
Version 3 | Version 4 |
---|---|
Grim details of Columbia disaster | Grim details of Columbia disaster |
(about 1 hour later) | |
The US space agency (Nasa) has released a detailed report into the deaths of the crew of space shuttle Columbia. | The US space agency (Nasa) has released a detailed report into the deaths of the crew of space shuttle Columbia. |
It comes almost six years after the orbiter disintegrated when re-entering the Earth's atmosphere. | It comes almost six years after the orbiter disintegrated when re-entering the Earth's atmosphere. |
The report includes grim details of the crew's final moments as the shuttle broke up over the state of Texas. | The report includes grim details of the crew's final moments as the shuttle broke up over the state of Texas. |
It concludes that the accident was not survivable but makes the point that astronaut seat restraints, suits and helmets did not work well. | |
The failure of these safety features by themselves would have resulted in "lethal trauma", says the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report. | |
It recommends the lessons be taken up in future spacecraft designs. | |
"This report confirms that although the valiant Columbia crew tried every possible way to maintain control of their vehicle, the accident was not ultimately survivable," said Nasa deputy associate administrator Wayne Hale. | |
The accident happened on 1 February 2003. | The accident happened on 1 February 2003. |
Forty-one seconds | Forty-one seconds |
When the space shuttle Columbia blasted off from the Kennedy Space Center in Florida, the orbiter's left wing was damaged by a piece of insulating foam falling off the orbiter's external fuel tank. COLUMBIA'S FATAL FOAM Piece of insulating foam falls during launch, piercing one of shuttle's wings On re-entry, hot atmospheric gases blast inside the breach and melt ship's structureCrew cabin breaks away from ship and starts spinning rapidlyAstronauts try to regain control of craft, flipping cockpit switches as alarms soundRapid depressurization causes crew to lose consciousnessLack of safety restraints cause crew traumatic injuries | |
That proved fatal for the seven astronauts when they re-entered the Earth's atmosphere days later. | |
The world watched as the shuttle disintegrated as hot atmospheric gases blasted inside the breach, melting the ship's structure. | |
Nasa's extensive 400-page report into their last moments found that the crew knew for as long as 41 seconds that they did not have control of the orbiter, and records that they went into problem-solving mode as they attempted to regain stability. | |
As a consequence, when the cabin structure failed, resulting in rapid depressurisation and loss of consciousness, some of the astronauts were not wearing their bulky protective gloves and still had their helmet visors open. Some were not fully strapped in. | |
Had the astronauts had time to get their gear on and prepare their suits properly, they might have survived a little longer and been able to take more actions. But, the report notes, they still would have died because of the extreme forces and conditions to which they were exposed. | |
Nonetheless, the report lists individual failures in training and equipment which should be addressed. The recommendations call for better seat harnesses, improved helmets and pressurised suits, and more automated systems that can trigger actions if astronauts become incapacitated. | |
The report says that future spacecraft should be designed such that when they do begin to break up in an accident, they experience the "most graceful degradation of vehicle systems and structure to enhance chances for crew survival". | |
Mr Hale, who oversaw the shuttle programme during its return to flight after the accident, urged spacecraft designers in the US and overseas to read the report and apply the "hard lessons which have been paid for so dearly". | Mr Hale, who oversaw the shuttle programme during its return to flight after the accident, urged spacecraft designers in the US and overseas to read the report and apply the "hard lessons which have been paid for so dearly". |