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Biden and Trump Are Fighting Each Other in a Changed World Biden and Trump Are Fighting Each Other in a Changed World
(2 months later)
America has swung wildly from electing, and re-electing, its first African-American president, to installing the most belligerently white chief executive in the nation’s history.America has swung wildly from electing, and re-electing, its first African-American president, to installing the most belligerently white chief executive in the nation’s history.
Now, as a multiracial cohort of demonstrators has massed in more than 2000 cities and towns, as Covid-19 has shifted to red states and as the economy has continued to crater, we head toward November 2020.Now, as a multiracial cohort of demonstrators has massed in more than 2000 cities and towns, as Covid-19 has shifted to red states and as the economy has continued to crater, we head toward November 2020.
Will the current crises push the nation to the left or to the right, and where will the country land on Election Day?Will the current crises push the nation to the left or to the right, and where will the country land on Election Day?
“A majority of whites are finally seeing what black people have known for a long time: systemic racism is real, but the daily interpersonal racism is also very real and very painful,” Andrea Benjamin, a professor of African and African-American Studies at the University of Oklahoma, wrote in an incisive email:“A majority of whites are finally seeing what black people have known for a long time: systemic racism is real, but the daily interpersonal racism is also very real and very painful,” Andrea Benjamin, a professor of African and African-American Studies at the University of Oklahoma, wrote in an incisive email:
The protests are bringing awareness and it is possible that real change will happen. The daily microaggressions — those sting. Books that explore racism, white privilege, and anti-racism are selling at a record pace. These are all good things. Still, I am waiting for the actions. It’s good to change minds, but black people are still dying at disproportionate rates due to Covid-19, we are less likely to own homes in most places, we have accumulated less wealth, we are more likely to go to prison. Let me be clear, we need real change and real reform to try to start chipping away at these outcomes and I am less optimistic that we are really ready to make those changes.
Brian Schaffner, a political scientist at Tufts, who runs the Cooperative Congressional Election Study with Stephen Ansolabehere, of Harvard, observes the situation from a comparatively detached, quantitative perspective. He wrote by email that he finds “support for the general notion that people are increasingly liberal in recent years.”Brian Schaffner, a political scientist at Tufts, who runs the Cooperative Congressional Election Study with Stephen Ansolabehere, of Harvard, observes the situation from a comparatively detached, quantitative perspective. He wrote by email that he finds “support for the general notion that people are increasingly liberal in recent years.”
[View our NYTimes/Siena College poll in which Biden leads Trump by 14 points.][View our NYTimes/Siena College poll in which Biden leads Trump by 14 points.]
Looking at the roughly 31 percent of voters who identify as liberal, the percentage who say they are very liberal has doubled from 5 to 10 percent from 2010 to 2018, while those who say they are somewhat liberal fell modestly and those who say they are simply liberal remained constant, according to Schaffner.Looking at the roughly 31 percent of voters who identify as liberal, the percentage who say they are very liberal has doubled from 5 to 10 percent from 2010 to 2018, while those who say they are somewhat liberal fell modestly and those who say they are simply liberal remained constant, according to Schaffner.
Using another measure, Schaffner calculated the shift in political thinking by combining answers to questions about health care, immigration, gay marriage, gun control, environment and government spending from 2010 to 2018. He found a strong leftward shift in public opinion on these issues after 2014, as shown in the accompanying graphic.Using another measure, Schaffner calculated the shift in political thinking by combining answers to questions about health care, immigration, gay marriage, gun control, environment and government spending from 2010 to 2018. He found a strong leftward shift in public opinion on these issues after 2014, as shown in the accompanying graphic.
Ansolabehere wrote by email that “since 2014 there has been a noticeable tilt in the scales back toward liberalism,” but, he stressed, “the country still self-identifies as slightly right of center, or more slightly conservative than liberal.”Ansolabehere wrote by email that “since 2014 there has been a noticeable tilt in the scales back toward liberalism,” but, he stressed, “the country still self-identifies as slightly right of center, or more slightly conservative than liberal.”
