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Army chief blames Iraq 'amateurs' | Army chief blames Iraq 'amateurs' |
(about 2 hours later) | |
A senior official has told the inquiry into the Iraq war that "amateurs" who did not have the experience to perform were put into key roles in the country. | A senior official has told the inquiry into the Iraq war that "amateurs" who did not have the experience to perform were put into key roles in the country. |
Lt Gen Frederick Viggers, Britain's senior military representative in Iraq, said lives had been lost as a result. | Lt Gen Frederick Viggers, Britain's senior military representative in Iraq, said lives had been lost as a result. |
He said senior officials, including ministers, needed more training to deal with the complexities involved in mounting an invasion. | He said senior officials, including ministers, needed more training to deal with the complexities involved in mounting an invasion. |
The inquiry is examining UK policy towards Iraq between 2001 and 2009. | The inquiry is examining UK policy towards Iraq between 2001 and 2009. |
The first few weeks have focused on policy in the run-up to the war, the UK's assessment of Iraq's weapons capacity, military preparations for the invasion and post-war planning. | The first few weeks have focused on policy in the run-up to the war, the UK's assessment of Iraq's weapons capacity, military preparations for the invasion and post-war planning. |
'Huge responsibility' | 'Huge responsibility' |
Lt Gen Viggers said the operation had suffered from a lack of direction and a clear idea of what would be faced from the beginning. | |
"It was rather like going to the theatre and seeing one sort of play and realising you were watching a tragedy as the curtains came back," he said. | |
INQUIRY TIMELINE November and December 2009: Former top civil servants, spy chiefs, diplomats and military commanders give evidenceJanuary and February 2010: Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and other politicians expected to appear before the panel March 2010: Inquiry expected to adjourn ahead of the general election campaignJuly and August 2010: Inquiry expected to resumeLate 2010 or early 2011: Report set to be published Iraq inquiry: Day-by-day timeline Q&A: Iraq war inquiry | INQUIRY TIMELINE November and December 2009: Former top civil servants, spy chiefs, diplomats and military commanders give evidenceJanuary and February 2010: Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and other politicians expected to appear before the panel March 2010: Inquiry expected to adjourn ahead of the general election campaignJuly and August 2010: Inquiry expected to resumeLate 2010 or early 2011: Report set to be published Iraq inquiry: Day-by-day timeline Q&A: Iraq war inquiry |
He said lessons from Iraq were not being applied in Afghanistan. | |
"We've got huge experience in this country - we're not using it and we're putting amateurs into really really important positions and people are getting killed as a result of some of these decisions," he told the inquiry. | "We've got huge experience in this country - we're not using it and we're putting amateurs into really really important positions and people are getting killed as a result of some of these decisions," he told the inquiry. |
"It's a huge responsibility and I just don't sense we're living up to it." | "It's a huge responsibility and I just don't sense we're living up to it." |
Without naming individuals, he said he blamed those at the highest levels of government. | |
"I am not talking about the soldiers and commanders and civilians... who did a great job. But it's the intellectual horsepower that drives these things [which] needs better co-ordination," he said. | "I am not talking about the soldiers and commanders and civilians... who did a great job. But it's the intellectual horsepower that drives these things [which] needs better co-ordination," he said. |
'Immutable decision' | |
Later, the commission heard that decisions on medium and long-term strategy had been imposed on regional commanders without consultation. | |
There was a terrific argument about this but actually there was no point in us discussing it as it already been discussed in Washington and was immutable Hilary Synnott, CPA regional co-ordinator | |
Hilary Synnott, the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) regional co-ordinator for Southern Iraq from July 2003 until January 2004, described the moment a long-term plan for the governance of Iraq had been revealed. | |
"It caused an explosion among American commanders," he said. | |
"This was a long-term plan going up to the end of 2005. | |
"It was deeply flawed. | |
"There was a terrific argument about this, but actually there was no point in us discussing it, as it had already been discussed in Washington and was immutable." | |
He said when they had later been told that the CPA was to be wound up it had come as a "total surprise". | |
"The decision was made in Washington," he said. | |
"The assumption at the time among us was that the decision was greatly coloured by the imminence of the mid-term elections. | |
"The CPA was not winning, best to hand over responsibility for Iraqis and to cease to be responsible for Iraqi sovereignty. | |
"That's how it came to pass". |