This article is from the source 'bbc' and was first published or seen on . It will not be checked again for changes.
You can find the current article at its original source at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/rss/-/1/hi/uk_politics/8392344.stm
The article has changed 7 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.
| Version 2 | Version 3 |
|---|---|
| US 'assumed' UK war involvement | US 'assumed' UK war involvement |
| (28 minutes later) | |
| The US believed the UK would take part in the Iraq invasion even if there were no efforts to solve the crisis via the UN, the Chilcot inquiry has been told. | The US believed the UK would take part in the Iraq invasion even if there were no efforts to solve the crisis via the UN, the Chilcot inquiry has been told. |
| Ex-defence chief Lord Boyce said the US assumed in September 2002 the UK would provide the maximum troops available. | Ex-defence chief Lord Boyce said the US assumed in September 2002 the UK would provide the maximum troops available. |
| "No matter how many times" senior US officers were told UN efforts were necessary for UK involvement "there was a complete reluctance to believe it." | "No matter how many times" senior US officers were told UN efforts were necessary for UK involvement "there was a complete reluctance to believe it." |
| Their attitude, he told the hearing, was "you have got to say that". | Their attitude, he told the hearing, was "you have got to say that". |
| 'Exploring options' | 'Exploring options' |
| The inquiry has been looking into when military preparations for the invasion began and whether they made a diplomatic solution less likely. | The inquiry has been looking into when military preparations for the invasion began and whether they made a diplomatic solution less likely. |
| Lord Boyce, the head of the armed forces in the run-up to the war, said UK officials began to "explore options" in the summer of 2002 about contributing to an invasion of Iraq. | Lord Boyce, the head of the armed forces in the run-up to the war, said UK officials began to "explore options" in the summer of 2002 about contributing to an invasion of Iraq. |
| Participation was limited to a "small group" of military staff at the Ministry of Defence, he said. | Participation was limited to a "small group" of military staff at the Ministry of Defence, he said. |
| Discussions focused on the scale of the UK's possible contribution, ranging from a small-scale effort - such as providing special forces - to a large-scale division-sized commitment. | Discussions focused on the scale of the UK's possible contribution, ranging from a small-scale effort - such as providing special forces - to a large-scale division-sized commitment. |
| Lord Boyce said US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld always believed that the UK would stand shoulder to shoulder with the US. | |
| "There was a huge reluctance by the US throughout from July 2002 through to March 17 2003 to believe that we were not going to commit our forces unless we had been fully through the UN process and through Parliament as well. | "There was a huge reluctance by the US throughout from July 2002 through to March 17 2003 to believe that we were not going to commit our forces unless we had been fully through the UN process and through Parliament as well. |
| "No matter how many times you said to senior US officers... there was a complete reluctance to believe that. There was a case that 'you have got to say that but actually come the day you will be there. That was the attitude'." | "No matter how many times you said to senior US officers... there was a complete reluctance to believe that. There was a case that 'you have got to say that but actually come the day you will be there. That was the attitude'." |
| Asked why the US "assumed" that the UK would provide the maximum troops requested, he added: "You will have to ask them that." | Asked why the US "assumed" that the UK would provide the maximum troops requested, he added: "You will have to ask them that." |
| 'Caution' | 'Caution' |
| As contingency planning intensified in the autumn of 2002, he said he was prevented from discussing a logistical build-up because it would send out the "wrong signals" as the UK tried to get the UN to back a resolution calling on Saddam Hussein to disarm. | As contingency planning intensified in the autumn of 2002, he said he was prevented from discussing a logistical build-up because it would send out the "wrong signals" as the UK tried to get the UN to back a resolution calling on Saddam Hussein to disarm. |
| Ultimately, the UK had to tell the US that it would not be able to provide the maximum number of troops for possible military action in January 2003 as this would not be "physically possible" given the time limits. | Ultimately, the UK had to tell the US that it would not be able to provide the maximum number of troops for possible military action in January 2003 as this would not be "physically possible" given the time limits. |
| The London inquiry, in its second week, also heard from the then senior civil servant at the Ministry of Defence that the UK faced a "dilemma" as planning for possible military action increased in 2002. | The London inquiry, in its second week, also heard from the then senior civil servant at the Ministry of Defence that the UK faced a "dilemma" as planning for possible military action increased in 2002. |
| Sir Kevin Tebbit said the UK was "cautious" in its approach to military planning and possible timescales because its policy was to go down the UN route to try and force Saddam Hussein to disarm. | Sir Kevin Tebbit said the UK was "cautious" in its approach to military planning and possible timescales because its policy was to go down the UN route to try and force Saddam Hussein to disarm. |
| He denied that military preparations hindered the diplomatic process, saying that options had to be drawn up because of the length of time needed to prepare for potential military action. | He denied that military preparations hindered the diplomatic process, saying that options had to be drawn up because of the length of time needed to prepare for potential military action. |
| "There was not a military pressure building up for this to happen. That was never the case," he said. | "There was not a military pressure building up for this to happen. That was never the case," he said. |
| However, Sir Kevin said the UK could not "stand aside" from issues of planning if it wanted to "influence events" both for a potential invasion and its aftermath. | However, Sir Kevin said the UK could not "stand aside" from issues of planning if it wanted to "influence events" both for a potential invasion and its aftermath. |
| The Iraq inquiry is questioning senior military figures for the first time as it examines war planning. | The Iraq inquiry is questioning senior military figures for the first time as it examines war planning. |