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| Al-Qaeda link to Iraq 'rejected' | |
| (20 minutes later) | |
| The UK investigated claims of links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda but decided they were not "natural allies", the Iraq inquiry has been told. | The UK investigated claims of links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda but decided they were not "natural allies", the Iraq inquiry has been told. |
| Despite "sporadic" contacts between al-Qaeda members and Iraq in the 1990s, there was no "serious collaboration", Foreign Office officials said. | Despite "sporadic" contacts between al-Qaeda members and Iraq in the 1990s, there was no "serious collaboration", Foreign Office officials said. |
| The 9/11 attacks actually drove Iraq and al-Qaeda further apart, they added. | The 9/11 attacks actually drove Iraq and al-Qaeda further apart, they added. |
| In its second day of public hearings, the inquiry is looking into Iraq's weapons capability and UK policy. | In its second day of public hearings, the inquiry is looking into Iraq's weapons capability and UK policy. |
| 'Clear account' | 'Clear account' |
| Inquiry chairman Sir John Chilcot said he was seeking a "clear account" of the government's assessment of the Iraqi threat in the run-up to the 2003 US-led invasion and how that corresponded to what was discovered after the war. | Inquiry chairman Sir John Chilcot said he was seeking a "clear account" of the government's assessment of the Iraqi threat in the run-up to the 2003 US-led invasion and how that corresponded to what was discovered after the war. |
| The reasons for going to war in Iraq - including the now discredited claim that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction which could be used within 45 minutes of an order being given - are a long-standing source of controversy. | The reasons for going to war in Iraq - including the now discredited claim that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction which could be used within 45 minutes of an order being given - are a long-standing source of controversy. |
| Asked about Iraq's involvement with terrorists, Tim Dowse - the Foreign Office's Director of Counter-Proliferation between 2001 and 2003 - said it had supported groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas in the past. | Asked about Iraq's involvement with terrorists, Tim Dowse - the Foreign Office's Director of Counter-Proliferation between 2001 and 2003 - said it had supported groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas in the past. |
| Following the 9/11 attacks and suggestions in the US of a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda, he said the Foreign Office had looked at the matter "very carefully". | Following the 9/11 attacks and suggestions in the US of a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda, he said the Foreign Office had looked at the matter "very carefully". |
| WITNESSES ON WEDNESDAY William Ehrman: Foreign Office's director of international security (2000/02) and director general of defence and intelligence (2002-2004) Tim Dowse: Foreign Office's head of counter-proliferation (2001-2003) Q&A: Iraq war inquiry Analysis: tolerant or critical? How US has investigated Iraq war | WITNESSES ON WEDNESDAY William Ehrman: Foreign Office's director of international security (2000/02) and director general of defence and intelligence (2002-2004) Tim Dowse: Foreign Office's head of counter-proliferation (2001-2003) Q&A: Iraq war inquiry Analysis: tolerant or critical? How US has investigated Iraq war |
| Despite reports that senior members of al-Qaeda had visited Iraq in the late 1990s, it concluded there was "nothing that looked like a relationship between the Iraqis and al-Qaeda". | Despite reports that senior members of al-Qaeda had visited Iraq in the late 1990s, it concluded there was "nothing that looked like a relationship between the Iraqis and al-Qaeda". |
| "After 9/11 we concluded that Iraq had stepped further back and they did not want to be associated with al-Qaeda," he said. "They were not natural allies." | "After 9/11 we concluded that Iraq had stepped further back and they did not want to be associated with al-Qaeda," he said. "They were not natural allies." |
| Sir William Ehrman, the Foreign Office's director general for defence and intelligence between 2002 and 2004, said it had discussed the issue with Washington which had put "more weight" on the claims. | Sir William Ehrman, the Foreign Office's director general for defence and intelligence between 2002 and 2004, said it had discussed the issue with Washington which had put "more weight" on the claims. |
| But he said: "Our view was that there was no evidence to suggest serious collaboration of any sort between Iraq and al-Qaeda." | But he said: "Our view was that there was no evidence to suggest serious collaboration of any sort between Iraq and al-Qaeda." |
| Addressing the overall threat posed by Iraq in 2001, the Foreign Office said it was "not top of its list" of countries causing concern because of their stated desire to develop weapons of mass destruction, ranking below Iran, North Korea and Libya. | Addressing the overall threat posed by Iraq in 2001, the Foreign Office said it was "not top of its list" of countries causing concern because of their stated desire to develop weapons of mass destruction, ranking below Iran, North Korea and Libya. |
