This article is from the source 'bbc' and was first published or seen on . It will not be checked again for changes.
You can find the current article at its original source at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/rss/-/1/hi/uk_politics/8382194.stm
The article has changed 19 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.
| Version 13 | Version 14 |
|---|---|
| Iraq war 'legitimacy' questioned | Iraq war 'legitimacy' questioned |
| (about 1 hour later) | |
| The Iraq war was of "questionable legitimacy" even though it is unlikely to be ever proved illegal, a former senior diplomat has said. | The Iraq war was of "questionable legitimacy" even though it is unlikely to be ever proved illegal, a former senior diplomat has said. |
| Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the UK's ambassador to the UN in 2003, said the invasion did not have the backing of most UN members or even the UK public. | Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the UK's ambassador to the UN in 2003, said the invasion did not have the backing of most UN members or even the UK public. |
| But he said he believed the US and UK had "established" its legality in that it had never been challenged in court. | But he said he believed the US and UK had "established" its legality in that it had never been challenged in court. |
| The inquiry is looking into the background to the 2003 invasion. | The inquiry is looking into the background to the 2003 invasion. |
| Inquiry members, headed by Sir John Chilcot, are initially concentrating on UK-US relations in the run-up to war and the UK's assessment of Iraq's military threat. | Inquiry members, headed by Sir John Chilcot, are initially concentrating on UK-US relations in the run-up to war and the UK's assessment of Iraq's military threat. |
| Legality | Legality |
| Sir Jeremy, the UK's permanent representative to the UN between 1997 and 2003, was centre stage in UK-led efforts to negotiate a second UN resolution in early 2003, seen by many countries as necessary to directly authorise military action. | Sir Jeremy, the UK's permanent representative to the UN between 1997 and 2003, was centre stage in UK-led efforts to negotiate a second UN resolution in early 2003, seen by many countries as necessary to directly authorise military action. |
| The move was vetoed by France and Russia, leading critics to claim the subsequent invasion was illegal. | The move was vetoed by France and Russia, leading critics to claim the subsequent invasion was illegal. |
| If you do something internationally that the majority of UN member states think is wrong, illegitimate or politically unjustifiable, you are taking a risk in my view Sir Jeremy Greenstock class="" href="/2/hi/uk_news/8383168.stm">Analysis: Chilcot week one | |
| Sir Jeremy said he believed existing UN resolutions provided "sufficient legal cover" for future action but only if Iraq was found to be in breach of its disarmament obligations. | Sir Jeremy said he believed existing UN resolutions provided "sufficient legal cover" for future action but only if Iraq was found to be in breach of its disarmament obligations. |
| Asked about the legality of the war, he said there were different opinions and that a "final and conclusive" verdict was never likely to be made. | Asked about the legality of the war, he said there were different opinions and that a "final and conclusive" verdict was never likely to be made. |
| But he added: "If you do something internationally that the majority of UN member states think is wrong, illegitimate or politically unjustifiable, you are taking a risk in my view." | But he added: "If you do something internationally that the majority of UN member states think is wrong, illegitimate or politically unjustifiable, you are taking a risk in my view." |
| "I regarded our participation in the military action against Iraq in March 2003 as legal but of questionable legitimacy in that it did not have the democratically observable backing of a great majority of member states or even perhaps of a majority of people inside the UK. | "I regarded our participation in the military action against Iraq in March 2003 as legal but of questionable legitimacy in that it did not have the democratically observable backing of a great majority of member states or even perhaps of a majority of people inside the UK. |
| "There was a failure to establish legitimacy although I think we successfully established legality in the UN....to the degree, at least, that we were never challenged in the UN or International Court of Justice for those actions." | "There was a failure to establish legitimacy although I think we successfully established legality in the UN....to the degree, at least, that we were never challenged in the UN or International Court of Justice for those actions." |
| 'Grounds for war' | 'Grounds for war' |
| Sir Jeremy also said he believed war may "possibly" have been averted if the weapons inspectors had been given more time. | Sir Jeremy also said he believed war may "possibly" have been averted if the weapons inspectors had been given more time. |
| INQUIRY TIMELINE November-December: Former top civil servants, spy chiefs, diplomats and military commanders to give evidenceJanuary-February 2010: Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and other politicians expected to appear before the panel March 2010: Inquiry expected to adjourn ahead of the general election campaignJuly-August 2010: Inquiry expected to resumeReport set to be published in late 2010 or early 2011 Iraq inquiry: Day-by-day timeline Q&A: Iraq war inquiry | INQUIRY TIMELINE November-December: Former top civil servants, spy chiefs, diplomats and military commanders to give evidenceJanuary-February 2010: Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and other politicians expected to appear before the panel March 2010: Inquiry expected to adjourn ahead of the general election campaignJuly-August 2010: Inquiry expected to resumeReport set to be published in late 2010 or early 2011 Iraq inquiry: Day-by-day timeline Q&A: Iraq war inquiry |