In the case of the current protests in response to the killing in police custody of George Floyd, Ansolabehere noted that “traditionally Republicans have done very well among suburban voters with tough on crime messages,” but, “that said, the last time we had an experience like this was Los Angeles in 1992, and that ended up being a good Democratic year.”In the case of the current protests in response to the killing in police custody of George Floyd, Ansolabehere noted that “traditionally Republicans have done very well among suburban voters with tough on crime messages,” but, “that said, the last time we had an experience like this was Los Angeles in 1992, and that ended up being a good Democratic year.”
The parallels to 1992 are striking, Ansolabehere wrote:The parallels to 1992 are striking, Ansolabehere wrote:
The L.A.P.D. was out of control and needed reform. The verdicts and rioting happened in May 1992 when the economy was weak, as we were coming out of a recession. There were two Senate seats up in CA. Democrats won both. The upshot is that the 1992 example is the closest I know of to the present situation. Rioting and anti-police sentiment seemed to give the Republicans an issue, but they could not get traction.
On June 15, Schaffner published a report on the website of the progressive think thank, Data For Progress, “White Republicans and Independents are starting to acknowledge their privilege, but will it last?” which tracks agreement and disagreement with the statement “White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.” This polling question, he wrote, has proved crucial in recent elections:On June 15, Schaffner published a report on the website of the progressive think thank, Data For Progress, “White Republicans and Independents are starting to acknowledge their privilege, but will it last?” which tracks agreement and disagreement with the statement “White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.” This polling question, he wrote, has proved crucial in recent elections:
In 2016, the denial of white privilege was strongly associated with voting for Trump and was even a strong predictor of switching from voting for Obama in 2012 to backing Trump in 2016. The acknowledgment or denial of racism continued to be a strong predictor of vote choices in House races in 2018.
In 2016, a minority (43 percent) of white American adults “somewhat or strongly agreed that white people have advantages in the United States,” Schaffner wrote.In 2016, a minority (43 percent) of white American adults “somewhat or strongly agreed that white people have advantages in the United States,” Schaffner wrote.
However, when we asked this question again on June 9, 2020, 57 percent of whites acknowledged the existence of white privilege — an increase of 14 percentage points over 2016 and even a 12 point increase over views registered in November 2019.
Even more striking:Even more striking:
The increased acknowledgment of white privilege appears to have come exclusively from white Republicans and independents. The vast majority of white Democrats already acknowledged their privilege — about three-fourths of white Democrats consistently agree that whites have advantages.
From 2016 to 2019, acknowledgment of white privilege among white Republicans had hovered closely around 20 percent, with a slight downward trend. But in the June 9 survey this year, that percentage more than doubled, to 44 percent. Among white Independents, acknowledgment had been in the 33-35 percent range from 2016 to 2019, but in the most recent survey, it shot up to 55 percent.From 2016 to 2019, acknowledgment of white privilege among white Republicans had hovered closely around 20 percent, with a slight downward trend. But in the June 9 survey this year, that percentage more than doubled, to 44 percent. Among white Independents, acknowledgment had been in the 33-35 percent range from 2016 to 2019, but in the most recent survey, it shot up to 55 percent.
“While the data show a dramatic increase in acknowledgment of white privilege among these groups, there are many reasons for any optimism to be cautious,” Schaffner warned, stressing that “it is impossible to know whether this increased acknowledgment of white privilege will persist once the protests have subsided and peoples’ attention has shifted.”“While the data show a dramatic increase in acknowledgment of white privilege among these groups, there are many reasons for any optimism to be cautious,” Schaffner warned, stressing that “it is impossible to know whether this increased acknowledgment of white privilege will persist once the protests have subsided and peoples’ attention has shifted.”