| With sanctions in place against Iraq, the Foreign Office believed Saddam Hussein could not build a nuclear weapon and, even if sanctions were removed, it was estimated it would take him five years to do so. | With sanctions in place against Iraq, the Foreign Office believed Saddam Hussein could not build a nuclear weapon and, even if sanctions were removed, it was estimated it would take him five years to do so. |
| 'Unanswered questions' | 'Unanswered questions' |
| As for biological and chemical weapons, Mr Dowse said most evidence suggested Iraq's programme had largely been "destroyed" in 1991. | As for biological and chemical weapons, Mr Dowse said most evidence suggested Iraq's programme had largely been "destroyed" in 1991. |
| However, he said recent intelligence had suggested Iraq was seeking to rebuild its capacity and there were "unanswered questions" about its actual capability since weapons inspectors had been expelled in 1998. | However, he said recent intelligence had suggested Iraq was seeking to rebuild its capacity and there were "unanswered questions" about its actual capability since weapons inspectors had been expelled in 1998. |
| He was black and he had to prove himself white. He did not do so Sir William Ehrman on Saddam Hussein class="" href="/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8378559.stm">Iraq inquiry: Day-by-day timeline | |
| He also said the threat posed by Iraq was viewed as "unique" from other "deliberate proliferators" because it had shown itself willing to use weapons of mass destruction on its own people and its neighbours and was flouting a range of UN disarmament resolutions. | He also said the threat posed by Iraq was viewed as "unique" from other "deliberate proliferators" because it had shown itself willing to use weapons of mass destruction on its own people and its neighbours and was flouting a range of UN disarmament resolutions. |
| Turning to the months leading up to the war, Sir William said Saddam Hussein failed to comply with "two key tests" in UN Security Resolution 1441, requiring him to provide a "full declaration" of Iraq's weapons capacity and to fully co-operate with UN weapons inspectors. | Turning to the months leading up to the war, Sir William said Saddam Hussein failed to comply with "two key tests" in UN Security Resolution 1441, requiring him to provide a "full declaration" of Iraq's weapons capacity and to fully co-operate with UN weapons inspectors. |
| "He [Saddam Hussein] was black and he had to prove himself white. He did not do so." | "He [Saddam Hussein] was black and he had to prove himself white. He did not do so." |
| Veto denial | Veto denial |
| If Iraq had met these tests, Mr Dowse suggested, the UK government might have taken a "different" view on what to do about Iraq. | If Iraq had met these tests, Mr Dowse suggested, the UK government might have taken a "different" view on what to do about Iraq. |
| Giving inspectors more time to do their work - as called for by France and Russia - may have helped "diplomatically and politically", he said. | Giving inspectors more time to do their work - as called for by France and Russia - may have helped "diplomatically and politically", he said. |
| But he said this would not have made any difference to the ultimate outcome without full Iraqi co-operation, which was not forthcoming. | But he said this would not have made any difference to the ultimate outcome without full Iraqi co-operation, which was not forthcoming. |
| The stated aim of the early hearings is to look at a "wide range" of factors leading up to war, including intelligence and diplomacy. | The stated aim of the early hearings is to look at a "wide range" of factors leading up to war, including intelligence and diplomacy. |
| The inquiry, looking at the whole period from 2001 to 2009, was set up by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who also chose the panel. | The inquiry, looking at the whole period from 2001 to 2009, was set up by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who also chose the panel. |
| Mr Brown and predecessor Tony Blair are expected to be among future witnesses, with the inquiry not expected to report its full findings until the end of 2010 or early 2011. | Mr Brown and predecessor Tony Blair are expected to be among future witnesses, with the inquiry not expected to report its full findings until the end of 2010 or early 2011. |
| On Wednesday, the prime minister rejected claims by Lib Dem leader Nick Clegg that government departments would be able to veto parts of the final report. | On Wednesday, the prime minister rejected claims by Lib Dem leader Nick Clegg that government departments would be able to veto parts of the final report. |
| Previously, the Butler inquiry looked at intelligence failures before the war, while the Hutton inquiry examined the circumstances leading to the death of former government adviser David Kelly. | Previously, the Butler inquiry looked at intelligence failures before the war, while the Hutton inquiry examined the circumstances leading to the death of former government adviser David Kelly. |