| However, he said he still felt that Iraq had been concealing some illegal materials or programmes: "I still believe there is something there but it is a question of what that something is." | However, he said he still felt that Iraq had been concealing some illegal materials or programmes: "I still believe there is something there but it is a question of what that something is." |
| On its fourth day of public hearings, the inquiry examined failed efforts to resolve the Iraq crisis through the United Nations. | On its fourth day of public hearings, the inquiry examined failed efforts to resolve the Iraq crisis through the United Nations. |
| Sir Jeremy said Iraq's representative at the UN told him in September 2002 that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction but the UK government was not in a position to ascertain whether this was true. | Sir Jeremy said Iraq's representative at the UN told him in September 2002 that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction but the UK government was not in a position to ascertain whether this was true. |
| He said the "whole saga", in terms of UK policy, was driven by the belief that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and any talk from the US of other motivations for war, such as regime change, were "unhelpful". | He said the "whole saga", in terms of UK policy, was driven by the belief that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and any talk from the US of other motivations for war, such as regime change, were "unhelpful". |
| Sir Jeremy Greenstock said UK focus was on "weapons of mass destruction and nothing else" | Sir Jeremy Greenstock said UK focus was on "weapons of mass destruction and nothing else" |
| The failure to secure a second UN resolution had been damaging in terms of public perceptions of the reasons for going to war. | The failure to secure a second UN resolution had been damaging in terms of public perceptions of the reasons for going to war. |
| "What we were left with by the failure of diplomacy was the US set of reasons for going to war with Iraq not the British ones." | "What we were left with by the failure of diplomacy was the US set of reasons for going to war with Iraq not the British ones." |
| Throughout the process the UK government believed confronting Iraq was in the national interest, he said, but felt this should be done through "collective action" and on the basis of UN resolutions. | Throughout the process the UK government believed confronting Iraq was in the national interest, he said, but felt this should be done through "collective action" and on the basis of UN resolutions. |
| He said he did not "recall" being consulted about an alleged change in the UK's approach to Iraq in April 2002, the point when critics of the war say that Tony Blair signed up to military action. | He said he did not "recall" being consulted about an alleged change in the UK's approach to Iraq in April 2002, the point when critics of the war say that Tony Blair signed up to military action. |
| But, by early 2003, it was clear the UK had given a "commitment" that should the US go to war, the UK would fight alongside it. | But, by early 2003, it was clear the UK had given a "commitment" that should the US go to war, the UK would fight alongside it. |
| Second resolution | Second resolution |
| Weapons inspectors returned to Iraq in early 2003 after the UN Security Council passed resolution 1441 the previous November. | Weapons inspectors returned to Iraq in early 2003 after the UN Security Council passed resolution 1441 the previous November. |
| This gave Saddam Hussein a "final opportunity" to declare his weapons stockpile and co-operate with inspectors or face serious consequences. | This gave Saddam Hussein a "final opportunity" to declare his weapons stockpile and co-operate with inspectors or face serious consequences. |
| WITNESSES ON FRIDAY Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK Permanent Representative to the UN 1997-2003 Analysis: tolerant or critical? How US has investigated Iraq war Send us your comments | WITNESSES ON FRIDAY Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK Permanent Representative to the UN 1997-2003 Analysis: tolerant or critical? How US has investigated Iraq war Send us your comments |
| Asked about the UK's objective in seeking a further UN resolution, Sir Jeremy said one of the reasons was to try and obtain "the safest possible legal grounds for use of force should that be necessary". | Asked about the UK's objective in seeking a further UN resolution, Sir Jeremy said one of the reasons was to try and obtain "the safest possible legal grounds for use of force should that be necessary". |
| Although the US felt it did not need a further resolution to justify military action it realised that the UK, as its main ally, would benefit from this, explained the former ambassador. | Although the US felt it did not need a further resolution to justify military action it realised that the UK, as its main ally, would benefit from this, explained the former ambassador. |
| Sir Jeremy was also deputy of the heavily criticised Coalition Provisional Authority, which ran Iraq in the months after the war, but will be questioned about post-war planning at a later date in the inquiry. | Sir Jeremy was also deputy of the heavily criticised Coalition Provisional Authority, which ran Iraq in the months after the war, but will be questioned about post-war planning at a later date in the inquiry. |
| The Iraq inquiry, set up by Prime Minister Gordon Brown in July, is due to report by the end of 2010. | The Iraq inquiry, set up by Prime Minister Gordon Brown in July, is due to report by the end of 2010. |
| Mr Brown and his predecessor Tony Blair are expected to be among future witnesses along with former senior advisers and military figures. | Mr Brown and his predecessor Tony Blair are expected to be among future witnesses along with former senior advisers and military figures. |