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| Five things you need to know about how the defence strategic review changes Australia’s military priorities | Five things you need to know about how the defence strategic review changes Australia’s military priorities |
| (about 3 hours later) | |
| Review says the ADF is not ‘fully fit for purpose’ and suggests ways to counter new threats in our region | Review says the ADF is not ‘fully fit for purpose’ and suggests ways to counter new threats in our region |
| The Albanese government released the defence strategic review on Monday, promising $19bn of spending to help improve the range and force projection of the Australian defence force to Australia’s north in response to greater major power competition. | The Albanese government released the defence strategic review on Monday, promising $19bn of spending to help improve the range and force projection of the Australian defence force to Australia’s north in response to greater major power competition. |
| 1. The world has changed | 1. The world has changed |
| The review found, and the government agreed, that the ADF is “not fully fit for purpose”. | The review found, and the government agreed, that the ADF is “not fully fit for purpose”. |
| The review said the ADF is aimed to address “radically different” strategic circumstances, particularly that “our alliance partner, the US “is no longer the unipolar leader of the Indo-Pacific”, an obvious reference to the rise of China. | The review said the ADF is aimed to address “radically different” strategic circumstances, particularly that “our alliance partner, the US “is no longer the unipolar leader of the Indo-Pacific”, an obvious reference to the rise of China. |
| “The region has seen the return of major power strategic competition and the intensity of which should be seen as the defining feature of our region and time,” it said, warning that Australia must manage and seek to avoid “the prospect of major conflict in the region that directly threatens our national interest”. | “The region has seen the return of major power strategic competition and the intensity of which should be seen as the defining feature of our region and time,” it said, warning that Australia must manage and seek to avoid “the prospect of major conflict in the region that directly threatens our national interest”. |
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| The review said there is only a “remote possibility of any power contemplating an invasion of our continent” but that “the threat of military force or coercion against Australia does not require invasion.” | The review said there is only a “remote possibility of any power contemplating an invasion of our continent” but that “the threat of military force or coercion against Australia does not require invasion.” |
| It cited threats to trade routes, cyberwarfare, and long range missile strikes as developments that have “radically reduced Australia’s geographic benefits” of the “comfort of distance”. | It cited threats to trade routes, cyberwarfare, and long range missile strikes as developments that have “radically reduced Australia’s geographic benefits” of the “comfort of distance”. |
| 2. National defence v defence of Australia | 2. National defence v defence of Australia |
| In the postwar period the priority has been the defence of Australia doctrine, focused on low-level conflict from small to middle regional powers, which the review said is “no longer suitable”. | In the postwar period the priority has been the defence of Australia doctrine, focused on low-level conflict from small to middle regional powers, which the review said is “no longer suitable”. |
| Instead, the new approach is national defence, which includes preparing for “potential threats rising from major power competition, including the prospect of conflict”. | Instead, the new approach is national defence, which includes preparing for “potential threats rising from major power competition, including the prospect of conflict”. |
| Australia’s defence force will now have five jobs: defending the nation; deterring adversaries through denial, particularly from projecting force against Australia from its northern approaches; protecting our economic connection with the region and the world; collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and maintenance of the international rules based order. | Australia’s defence force will now have five jobs: defending the nation; deterring adversaries through denial, particularly from projecting force against Australia from its northern approaches; protecting our economic connection with the region and the world; collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and maintenance of the international rules based order. |
| 3. More force projection | 3. More force projection |
| The review found that the navy needs “enhanced lethality” – hence the Aukus nuclear-powered submarine acquisition, and a recommendation for a continuous naval shipbuilding program. | The review found that the navy needs “enhanced lethality” – hence the Aukus nuclear-powered submarine acquisition, and a recommendation for a continuous naval shipbuilding program. |
| According to the national defence statement accompanying the review, the army must be “optimised for littoral operations in our northern land and maritime spaces and provide a long-range strike capability”. This includes more long-range firing weapons (Himars) and land-based maritime strike capabilities, with the army’s range for firing projectile munitions to increase from 40km to 300km. | According to the national defence statement accompanying the review, the army must be “optimised for littoral operations in our northern land and maritime spaces and provide a long-range strike capability”. This includes more long-range firing weapons (Himars) and land-based maritime strike capabilities, with the army’s range for firing projectile munitions to increase from 40km to 300km. |
| The review also called for the “rapid establishment of domestic manufacturing” of guided weapons, with options to develop a domestic missile industry to be provided by the second quarter of 2024. The government agreed this is a priority. | The review also called for the “rapid establishment of domestic manufacturing” of guided weapons, with options to develop a domestic missile industry to be provided by the second quarter of 2024. The government agreed this is a priority. |
| 4. Cuts to army to help pay for $19bn of spending | |
| The review recommended that “defence funding should be increased to meet our strategic circumstances.” The total to be spent on implementing the review is $19bn over four years, including the $9bn spent on Aukus submarines. | |
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| There will need to be “difficult decisions and tradeoffs to manage the defence budget over the immediate period”, it said. There are $7.8bn of cuts achieved through “reprioritisation of the integrated investment program”. | There will need to be “difficult decisions and tradeoffs to manage the defence budget over the immediate period”, it said. There are $7.8bn of cuts achieved through “reprioritisation of the integrated investment program”. |
| Guardian Australia understands six defence projects have been cancelled; six delayed; and 21 “rescoped”, including a reduction in land combat vehicles from 450 to 129. The second regiment of army self-propelled howitzers will be cancelled immediately. | Guardian Australia understands six defence projects have been cancelled; six delayed; and 21 “rescoped”, including a reduction in land combat vehicles from 450 to 129. The second regiment of army self-propelled howitzers will be cancelled immediately. |
| There’s also a short and sharp review of the navy’s surface combatant fleet capability in the third quarter of 2023, which could mean cuts to Hunter class frigates. | There’s also a short and sharp review of the navy’s surface combatant fleet capability in the third quarter of 2023, which could mean cuts to Hunter class frigates. |
| 5. The too-hard or not-yet basket | 5. The too-hard or not-yet basket |
| There are 13 recommendations from the review that are agreed only “in principle”. | There are 13 recommendations from the review that are agreed only “in principle”. |
| These included: an east coast facility for the nuclear submarines, the location of which will only be decided “late in this decade”; a fuel council to deliver a resilient national fuel supply; a centralised space domain capability and a trained defence space workforce; and integrating long-range anti-ship missiles on to the F-35A. | These included: an east coast facility for the nuclear submarines, the location of which will only be decided “late in this decade”; a fuel council to deliver a resilient national fuel supply; a centralised space domain capability and a trained defence space workforce; and integrating long-range anti-ship missiles on to the F-35A. |
| Also in this category is the recommendation to work with states and territories to develop “national resilience and response measures for adverse climate change … without the need of ADF support except in the most extreme emergencies”. | Also in this category is the recommendation to work with states and territories to develop “national resilience and response measures for adverse climate change … without the need of ADF support except in the most extreme emergencies”. |
| “Defence should be the force of last resort for domestic aid to the civil community, except in extreme circumstances,” it said. | “Defence should be the force of last resort for domestic aid to the civil community, except in extreme circumstances,” it said. |
| The government acknowledged that the ADF helping with natural disasters “comes at a cost to force preparedness, readiness and combat effectiveness”, promising to work on it with states and say more in 2024. | The government acknowledged that the ADF helping with natural disasters “comes at a cost to force preparedness, readiness and combat effectiveness”, promising to work on it with states and say more in 2024. |