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Spy chief facing WMD questioning No Iraq 'manipulation' - spy boss
(about 2 hours later)
Spy chief Sir John Scarlett is being questioned about intelligence on Iraq after claims a taxi driver was the source for the most infamous claim. Spy chief Sir John Scarlett has said there was "no conscious intention" to manipulate information about Iraq's weapons in the run-up to the war.
The man who drew up the September 2002 dossier, which said Iraq could deploy weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes, is facing the Chilcot inquiry. Sir John told the Iraq inquiry he did not come under pressure to firm up the September 2002 dossier, containing a claim Iraq could use WMD in 45 minutes.
His appearance came after Tory MP Adam Holloway said advice casting doubt on the 45-minute claim was "ignored". But he said it would have been "better" if it stated this concerned battlefield munitions not long-range missiles.
The inquiry chairman said it would deal with the MP's claim where "relevant". An MP has claimed the 45-minute claim originated from an Iraqi taxi driver.
However, Sir John Chilcot said it was not specifically a "matter" for Tuesday's inquiry hearing. Tory MP Adam Holloway published a report on Tuesday saying advice casting doubt on the 45-minute claim was "ignored", but Sir John was not asked about this.
Sir John Chilcot said the former chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) would be asked whether the intelligence community was asking and providing answers to "crucial questions" about the threat from Iraq before and during the conflict. Appearing before the Chilcot inquiry, the man who drew up the September 2002 dossier, which said Iraq could deploy weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes, said it was produced in good faith.
Ministers withdrew the 45-minute claim after the war but said they acted in good faith. "There was absolutely no conscious intention to manipulate the language or to obsfuscate or to create any misunderstanding on what this might refer to," he said.
Intelligence
Ministers withdrew the 45-minute claim after the war but said they acted in good faith in accepting it being included in the dossier.
It was at the heart of the row between the government and the BBC which culminated in the death of government weapons expert Dr David Kelly.It was at the heart of the row between the government and the BBC which culminated in the death of government weapons expert Dr David Kelly.
Sir John, who until recently was head of MI6, was chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee in September 2002 when it produced the controversial dossier spelling out the case for military action against Iraq.
Sir John defended the dossier but said it should have stated the 45-minute claim referred to battlefield munitions not ballistic missiles to avoid the information "getting lost in translation".
He also said he had limited involvement in a foreword to the dossier written by Tony Blair, which said it proved "beyond doubt" that Saddam continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.
He described it as an "overtly political" piece which carried the prime minister's name.
Giving evidence, he told the inquiry that, on 19 March - the day before the invasion - the Joint Intelligence Committee discussed intelligence suggesting Iraq had disassembled its chemical weapons capability and might find it "difficult" to reconstitute it.
However, he said this was not new information and the committee did not revise its view that Iraq did possess chemical and biological weapons and had the capacity to use them in battlefield munitions.
He said that the prime minister and other ministers were informed of its conclusions.
Discussing the reliability of intelligence, he said the nature of Iraqi society - where policy revolved around the "whims and personality" of Saddam Hussein - meant it was difficult to produce intelligence, particular about secretive weapons programmes, he said.
He said all intelligence sources, particularly those from opposition and exile groups, were treated with "caution".
He said "significant" assessments in August and September 2002 suggested Saddam was accelerating both his biological and chemical weapons programmes and had "intent" to use them if attacked - reports that continued to influence JIC thinking in the run-up to war.
'Political wind''Political wind'
Sir John, who until recently was head of MI6, was chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee in September 2002 when it produced the controversial dossier spelling out the intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the case for military action against Iraq. Ahead of Sir John's appearance a Commons Defence Committee member, Tory MP Adam Holloway claimed military advice was matched to the "prevailing political wind" in the run-up to the invasion.
Sir John is expected to go over much of the same ground as in his appearance before the Hutton Inquiry in 2003 - although he stood by the 45-minute claim at that time.
He told the inquiry that Iraq was a "top priority" for the intelligence body throughout 2002 and early 2003.
As well as producing regular reports on Iraq's suspected WMD programme, he said the JIC also produced analysis of other issues such as how stable Saddam Hussein's regime was and how he would react as international pressure was ratcheted up.