The African-American political scientists I contacted argued that changing attitudes, especially among young white people, are likely to be lasting and to have significant consequence for both elections and policymaking.The African-American political scientists I contacted argued that changing attitudes, especially among young white people, are likely to be lasting and to have significant consequence for both elections and policymaking.
Megan Ming Francis, at the University of Washington, wrote in an email:Megan Ming Francis, at the University of Washington, wrote in an email:
These protests will contribute to a durable shift in how most Americans understand policing and the limits of the criminal punishment system. In addition, these protests will likely have an impact on policy as even after the demonstrations are over, activists will move inside of formal political institutions and demand and work to change policies.
Jake Grumbach, a colleague of Francis’s at the University of Washington, wrote,Jake Grumbach, a colleague of Francis’s at the University of Washington, wrote,
Young people are also much more progressive than older generations. This shift includes all racial groups. There is even substantial movement among Republicans on some questions.
There are, Grumbach continued,There are, Grumbach continued,
additional reasons to expect these current protests over the Floyd murder to have positive effects. There are more cameras than ever, and police brutality, whether killings or violence against protesters, is impossible to ignore. The protests have been widespread and largely peaceful.
Tatishe Nteta, of the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, declared that he is convinced thatTatishe Nteta, of the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, declared that he is convinced that
We are seeing movement toward blacks and away from conservative constituencies. The evidence for this broad move are seen in the actions of traditionally conservative elected officials and leaders; from the kneeling of police chiefs and rank and file members of police during the protests, the embrace of this movement by the NFL commissioner Roger Goodell, to calls for widespread reform by police unions, Republican mayors, governors, and members of Congress, to an executive order signed by President Trump — we are witnessing how social movement activity and public opinion are now driving elite conservative behavior.
Daniel Q. Gillion, of the University of Pennsylvania and the author of “The Political Power of Protest,” argued that the country has been moving leftward since 2016, and that a series of protests, not just those against the killing of George Floyd, have played a key role:Daniel Q. Gillion, of the University of Pennsylvania and the author of “The Political Power of Protest,” argued that the country has been moving leftward since 2016, and that a series of protests, not just those against the killing of George Floyd, have played a key role:
Over the last four years, America has experienced some of the largest liberal protests in our history — the Women’s Right Movement, March for Our Lives, and Black Lives Matter. This liberal movement has been underway for some time now.
Christopher Sebastian Parker, who is also at the University of Washington, makes the case that not only are the protests, the videos of police brutality and racial health disparities — which have been forced into public view by the pandemic — driving the country leftward, but that a key player in driving leftward movement is Trump himself:Christopher Sebastian Parker, who is also at the University of Washington, makes the case that not only are the protests, the videos of police brutality and racial health disparities — which have been forced into public view by the pandemic — driving the country leftward, but that a key player in driving leftward movement is Trump himself:
When one adds to that a president who seemingly does anything and everything to inflame the situation, it’s hard to imagine that consequences won’t follow. With the election of Trump, Latinos and Asian-Americans have moved ever more closely to the black community in their respective preferences. College-educated whites have also become more progressive since Trump assumed the Oval Office.
Measuring trends on three different dimensions —— economic, racial and cultural issues — Stanley Feldman, a political scientist at Stony Brook University, and three Australian colleagues, tracked responses to 40 questions in American National Election Study surveys from 1972 to 2016 covering 34,345 respondents.Measuring trends on three different dimensions —— economic, racial and cultural issues — Stanley Feldman, a political scientist at Stony Brook University, and three Australian colleagues, tracked responses to 40 questions in American National Election Study surveys from 1972 to 2016 covering 34,345 respondents.
In an email, Feldman pointed to some of the key findings in an unpublished working paper, “Sorting Apart: Partisan Polarization in the American Electorate, 1972-2016,” especially on racial attitudes.In an email, Feldman pointed to some of the key findings in an unpublished working paper, “Sorting Apart: Partisan Polarization in the American Electorate, 1972-2016,” especially on racial attitudes.
“It’s clear that preferences have shifted significantly in a more conservative direction over this time period among Republican identifiers,” Feldman wrote, adding that contrary to those who argue that racial hostility among working class whites is the deciding factor in elections, he and his co-authors found that“It’s clear that preferences have shifted significantly in a more conservative direction over this time period among Republican identifiers,” Feldman wrote, adding that contrary to those who argue that racial hostility among working class whites is the deciding factor in elections, he and his co-authors found that
It’s not the case that conservative racial issue preferences are concentrated among low-income whites. High-income Republicans are more conservative on racial issues than low-income Republicans.
There is a sustained liberal trend on racial issues, Feldman wrote,There is a sustained liberal trend on racial issues, Feldman wrote,
among Democratic identifiers from 1972 to 2012, but virtually all of this is a function of the growing size of minorities among Democratic partisans. There is no real change in racial issue preferences among white Democratic identifiers up to 2012.
The progressive trend gains momentum between 2012 and 2016 when “you see a really large shift in the liberal direction among white Democrats.” Feldman suggested thatThe progressive trend gains momentum between 2012 and 2016 when “you see a really large shift in the liberal direction among white Democrats.” Feldman suggested that
it could be a swift reaction to Trump’s rhetoric in the 2016 campaign. It’s also very possible that this was in response to the first wave of Black Lives Matter protests — Ferguson, Eric Garner, etc. It would take much more fine-grained data to sort this out.
The swing among white Democrats toward increased racial liberalism will have significant political consequences, Andrew Engelhardt, a postdoctoral research associate in political science at Brown, wrote in an email.The swing among white Democrats toward increased racial liberalism will have significant political consequences, Andrew Engelhardt, a postdoctoral research associate in political science at Brown, wrote in an email.
As white and black Democrats find common ground, Engelhardt argues,As white and black Democrats find common ground, Engelhardt argues,
this increased homogeneity makes Democrats less susceptible to wedge issues. The number of them who are cross-pressured by, say, holding more conservative social issue views when deciding whether to support a more liberal candidate, is decreasing. There’s less reason for people to decide to not turn out or to vote for the other party.
While white Democrats of all ages moved left on racial issues between 2012 and 2016, “millennials (born between 1981 and 1996) were substantially more liberal on racial attitudes in 2016 than older generations,” according to Feldman. This point leads directly to a striking finding in “The Age of Police Reform,” a 2019 working paper by Rebecca Goldstein, a law professor at the University of California-Berkeley, that “Age is a more powerful predictor of police-related policy preferences than race.”While white Democrats of all ages moved left on racial issues between 2012 and 2016, “millennials (born between 1981 and 1996) were substantially more liberal on racial attitudes in 2016 than older generations,” according to Feldman. This point leads directly to a striking finding in “The Age of Police Reform,” a 2019 working paper by Rebecca Goldstein, a law professor at the University of California-Berkeley, that “Age is a more powerful predictor of police-related policy preferences than race.”
At Goldstein’s request, the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study asked respondents whether they would support or oppose a proposal to “increase the number of police on the street by 10 percent, even if it means fewer funds for other public services.”At Goldstein’s request, the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study asked respondents whether they would support or oppose a proposal to “increase the number of police on the street by 10 percent, even if it means fewer funds for other public services.”
The result:The result:
All whites were 12 points more supportive of increasing the number of police than blacks, 58 to 46. But this difference paled in comparison to the 35-point difference between those over 65 of all races and those under 30, 73-38. And even those numbers in fact understate the difference between the role of age and the role of race in shaping attitudes toward spending on police.All whites were 12 points more supportive of increasing the number of police than blacks, 58 to 46. But this difference paled in comparison to the 35-point difference between those over 65 of all races and those under 30, 73-38. And even those numbers in fact understate the difference between the role of age and the role of race in shaping attitudes toward spending on police.