Although he acknowledged some of the intelligence available on these subjects was "limited", he defended the work of the JIC as "wide-ranging and well chosen".
A Commons Defence Committee member, Mr Holloway claims military advice was matched to the "prevailing political wind" in the run-up to the invasion.
Despite this glaring factual inaccuracy... the report was characterised as reliable Adam Holloway MP Timeline: The 45-minute claim At-a-glance: Butler report
Mr Holloway, the MP for Gravesham and a former officer in the Grenadier Guards, published his paper The Failure of British Political and Military Leadership through First Defence, the centre-right think-tank he chairs.Mr Holloway, the MP for Gravesham and a former officer in the Grenadier Guards, published his paper The Failure of British Political and Military Leadership through First Defence, the centre-right think-tank he chairs.
In it, he said the claim that Saddam could launch weapons of mass destruction in 45-minutes arose as British intelligence were "squeezing" agents in Iraq for information, under pressure from Downing Street to back up its case that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.In it, he said the claim that Saddam could launch weapons of mass destruction in 45-minutes arose as British intelligence were "squeezing" agents in Iraq for information, under pressure from Downing Street to back up its case that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.
Despite this glaring factual inaccuracy... the report was characterised as reliable Adam Holloway MP Timeline: The 45-minute claim At-a-glance: Butler report
"The provenance of this information was never questioned in detail until after the Iraq invasion, when it became apparent that something was wrong," he said."The provenance of this information was never questioned in detail until after the Iraq invasion, when it became apparent that something was wrong," he said.
"In the end it turned out that the information was not credible, it had originated from an emigre taxi driver on the Iraqi-Jordanian border, who had remembered an overheard conversation in the back of his cab a full two years earlier.""In the end it turned out that the information was not credible, it had originated from an emigre taxi driver on the Iraqi-Jordanian border, who had remembered an overheard conversation in the back of his cab a full two years earlier."
Mr Holloway stated that an intelligence analyst had at the time flagged up - via a footnote - that the claims were "demonstrably untrue".Mr Holloway stated that an intelligence analyst had at the time flagged up - via a footnote - that the claims were "demonstrably untrue".
"Despite this glaring factual inaccuracy... the report was characterised as reliable," he said."Despite this glaring factual inaccuracy... the report was characterised as reliable," he said.
The claim then formed one of the main planks of the September 2002 dossier stating the case for the war, Mr Holloway added. The claim then formed one of the main planks of the September 2002 dossier stating the case for the war, Mr Holloway added. The government has yet to respond to his claims.
The inquiry chairman said it would deal with the MP's claim where "relevant" in the inquiry but it was not specifically a "matter" for Tuesday's inquiry hearing.
'Caveats removed''Caveats removed'
The government has yet to respond to his claims. The row between the BBC and the government came after a report suggesting the dossier had been "sexed up" by Downing Street against the wishes of the intelligence services and that the 45-minute claim was included even though the government "probably knew" it was wrong.
Lord Butler's inquiry into intelligence about Iraq's weapons capability later found it had come "third-hand", through an established source and a second link in the reporting chain from the original Iraqi military source. The Hutton Inquiry into the death of the BBC's source - Dr David Kelly - ruled that the BBC report's claims were "unfounded" because the 45 minute claim, was based on a report which the Secret Intelligence Service "regarded as reliable".
MI6 had later cast doubts over the reliability of the middle link, the inquiry found in 2004. It was not until the following year's Butler inquiry into intelligence about Iraq's weapons capability in 2004 that it emerged that the 45-minute claim had come "third-hand", through an established source and a second link in the reporting chain from the original Iraqi military source.
Lord Butler concluded the limitations of the intelligence were not "made sufficiently clear", that important caveats had been removed and that the 45 minutes claim was "unsubstantiated" and should not have been included without clarification.Lord Butler concluded the limitations of the intelligence were not "made sufficiently clear", that important caveats had been removed and that the 45 minutes claim was "unsubstantiated" and should not have been included without clarification.
Mr Holloway claims to have information from intelligence officers that there was "no appetite" in government for information contravening the case for war and that, as a consequence, civil servants ignored it in the interests of their careers. The then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw told MPs that MI6 had withdrawn the claim in October 2004.
Mr Holloway claims this is indicative of a culture of senior defence officials and military officers glossing over problems to toe the government line.