Crucially, blacks and other minorities are younger on average than whites; when age is accounted for, the racial difference in attitudes toward spending on policing becomes much smaller. And when additional factors are incorporated —- education, income, and a given county’s violent crime rate — so that whites are compared to minorities of similar backgrounds, then, Goldstein found, racial and ethnic differences on police spending become even smaller:Crucially, blacks and other minorities are younger on average than whites; when age is accounted for, the racial difference in attitudes toward spending on policing becomes much smaller. And when additional factors are incorporated —- education, income, and a given county’s violent crime rate — so that whites are compared to minorities of similar backgrounds, then, Goldstein found, racial and ethnic differences on police spending become even smaller:
Conditional on age group and the same set of background characteristics, African-American respondents were only 5.7 percent less likely than white respondents to report supporting additional policing, Hispanic respondents were 3.3 percent more likely than whites to report supporting additional policing, and Asian respondents were 2.1 percent more likely than whites to report supporting additional policing.
Goldstein found that the sharp differences between the attitudes of the young and old toward police spending is specific to this generation, and not just an artifact of all people becoming more conservative as they age.Goldstein found that the sharp differences between the attitudes of the young and old toward police spending is specific to this generation, and not just an artifact of all people becoming more conservative as they age.
In an examination of 21 General Social Survey polls conducted since 1984 that asked “are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on halting the rising crime rate,” Goldstein determined that the drop in support for spending among those under 30 did not surface until the current generation of millennials came of age. In contrast to the millennial cohort, she wrote:In an examination of 21 General Social Survey polls conducted since 1984 that asked “are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on halting the rising crime rate,” Goldstein determined that the drop in support for spending among those under 30 did not surface until the current generation of millennials came of age. In contrast to the millennial cohort, she wrote:
Having been born from 1946 to 1958 is associated with an 8.2 percent increased likelihood of believing there is too little spending on halting the rising crime rate, having been born from 1958 to 1970 is associated with a 9.8 percent increased likelihood of believing there is too little spending on halting the rising crime rate, and having been born from 1970 to 1982 is associated with an 7.9 percent increased likelihood of believing there is too little spending on halting the rising crime rate.
What explains this cohort effect, Goldstein asks? The poll data does not provide evidence of a specific cause, but she hypothesizes:What explains this cohort effect, Goldstein asks? The poll data does not provide evidence of a specific cause, but she hypothesizes:
Older Americans lived through and remember the most recent crime wave in the U.S., from the 1960s through the early 1990s, while younger Americans were born either at the tail end of the crime wave or once the crime drop had already begun. The F.B.I.’s UCR data indicate that violent crime rates rose from 161 per 100,000 persons in 1960 to 758 per 100,000 persons in 1991.
Millennials, who oppose additional policing, are “too young to remember this period well,” Goldstein said. In my email exchange with Ansolabehere, he looked at the generational differences from a different vantage point.Millennials, who oppose additional policing, are “too young to remember this period well,” Goldstein said. In my email exchange with Ansolabehere, he looked at the generational differences from a different vantage point.
“There are a lot of people in the streets making noise, but most people are at home and don’t support what’s going on,” Ansolabehere wrote, noting that many older voters are pulled in two directions:“There are a lot of people in the streets making noise, but most people are at home and don’t support what’s going on,” Ansolabehere wrote, noting that many older voters are pulled in two directions:
That line is my summary of the silent majority view. It’s that they want law and order. They actually support more spending on police and they are afraid of backsliding to the crime rates of early 1990s and earlier. In terms of the protests the ones who are staying home are older.
These men and women, Ansolabehere added,These men and women, Ansolabehere added,
aren’t likely to rally behind various proposals to defund the police. They do want the police to behave though, and the bits of survey data I’ve seen suggest high support for body cams, bans on choke holds, and other police reforms.
Goldstein’s finding that age is more important than race in shaping attitudes toward the police provides a partial explanation for the substantial participation of whites in the protests over the killing of Floyd.Goldstein’s finding that age is more important than race in shaping attitudes toward the police provides a partial explanation for the substantial participation of whites in the protests over the killing of Floyd.
Two of my Times colleagues, Amy Harmon and Sabrina Tavernise, reported last week on surveys of protesters in Los Angeles, New York and Washington, D.C. conducted by Dana R. Fisher, a sociologist at the University of Maryland, and Michael T. Heaney, a political scientist at the University of Michigan.Two of my Times colleagues, Amy Harmon and Sabrina Tavernise, reported last week on surveys of protesters in Los Angeles, New York and Washington, D.C. conducted by Dana R. Fisher, a sociologist at the University of Maryland, and Michael T. Heaney, a political scientist at the University of Michigan.
Fisher and Heaney found that whites made up 61 percent of the protesters in New York, 65 percent in Washington D.C., and 53 percent in Los Angeles. The presence of such large numbers of whites in protests over police brutality “is utterly different from anything we’ve seen,” Douglas McAdam, a sociologist at Stanford, told the Times.Fisher and Heaney found that whites made up 61 percent of the protesters in New York, 65 percent in Washington D.C., and 53 percent in Los Angeles. The presence of such large numbers of whites in protests over police brutality “is utterly different from anything we’ve seen,” Douglas McAdam, a sociologist at Stanford, told the Times.
Data revealing the trends toward racial liberalization described above coincide with poll data revealing declining support for Trump and the Republican Party.Data revealing the trends toward racial liberalization described above coincide with poll data revealing declining support for Trump and the Republican Party.
Joe Biden’s lead over Trump has grown from 5.6 points to 8.1 points since Floyd was killed on May 25; Trump’s disapproval rating has risen and his approval level has fallen over the same period; and the Democratic advantage in the generic congressional vote has inched upward.Joe Biden’s lead over Trump has grown from 5.6 points to 8.1 points since Floyd was killed on May 25; Trump’s disapproval rating has risen and his approval level has fallen over the same period; and the Democratic advantage in the generic congressional vote has inched upward.
While a leftward movement among voters, particularly on racial matters, is, at the moment, indisputable, these and other social and cultural issues remain volatile, and Republicans remain undeterred.While a leftward movement among voters, particularly on racial matters, is, at the moment, indisputable, these and other social and cultural issues remain volatile, and Republicans remain undeterred.
David Siders, a national correspondent for Politico, reported on June 15:David Siders, a national correspondent for Politico, reported on June 15:
Interviews with more than 50 state, district and county Republican Party chairs depict a version of the electoral landscape that is no worse for Trump than six months ago — and possibly even slightly better. According to this view, the coronavirus is on its way out and the economy is coming back. Polls are unreliable, Joe Biden is too frail to last, and the media still doesn’t get it.
Siders continued:Siders continued:
From the Eastern Seaboard to the West Coast and the battlegrounds in between, there is an overriding belief that, just as Trump defied political gravity four years ago, there’s no reason he won’t do it again.
Phillip Stephens, a Republican Party chairman in Robeson County, N.C. told Siders, “We’re calling him ‘Teflon Trump.’ Nothing’s going to stick, because if anything, it’s getting more exciting than it was in 2016.” This year, Stephens said, “We’re thinking landslide.”Phillip Stephens, a Republican Party chairman in Robeson County, N.C. told Siders, “We’re calling him ‘Teflon Trump.’ Nothing’s going to stick, because if anything, it’s getting more exciting than it was in 2016.” This year, Stephens said, “We’re thinking landslide.”
Joe Trippi, a Democratic consultant, is thinking landslide too, but not Stephens’s landslide:Joe Trippi, a Democratic consultant, is thinking landslide too, but not Stephens’s landslide:
The more wound up we get on coronavirus and unemployment and race, the more chaos we see. If Trump is chaos and Biden is community, what will the country choose? I think a whole bunch of suburban G.O.P. women, younger G.O.P., business G.O.P. and college educated G.O.P. choose Biden and community. G.O.P. women are exhausted by the chaos.
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